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Why are Scenarios Relevant 
for Cooperation Research?
Dirk Messner
The world can be characterized by dynamics of acceleration. 
The African population will double during the next three 
decades; global urban infrastructures will double by 2050; to 
stay below the 2 °C guardrail and to avoid dangerous climate 
change, emissions need to peak by 2020 and be reduced to 
zero by 2050; digitalization has the potential to substitute 
for a large percentage of currently existing jobs during the 
next two to three decades. The decisions of states, firms and 
political actors during the next one or two decades will create 
very long-term path dependencies in the emerging global 
society. Shaping globalization has, therefore, an important 
time dimension. Acceleration, path dependencies and very 
long-term impacts of current decisions need to be taken into 
account in Global Cooperation Research.
The Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation 
Research therefore brought together scenario experts, 
integrated assessment scholars and science fiction authors – 
people who concentrate on what the futures of our 
societies might look like – with global cooperation researchers. 
All of them agreed that shaping the future, organizing 
transformation processes towards sustainability and 
investing in global cooperation to make globalization work for 
all means building on new narratives about possible futures. 
Narratives are about imagination, creativity, innovation, 
diversity. Without transformative narratives, we cannot 
go beyond incremental changes. At the same time, new 
joint narratives and we-identities, emerging in transnational 
networks, are cornerstones of global cooperation and of 
global intentionalities, which create the preconditions for 
transnational problem-solving.
Can we observe progress in this regard? Are transnational 
futures emerging? Are transnational narratives about 
cooperative global orders on the rise? Do they converge or 
diverge? Or are right-wing populist movements signalling 
exactly the opposite: instead of transnational narratives 
driving our societies, are nationalistic backlashes and ‘Our 
Country First’ perspectives undermining global cooperation? 
We are in a transition period. The next two decades are 
decisive for the development of global cooperation in the 21st 
century. This Global Dialogues publication builds important 
bridges between scholars from very different disciplines 
which can help us to merge the knowledge of future scenario 
thinkers and pioneers of global cooperation research.
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Future Scenarios of  
Global Cooperation –  
Practices and Challenges
Nora Dahlhaus and  
Daniela Weißkopf
The world is changing rapidly. Political, economic, social and 
environmental disruptions are leading to growing insecurity 
within states and societies around the world about what 
the future might bring. In the European Union, the political 
uncertainty which became painfully visible through the 
Brexit referendum in 2016 has shaken the confidence of many 
Europeans in a construct which they had previously taken 
for granted. In this and similar contexts, scenario building 
has become a popular instrument to deal with uncertainties 
and prepare for possible future realities. Scenarios are 
an important instrument to foster future strategies for 
international cooperation and to prevent crisis dynamics. 
By illustrating the different ways in which current global 
challenges might develop in the future, they urge the 
international community to consider the long-term effects of 
the decisions policy-makers take today. This Global Dialogue 
depicts the progress in the field of scenario building as well as 
the possibilities, problems and pitfalls that come along with it. 
With the explanation of techniques and examples, the reader 
will be able to understand the theoretical and practical use of 
scenarios, as well as their shortcomings and failures.
With regard to the growing European uncertainty, one of 
the major influencing factors was the increasing number of 
refugees in Europe since 2014, which strained the European 
bond of solidarity and empowered right-wing movements – 
a phenomenon previously assumed, perhaps optimistically, 
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to have been consigned to history. It also led to the insight 
that insecurity, war, political and economic instability 
in certain regions and global inequality will increase the 
movement of people around the world. Here, scenarios on 
possible movements of refugees and migrants in the future 
are already leading to changes in policies today. In Germany, 
for example, the term Fluchtursachenbekämpfung (combating 
the causes of migration and flight) has become a key word for 
development and security policy. 
Scenarios on climate change, on the other hand, show that 
developing countries in the Global South will be hit hardest 
by this phenomenon. Global warming and desertification, 
storms and rising sea levels can no longer be regarded as 
challenges for the future: they are happening now. As a result, 
the fear of a worsening situation, the growing probability of 
food shortages, negative economic implications, conflicts and 
the loss of living space are triggering migration movements 
and insecurity within these regions. At the same time, the 
countries and regions most affected have contributed to 
least to global emissions and due to their often unstable 
economic and financial situation are less able to adapt to 
climate change. Their dependency on the policies adopted by 
the major emitting countries became even more visible with 
the election of Donald Trump in the US and his intention to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement – a decision that makes 
the future even less predictable. 
To tackle the predicted impacts, climate scenarios need to be 
considered in all the various policy fields. Scenarios produced 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
and other climate research institutes have helped to raise 
awareness of the urgent need for international cooperation 
to solve global challenges at all levels, as the implementation 
of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) show. We can already see where parts of these 
agreements are being translated into national policies and 
how they affect our own lives. 
Models of the likely impacts of climate change on coral reefs 
and other ecosystems but also on tourism and the fishing 
industry have influenced national policies. This shows clearly 
that scenarios can be used to build a bridge between existing 
knowledge on the most likely future developments and 
practical policies and can thus have a bearing on our everyday 
lives. Tourism is one example. Warming seawater, rising sea 
levels, more frequent storms and the absence of snow in 
skiing regions are just some of the visible climate effects 
which influence and are influenced by tourism. If, for example, 
corals die because the seawater becomes too warm, this has 
major adverse consequences not only for the ecosystem but 
also for the tourism industry in the country concerned. On the 
other hand, tourism itself has an impact on climate change 
because it increases greenhouse gas emissions. Recognizing 
this linkage, several UN agencies and the Government of 
Tunisia held the First International Conference on Climate 
Change and Tourism in Djerba, Tunisia, in 2003. Related to the 
outcome of the conference, UNEP, the University of Oxford, 
the World Tourism Organization and the World Meteorological 
Organization published a document on ‘Climate Change 
Adaptation and Mitigation in the Tourism Sector: Frameworks, 
Tools and Practices’ which explained that: 
The conference aimed to develop awareness 
among government administrations, the tourism 
industry and other tourism stakeholders, 
highlighting both current, and anticipated 
climate change impacts affecting tourism 
destinations and the need to carefully consider 
the consequences of climate change mitigation 
policies on tourism as well as the responsibility 
of the tourism sector to be a part of the solution 
by reducing its greenhouse gas emissions.1
An interesting example of how climate change, nature 
conservation and tourism are interrelated can be seen in 
Australia, a country which is widely known for its unique nature 
and especially the Great Barrier Reef – a World Heritage Area 
the size of Italy. The Australian Government has identified 
various severe impacts of climate change on this important 
marine ecosystem. By the early 2000s, coral bleaching – 
a process which is caused by warming seawater and impacts 
the algae that provide the corals with energy, resulting in 
coral death – had affected over 50% of the reefs.2 In 2016 
and 2017, coral bleaching was observed for the first time in 
two consecutive years. In 2016, one fifth of the reef’s coral 
was already dead and the ongoing heat in 2017 has given it no 
time to recover.3 While this development is caused by climate 
change in general and is therefore dependent on international 
climate protection policies, the Australian Government 
accepted its responsibility to enhance the resilience of the 
reef.4 For this purpose, the reef is segmented into zones 
within which different activities are permitted. Based on 
this new system, tourist activities are regulated and usually 
require a license, and commercial fishing and other activities 
in the reef region are subject to strict regulations. In this way, 
the government aims to protect the natural biodiversity of 
the endangered reef while enabling related industries, such 
as tourism, to continue with their activities.5 In light of the 
knowledge that climate change and its consequences will 
increasingly endanger the region in the future, protection 
policies are required in the present and were needed in the 
past – not only for the greater good of the environment but 
1  Simpson, Murray C. et al. (2008). 
Climate Change Adaptation and 
Mitigation in the Tourism Sector: 
Frameworks, Tools and Practices, 
Paris: UNEP, University of Oxford, 
UNWTO, WMO, 10.
2  Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority (2007). Great Barrier 
Reef Climate Change Action Plan 
2007–2011, 3.
3  The Economist (2017). The 
Impact of Climate Change on 
the Great Barrier Reef: The 
Corals of the Reef have been 
Bleached White for a Second Year 
in a Row, 5 May, https://www.
economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2017/05/economist-
explains-3, accessed 26.09.2017.
4  Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority (2007), loc.cit.
5  Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority (2017). Zoning, Permits 
and Plans: About Zoning, http://
www.gbrmpa.gov.au/zoning- 
permits-and-plans/zoning/about- 
zoning, accessed 26.09.2017.
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also because it was important to avoid the economic impacts 
of a dying coral reef.
The example shows that if scenarios can enhance our 
understanding of the consequences of ignoring a development 
and lead to actual policy changes, they may be regarded as 
successful. Even so, it is important to consider that the future 
is not perfectly predictable. 
Events over recent years have made it clear that there is not 
one future, that we cannot rely on what we thought would be 
there forever, and that the way in which the world develops 
depends on the actions taken by each and every individual. 
Even though the implementation of international agreements 
on sustainability and environment protection can already 
be observed in our daily lives, the question of individual 
responsibility is crucial for climate scenarios.
Over the last twenty years, for example, more and more 
countries worldwide have taken action to fight plastic waste. 
Rwanda, Kenya and China, but also many European Union 
member states, have banned free plastic bags. Some large 
companies such as McDonalds and Starbucks, but also small 
cafés and restaurant chains, encourage their customers to 
bring their own coffee mugs instead of taking coffee-to-go 
cups away. In the context of energy saving targets, eight years 
ago, the European Union introduced legislation to replace 
incandescent light bulbs with energy saving lamps. At that 
time, the ban on incandescent light bulbs met with resistance 
and skepticism among many consumers, especially in Germany. 
Today, support for climate and environmental protection 
is rising at the individual level, according to a recent survey 
by the German Federal Environment Agency6. In many areas, 
however, there is no fundamental change in behaviour. 
Even if consumers pay attention to energy efficiency when 
purchasing cars or technical devices, this will not be sufficient 
to compensate for rising electricity consumption and high 
CO2 emissions. The need to adjust consumption behaviour 
to meet the challenge of global warming is not yet reflected 
in most people’s habits and lives. In Germany, the federal 
transport infrastructure strategy now includes – for the first 
time – plans to extend the construction of cycle paths as a 
means of supporting low-emission transport options. Even 
so, it national policy-makers and industry still seem to give 
higher priority to economic interests than to environmental 
concerns – as the Volkswagen emission scandal has recently 
shown. So we need to ask ourselves how we can promote a 
sustainable future at all levels and where we set our personal 
priorities. 
Our viewpoints on global challenges such as climate change 
are influenced not only by scientific scenarios, but also by 
those scenarios we are confronted with in our everyday lives, 
for example when we go to the cinema or browse in a bookstore. 
6  Benthin, Rainer, and Gellrich, 
Angelika (2016). Umweltbe-
wusstsein in Deutschland 2016: 
Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen 
Bevölkerungsumfrage, Berlin: 
Bundesministerium für Umwelt, 
Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktor-
sicherheit, http://www.bmub.
bund.de/fileadmin/Daten_ 
BMU/Pools/Broschueren/
umweltbewusstsein_
deutschland_2016_bf.pdf, 
accessed 26.09.2017.
While scientists try to predict climate change impacts, migration 
routes, conflicts, population developments and other 
politically important trends, the arts engage differently 
with the future. Uncoupled from academic restrictions 
but somehow connected to reality, dystopian and utopian 
literature describes possible futures and science fiction 
expands the horizons of what is thinkable in the future. There 
has been a long tradition of artists – science fiction writers, 
film directors and painters – envisioning future(s). George 
Orwell’s dystopian novel ‘Nineteen Eighty-four’, written in 
1949 about a future surveillance state in which ‘Big Brother 
is watching you’, for instance, is more relevant than ever 
when we talk about Big Data and the digitalization of the 
human being. Movies like ‘The Day After Tomorrow’ about 
the consequences of climate change illustrate an apocalyptic 
future scenario of life on Earth and even appear to have 
significantly influenced public awareness of the vulnerability 
of the climate system.7 Besides creating space for creative 
future thinking and imagining future scenarios, narration has 
always been relevant in people’s lives, influencing their views 
of life, their thinking and their actions. Narrative perspectives 
help us to empathize with different characters and let us 
slip into other worldviews than our own. Fictional writing 
therefore adds to the scenarios’ potential not only to build 
empirical knowledge of possible futures, but also to foster 
mutual understanding and connect stories of the future 
beyond borders and cultures. 
In recent years, political and social scientists have focused 
more and more on findings from literature or psychological 
studies to understand what role narratives play for social 
cohesion and how they impact on societal and political change. 
Currently, we find that existing narratives, with which we have 
identified, are losing their credibility. Narratives such as the 
European story of peace and prosperity and the US narrative of 
the ‘American Dream’ have become less convincing, especially 
since the global economic crisis. Former US President Barack 
Obama, in an interview with the New York Times, pointed to 
the role reading novels and stories played during his time at 
the White House. He states that looking back into historical 
literature and examining how authors once saw and described 
humankind can help us to identify recurring patterns and 
assess current dynamics. Identifying narratives from the past 
and the present can encourage us to promote narratives that 
support global cooperation. Even though none of the scenarios 
we are building now will become reality as they stand, they all 
help in preparing for many possible developments and show 
where action is needed to prevent undesirable consequences 
of current activities or plans. The future is not unchangeable, 
and scenarios show that different courses of action lead to 
different outcomes. Narrative scenarios which are built on 
7  Leiserowitz, Anthony (2004). 
‘Before and after The Day 
After Tomorrow: A U.S. Study of 
Climate Change Risk Perception’, 
Environment 46 (9): 22–37,  
http://environment.yale.edu/
leiserowitz/climatechange/
TDAT.html, accessed 26.09.2017.
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scientific findings or creative fantasies of possible future 
developments therefore help us to face the uncertainties of 
the future. They outline the many different ways – positive 
and negative – in which the world and humanity might develop.
In this Global Dialogue, the authors explore methods and 
techniques that help to make use of scenarios as an instrument 
for future analysis. They ask how science and politics can be 
brought together to create scenarios and how states can 
be convinced to foster cooperation for a sustainable future; 
how sustainable goals are internalized from an early age 
onwards; and which internal and external barriers conflict 
with sustainable development. Philosophical and literary 
perspectives also underline the potential of narrative 
scenarios to expand the boundaries of our thinking. In this way, 
the Global Dialogue aims to depict the possibilities, problems 
and pitfalls of scenario building and shows the reader what 
scenarios are actually used for and where they fall short of 
their objective. 
The initial idea for this Global Dialogue evolved from the 
Masterclass on ‘Future Scenarios of Global Cooperation – 
Practices and Challenges’ which took place in Essen in March 
2017. This event brought together experts from all over the 
world to discuss global present and future challenges such 
as climate change and the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Coming from diverse backgrounds ranging from political 
science and literature studies to economics, the participants 
offered unique insights into possible scenarios of the future. 
This Global Dialogue aims to capture their thoughts and lines 
of argument and makes them accessible to a wider audience. 
In a first step, the Global Dialogue addresses the question 
of how social sciences can contribute to the understanding 
of future scenarios of global cooperation. One of the central 
questions is whether scenario building, which has so far been 
mainly applied in the field of natural science, should introduce 
social science perspectives to a greater extent for the purpose 
of better assessing social dynamics. A further question to 
be explored is whether social science is sufficiently well-
prepared to engage in future scenario analysis or whether 
methodological innovations are necessary in this regard. 
Nebojsa Nakicenovic and Caroline Zimm point to the urgency 
of finding ways to implement the Sustainable Development 
Goals successfully and achieve transformational change. They 
warn that time is running out for the world to stop climate 
change. If global warming reaches the tipping point of two 
degrees, the Arctic ice sheet will melt, sea levels will rise and 
catastrophes such as floods and hunger crises will be inevitable. 
Nakicenovic and Zimm emphasize that strengthening not only 
the Earth’s but also social systems’ resilience is a global goal 
that transcends national borders and sovereignty. They argue 
for an interdisciplinary approach that considers not only green 
technical innovation but also social science theories, which 
can help us to identify future pathways of social change. In 
this context, Nakicenovic and Zimm introduce the World in 
2050 initiative, which has established a network of scientists 
from various research fields to find new methodological 
approaches for using scenario building as a tool to lead us out 
of the Anthropocene into a sustainable future.
In his contribution ‘How social science can help us understand 
and shape the future of global cooperation’, Thomas Hale 
is also looking for innovative methodological approaches. 
Hale raises the question whether multilateral governance 
is at risk in terms of institutional inertia and fragmentation 
and how we can move global cooperation forward. In their 
current form, the social sciences are not capable of doing 
so, Hale claims; he argues that social scientists must develop 
new methodologies to understand global cooperation. In this 
regard, Hale criticizes that social sciences relies on drawing 
conclusions from the past, instead of looking into the future. 
Hale agrees that the explanatory power of socio-scientific 
forecasting quickly reaches its limits due to multi-causality 
and outlier cases. However, the global challenges demand 
that science look into the future and find techniques that 
make this possible. Hale names three set of tools for social 
scientists to explore the future of cooperation: extrapolating 
from current explanations, modeling and scenario analysis. 
He points to the great potential of the modeling and scenario 
analysis approach for making precise predictions and teasing 
out eventual ‘priors’ without neglecting methodological 
weaknesses.
Michael Reder approaches the topic from a philosophical 
perspective. He concentrates on the self-understanding 
of science and its meaning for the development of future 
scenarios and narratives. Reder critically examines academic 
research’s claim to generate knowledge independently from 
politics and society. He argues that scientists are also part 
of a political and social reality and encourages them not to 
neglect but rather to reflect their relationship to the social 
and political sphere critically. In this context, Reder tackles 
the question of how political deliberation and scientific 
scenarios can be brought together. Basing his thinking on 
Habermas, he develops a pragmatic model of a new self-
understanding of science in which society is understood 
as a dynamic network and scenarios are developed from 
deliberative processes reflecting the complex interplay of 
experiences and preferences. In this context, Reder suggests 
that disjunctions between science and politics need to be set 
aside and replaced by reciprocal communication. 
Stefan Lechtenböhmer presents a practical example of a 
participatory approach in a scenario that brought scientists 
and politicians together. With reference to the development 
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of the North Rhine-Westphalian climate protection plan, 
he illustrates the opportunities and challenges facing an 
inclusive process of scenario building. Stakeholders from 
industry, politics, civil society and science were asked to 
develop scenarios that included strategies, measures and 
potential for climate protection in North Rhine-Westphalia. 
The underlying intention of the participatory approach was 
to improve stakeholders’ identification with the project 
objectives and provide incentives for active involvement 
in the implementation process. Several workshops were 
conducted in a bottom-up process and resulted in six different 
scenarios. Lechtenböhmer describes how difficulties among 
stakeholders, especially from industry and non-governmental 
organizations, stemming from different notions of how to 
emphasize scenarios, had to be overcome. He also points to 
the positive conclusions participants draw from the planning 
process, such as the development of trust and understanding 
of the other parties’ perspective or recognition of the role of 
science as an important driver of innovation. 
The second part of the Dialogue focuses on specific 
challenges for global politics that will shape the future of 
humankind. In this context, there are two main challenges 
global governance institutions and states have been trying to 
tackle: climate change and sustainable development. These 
important global developments are therefore the focus of 
most research dealing with future problems and possibilities 
and are widely discussed within the scientific community. 
Lothar Brock chooses a historical approach. His contribution 
focuses on the origins of the debate on sustainable development 
at the international level. Firstly, Brock shows that global 
cooperation, while based on good will and serving a common 
good, is inseparably linked to particular interests. Cooperation 
thus means not only an alternative to confrontation, but also 
that conflicts of interest are managed through diplomacy. 
Brock argues that this ambivalence can be observed in the 
history of the UN conferences and retraces the origins of the 
SDG agenda and the Paris Agreement. In a second part, Brock 
draws conclusions from his analysis for the future development 
of cooperation on the SDGs. He states that in addition to their 
practical advantages, such as the reduction of transaction and 
time costs, multilateral negotiations have socialization effects 
and foster the development of a common normative framework. 
This strengthens the universality of sustainability standards 
and can help to bring global cooperation forward. Since some 
countries, such as the USA, are still opposing this promising 
trend, Brock argues that science should focus on researching 
nation-states’ opposition and resistance and explore political 
authority beyond the state to find out how the global shift to a 
multilateral world order can be utilized further in developing a 
more cooperative global community.
While Lothar Brock’s text paints a broader picture of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, their evolution and their 
implications, Bettina Mahlert focuses on the need for an 
individual understanding of the consequences of non-
implementation of the SDGs. She firstly draws attention to 
the similarities between the Sustainable Development Goals 
and scenario building by describing Pierre Wack’s scenarios 
at Royal Dutch/Shell. Even though the scenarios predicted 
the oil crisis, the company did not react. On this basis, an 
understanding developed that a change in behaviour needs 
more than just cognitive knowledge: it requires internalization 
of the need for change. Mahlert points out the similarities 
between this case of scenario building and the SDGs, for 
example that both cases need long-lasting transformation 
in behaviour. Addressing three related questions, Bettina 
Mahlert describes the discussion that evolved around 
the Sustainable Development Goals and ways to foster 
their implementation. She concludes that we have not yet 
sufficiently internalized the consequences of ecological 
destruction for our lives, even though this is a precondition 
for a sustainable implementation of the SDGs.
With regard to the work for a more sustainable future, 
Christian Berg points in his contribution to the need to ‘expect 
the unexpected’. As basic conditions might change, all possible 
challenges need to be taken into account. Berg develops a 
typology of barriers that hinder sustainable development, 
differentiating between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’. ‘Intrinsic 
barriers’, which are seen to be inextricably tied to the concept 
of sustainability, are for example conflicts of interest or trade-
offs. ‘Extrinsic barriers’ are coincidental and independent 
from the concept of sustainability. An example here is the 
short-term orientation of incentive structures in societies. 
The typology helps to identify needs to operationalize 
sustainability. On this basis, Berg develops ten principles for 
sustainable action which take an actor’s perspective on the 
topic. Through this bottom-up approach, Berg aims to address 
the barriers in a way that is approachable for individuals and 
therefore promotes ‘a more sustainable global society’. 
Images of more sustainable global futures are also the 
context within which Emilio Lèbre La Rovere’s contribution 
can be situated. Compared to Christian Berg, he chooses a 
micro-focus, looking at Brazil as a specific country and climate 
change as a specific topic. The case of Brazil is unique as the 
country has low per capita energy-related greenhouse gas 
emissions compared to the major emitting countries. At the 
same time, Brazil still needs to grow economically to improve 
living standards. La Rovere examines this country’s dilemma 
of promoting much-needed development while trying to 
avoid growing greenhouse gas emissions. Here, he introduces 
a study that builds upon scenarios of the economic and social 
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implications of different sets of GHG mitigation measures in 
Brazil, coming to the conclusion that mitigation strategies 
not only reduce greenhouse gas emissions but can also foster 
economic growth and increase household incomes. 
Linking climate change with the likelihood of conflicts, 
Halvard Buhaug adds a new dimension to the possible 
scenarios of the future in the context of rising temperatures. 
To introduce his argument, Buhaug explains that in recent 
decades, most conflicts have taken place in warm and tropical 
areas around the Equator. He points out that even taking other 
factors into account, the ‘climate effect’ still has statistical 
relevance. On this basis, Buhaug explains that these areas are 
already at risk of droughts and heat waves, which can affect 
food security, for example. Climate change will most likely 
worsen this situation and promote these kinds of indirect 
drivers of conflicts. In his conclusion, Buhaug also points to 
the reverse link between climate change and conflict. As 
conflicts lead to political instability and low economic growth, 
the population’s vulnerability to climate risks increases. As 
developed societies possess the means and the political will 
to tackle climate-related challenges while conflict-ridden 
countries usually do not, Buhaug sees the danger of a ‘vicious 
circle of instability and underdevelopment’. Therefore, 
peacebuilding can be seen as an important climate resilience 
strategy in war-torn countries.
Finally, the Dialogue addresses the question of how the 
scenario approach can benefit from other perspectives and 
offers an insight into future scenarios from science fiction and 
literature studies. 
In the first contribution in this part of the Global Dialogue, 
Karlheinz Steinmüller explains techniques behind scenario 
building and examines its relationship with science fiction. 
He points out that scenarios are a tool to predict the future, 
building on expectations and assumptions and taking into 
account uncertainties and human action. Even though 
scenarios may help us to spot certain developments, the real 
future will never look exactly like a scenario. Steinmüller 
elucidates the different kinds of scenarios, explaining that 
scenarios are either normative, questioning what kind of 
future we want, or explorative, looking at what kind of future 
we have to expect. He goes on to describe some of the scenario 
projects in which he was involved, such as FESTOS, which 
aimed to raise awareness of security threats posed by the 
potential abuse of new technologies. By comparing foresight 
with science fiction, he brings together these two strands in 
the form of narrative scenarios. Steinmüller defines seven 
steps in the writing of narrative scenarios. This technique, he 
concludes, makes it possible to overcome the shortcomings 
of foresight and science fiction alike. It can thus be used as an 
effective tool for communicating with target groups.
In her posthumanist reading of Wanuri Kahiu’s Pumzi, a 
short film set in a dystopian landscape after World War III, 
where natural life has almost completely vanished, Susan 
Arndt shows that it is not only science but also art which 
engages with possible developments in the future. Before 
going into the details of the movie, Arndt develops ‘FutureS’ 
as a category of analysis, emphasizing that there is not the 
one fixed future. The term should also imply that future is 
shaped by different agents and interests and some possible 
futures might not come into existence due to the dominance 
of others. On this basis, Arndt explains that future is highly 
related to power distribution and therefore unevenly shared. 
She goes on to analyze how the main character of the movie 
breaks out of the predetermined future and plants the first 
seeds to grow organic life back on Earth. With regard to our 
world, Arndt concludes that the movie shows that solidarity 
and responsibility across species and beyond a culture-nature 
divide can shape alternative possibilities for the future.
Ottmar Ette illustrates the importance of literature for 
the creation of new transcultural perspectives. Reflections 
from the writer Amin Maalouf, who identifies the cultural 
dimension of globalization as a determining factor for human 
future, serve as a starting point for Ottmar Ette to describe 
that living together in peace and cultural difference is the 
challenge and solution of our time. He claims that thinking in 
categories of alterity needs to be overcome. Instead, cultural 
differences should be perceived in a polyperspectival manner. 
In this context, Ette understands literature as a corrective to 
unification and simplification. He explains that the literatures 
of the world reflect the diversity of languages and different 
experiences from cultures and communities. Ette argues 
that literature not only preserves memory, but also registers 
current trends of change and points to possible futures. 
Against the backdrop of recent developments, such as the 
refugee flows to Europe, he assumes that the Eurocentric 
understanding of world literacy will be replaced by what 
he calls ‘WritingBetweenWorlds’. Like increasing individual 
mobility, literature is also moving and reflecting life realities, 
which are increasingly cosmopolitan and less aligned to 
geographical boundaries. Ottmar Ette encourages us to 
recognize that the European realities are characterized by the 
experience of migration, and that multilingual and polylogical 
thinking is necessary for successful coexistence.
This Global Dialogue aims to enhance understanding of how 
scenario building can be used to develop possible futures of 
cooperation. It therefore contributes to one of this year’s major 
research goals at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. 
The Centre is one of the main research institutes at the 
University of Duisburg-Essen. Coming from a methodological 
approach of plurality and transdisciplinary, the Centre aims 
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to enhance understanding of the possibilities and limits of 
transboundary cooperation. The Global Dialogue is part of 
a series of events organized by the Centre on the topic of 
scenario building. It inks discussions from the Masterclass and 
a new workshop series on ‘Migration, Scenarios and Climate 
Change’ which will start next year and will explore futures 
of European migration policy. We therefore hope that this 
Global Dialogue will be a prelude to further multi-perspective 
and interdisciplinary discussions on future scenarios and wish 
a thought-provoking and entertaining read. 
Part I
Different Scenario  
Approaches and What Social 
Science Has to Offer
25
Back to the Future:  
The Role of Quantitative 
Scenarios and Narratives  
in Understanding Transfor-
mation to Sustainability1
Nebojsa Nakicenovic  
and Caroline Zimm
Urgency 
The historic Paris Agreement on Climate Change adopted 
in December 2015 sets out an ambitious and aspirational 
goal for humanity of limiting global warming to ‘well below’ 
2o Celsius, which implies net zero greenhouse gas emissions 
by mid-21st century. Reaching this goal would require 
regular reviews and improvement of Nationally Determined 
Contributions. Structural change in all sectors and countries, 
including new behaviours and regulatory mechanisms, will 
be also required in addition to mobilizing huge volumes of 
investment, including the US$ 100 billion a year in support of 
the Green Climate Fund (UNFCCC 2015). 
Yet the world is currently heading toward the opposite 
direction, away from the ambitious Paris goals. Populist 
governments are opposing scientific findings related to 
climate change and action for climate mitigation, for example. 
We need a counterforce to nudge global development in the 
right direction so we can start implementing the required 
actions to fulfil the Paris Agreement. Time is running out; 
the later the needed transformational changes start, the 
harder it will be to achieve the future we want. Such a turn in 
the right direction might lead to conflict between opposing 
constituencies. Some will benefit from this transformation 
and others will lose, providing the motivation to mobilize 
against change. 
Humanity can only try to learn from history and understand 
what the human impact on Earth is and learn how we can alter 
our actions. We have a plethora of choices (e.g. from behaviour 
to technology) that vary not only in their short-term but also 
in their long-term effects. In deciding on future development 
pathway(s), an important decision will be how to bend the 
development curve towards sustainability as soon as possible, 
ideally immediately. 
The sustainability challenge is enormous, especially 
considering the remaining inequality in the world. The high 
affluence of around one billion people has led to global-scale 
environmental problems. The ‘global middle class,’ which is 
estimated to grow from 1.8 billion in 2009 to 3.2 billion by 
2020 and 4.9 billion by 2030 (Pezzini 2012), is also expected 
to take up resource-intensive lifestyles following the trend 
of consumerism in developed countries (Kharas 2010). At the 
same time, several billion people have not benefited from this 
development: 2.4 billion still do not have access to sanitation 
(WHO and UNICEF 2015) and three billion lack access to 
clean cooking technologies (GEA 2012), but they do have to 
bear the brunt of the negative externalities associated with 
development and transgression of the planetary boundaries. 
So not only do we have to reduce negative impacts which are 
already occurring but we have to do so while improving the lives 
1  This article is based on a previous 
research paper: Nakicenovic, 
Nebojsa et al. (2016). Global 
Commons in the Anthropocene: 
World Development on a Stable 
and Resilient Planet, IIASA 
Working Paper, Laxenburg, 
Austria: International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA), see: http://pure.iiasa.
ac.at/14003/.
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of the population excluded so far from the benefits of many 
advances of human development. Doing this falls nothing 
short of a new revolution after the Neolithic (Agricultural) 
and the Industrial Revolution, which fundamentally changed 
humanity and our relationship with the planet. 
Perhaps we can argue that the United Nations 2030 Agenda 
and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in September 2015 are a symbolic 
starting point for this sustainability revolution. The SDGs 
[…] provide an aspirational narrative for the 
desired future for human development with an 
actionable agenda. The aspiration is for a world 
free from hunger, injustice and absolute poverty, 
of universal education, health and employment 
with inclusive economic growth, based on 
transparency, dignity and equity, all achieved 
within the boundaries of the planet [(UN GA 
2015)]. The urgent question now is how to act 
on this aspirational agenda and to have a clear 
understanding of the full consequences and 
cost of inaction and the benefits of achieving 
the SDGs […]. (TWI2050 2017: 1)
This next revolution needs to cover a plethora of elements to 
achieve the SDGs, such as technology, governance, economic 
and social systems, demography, knowledge and values. 
Great Acceleration and Anthropocene
The Holocene provided the planet with a stable global 
climate, abundant ecosystem services, rich biodiversity, 
fertile soils and oceans and a healthy atmosphere. In the 
Holocene, the environmental conditions on Earth stabilized 
as a result of external (solar / planetary) forces and internal 
biophysical processes between biosphere, hydrosphere, 
atmosphere, cryosphere and geosphere settling into a new 
planetary equilibrium. It is within this biophysical equilibrium 
that seasons (winter, spring, summer and autumn) not only 
establish themselves firmly but become more reliable. Those 
early settlers crossed a critical threshold where, in at least 
eight out of ten years, rains would fall and temperatures 
greater than 15 °C would be reached for planting, and a 
growing season of greater than 90 days could be counted 
upon, thus providing a high probability of a successful harvest 
(Rockström and Klum 2015). 
We argue that it is the Agricultural Revolution that constituted 
the prerequisite for modern civilizations to evolve. An Earth 
system in a stable and resilient state, with the Holocene as 
our human reference point, may thus be a necessity for human 
prosperity and world development. The conclusion from this 
scientific insight is as basic as it is dramatic. With the evidence 
we have at hand, we can state that the interglacial state of the 
Holocene is the only state of the planet that we know for certain 
can support a world population of 7.4 billion (Rockström et al. 
2009), soon to approach nine to ten billion. It is correct that 
modern humans have survived, and thus could survive, outside 
of a Holocene-like planetary stability, but there is no evidence 
that a globally connected society providing a minimum quality 
of life could flourish. 
While the Industrial Revolution created the conditions for 
a radical change in how humans live and consume, the most 
profound growth occurred after the Second World War. The 
1950s witnessed the beginning of what has become known 
as ‘the Great Acceleration’ in human activity (Steffen et al. 
2004; Steffen et al. 2011; Steffen et al. 2015b) (Figure 1). From 
international tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
population and gross domestic product (GDP), the pace and 
scale of change have taken on an exponential trajectory. 
The Great Acceleration has delivered huge improvements 
in human wellbeing for parts of the world’s population, but 
this has come at a cost: Earth’s resilience to change – its 
ability to absorb shocks and remain stable – is declining 
rapidly. Disaggregating population and GDP by developed 
and developing nations shows that this phenomenal growth 
is largely driven by globalization and neoclassical economic 
policies that propel growth at all costs by promoting ever 
higher production and consumption in wealthy nations, not 
population growth per se (Steffen et al. 2015a).
Sometime after 1950, the Earth system strongly coupled 
with the socioeconomic system – the oceans, atmosphere and 
diversity of life that together keep the planet habitable. Today, 
the socioeconomic system is impacting the Earth system at an 
unprecedented magnitude and speed (Figure 2), (Crutzen and 
Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 2002; Steffen et al. 2004; Rockström 
et al. 2009; Waters et al. 2016). With increasing population 
and GDP, the human system is steadily infringing on Earth’s 
buffering capacity, threatening Earth resilience. This indicates 
that the relationship between humans and the planet has 
changed. The so-called Great Acceleration has led humanity 
and the planet out of the Holocene. It has been proposed that 
we have entered a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, 
as humans leave such strong traces on earth, threatening 
earth stability and resilience. It is not known where humanity 
may end up along the Anthropocene trajectory, nor is it 
known whether the state of the planet would be in any way 
comparable to the Holocene.
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Tipping Elements and Global Commons
The notion that a single stable equilibrium is the natural 
state of Earth is not supported by observations of past global 
changes (Steffen et al. 2004). The behaviour of the Earth system 
is typified not by stable equilibria, but by strong nonlinearities, 
where relatively small changes in a forcing function can push 
the system across a threshold and lead to abrupt changes in key 
aspects of system functioning where the internal dynamics of 
the system kick in and accelerate change – we call these ‘tipping 
elements’ or ‘tipping points’ (Lenton et al. 2007). Examples 
include the rapid ending of ice ages, the exceptionally rapid 
warming and cooling events in the North Atlantic region, mega-
droughts and other extreme events.
Scientific knowledge of complex ecological and social 
systems has grown significantly in recent decades. Incremental 
change may push a system – a city, economy, forest or 
fishing zone, for example – to a bifurcation point where, 
after incremental change, it is pulled irresistibly toward 
a new basin of attraction and so a new equilibrium state. 
Or a system, after long periods of incremental change, may 
suddenly collapse irreversibly into a new state. 
Analysis of the large-scale subsystems of the Earth system – 
ocean circulations, permafrost, ice sheets, Arctic sea ice, the 
rainforests and atmospheric circulations – indicates that these 
systems are prone to large-scale change and collapse (Lenton 
et al. 2007). Moreover, human activities, such as industrial 
scale farming and fishing, are reducing the resilience of these 
subsystems to absorb shocks, and pushing these subsystems 
toward new states. If one system collapses to a new state, it 
may set up positive feedback loops, amplifying the change 
and triggering changes in other subsystems. This might be 
termed a ‘cascading collapse’ of key components of the Earth 
system. Given that the stability of the Earth system underpins 
human civilization and welfare, avoiding this fate would seem 
to be an attractive course of action.
Understanding the complex interactions between rapidly 
changing systems is an active area of research. Sea ice thickness 
and area are shrinking in the Arctic. As the sea ice melts, 
Figure 1: The Great Acceleration – socioeconomic trends in (a) population, 
(b) real GDP, (c) FDI, (d) urban population, (e) primary energy use, (f) 
fertilizer consumption, (g) large dams, (h) water use, (i) paper production, ( j) 
transportation, (k) telecommunications and (l) international tourism. Source: 
Steffen et al. 2015a.
Figure 2: The Great Acceleration – Earth system trends in (a) carbon dioxide, 
(b) nitrous oxide, (c) methane, (d) stratospheric ozone, (e) surface temperature, 
(f) ocean acidification, (g) marine fish capture, (h) shrimp aquaculture, 
(i) nitrogen to coastal zone, ( j) tropical forest loss, (k) domesticated land 
(land use change) and (l) tropical biosphere degradation. Source: Steffen et 
al. 2015a.
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it exposes dark ocean underneath which absorbs more heat 
than the white surface, thus causing more warming and so 
melting in the region. Warmer water is contributing to the 
melting of the Greenland ice sheet which is pouring more 
freshwater into the north Atlantic, potentially interfering 
with the north Atlantic overturning circulation. All these 
events can potentially affect El Niño in the Pacific Ocean, 
which affects melting in Antarctica, the Indian monsoon, 
rainfall in Africa and coral reefs. 
A recent analysis of tipping elements in the Earth system 
indicates that at temperatures of between 2 – 3 °C above 
pre-industrial levels, the risk of the subsystems of the Earth 
system collapsing becomes high, although many uncertainties 
remain (Schellnhuber, Rahmstorf, and Winkelmann 2016). 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of global temperature for the 
past 20,000 years, including the relatively stable climate 
during the Holocene since around 10,000 years ago. The 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) provide 
scenarios on possible future temperature levels to 2100, based 
on different trajectories of greenhouse gas concentration 
and how this is related to global warming (van Vuuren et al. 
2011). ‘This analysis follows the tipping point definitions of 
Lenton et al. (2007) where irreversibility is not a requirement, 
hence the inclusion of sea ice cover. Earth has now reached 
1°C above pre-industrial levels as a result of human actions. 
With locked in emissions and inertia in the socioeconomic 
system we are virtually committed to about 1.5 °C (Rogelj et 
al. 2015). Moreover, while nations have agreed to keep global 
temperature increase well below 2 °C with a long-term aim of 
stabilization at 1.5 °C, aggregated current national proposals 
to reduce emissions will lead to a warming of 2.7 – 3.5 °C 
(Climate Action Tracker 2015).’
Several of the tipping elements that are crucial for 
planetary resilience and stability and could possible switch 
within that range fall within national jurisdiction (e.g. coral 
reefs). The stability and resilience of the earth are common 
to us all, so this calls for a new concept and governance of 
global commons in the Anthropocene. In the Anthropocene, 
local commons can become global commons because of 
their importance for planetary resilience, regardless of 
national sovereignty.
Scenarios for the SDGs 
We need to understand how we can leave the Anthropocene 
and navigate to a safe place for humanity. One way to 
do this is to develop scenarios. Scenarios are plausible 
stories that are useful for exploring future societal and 
economic development and are supported by quantifications. 
They are the main tools suited to investigate alternative 
futures under a set of assumed conditions, including 
uncertainty and complexity related to future challenges 
(Nakicenovic et al. 2000). The literature on scenarios is huge; 
there are more than 1,000 global scenarios available just in 
the context of climate change (IAMC 2014). 
With the adoption of the SDGs a more holistic approach 
is called for. We need to develop integrated scenarios to 
aide implementing the SDGs as climate-only scenarios do 
not address the amplitude of development challenges we 
are facing. ‘What is lacking, but urgently required, is an 
assessment of the viability of achieving these multiple social-
economic-environmental-planetary goals simultaneously 
using integrative and systemic methodological approaches. 
The World in 2050 (TWI2050) initiative is a global research 
initiative launched by the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network (SDSN), and the Stockholm Resilience 
Center (SRC) that aims to fill this knowledge gap. The 
initiative brings together a network of leading policymakers, 
analysts, modelling and analytical teams, and organisations 
from around the world to collaborate in developing pathways 
toward sustainable futures and policy frameworks needed for 
implementing the SDGs, and more importantly, for achieving 
the needed transformational change. TWI2050 aims not 
only to contribute to this understanding, but also develop 
Figure 3: Evolution of global mean surface temperature from the Last Glacial 
Maximum through the Holocene and future global warming scenarios (RCP, 
Representative Concentration Pathways) related to tipping elements. 
WAIS, West Antarctic ice sheet; THC, thermohaline circulation; ENSO, 
El Niño-Southern oscillation; EAIS, East Antarctic ice sheet. Adapted from 
Schellnhuber, Rahmstorf, and Winkelmann 2016.
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science-based transformational and equitable pathways 
to sustainable development that can provide much needed 
information and guidance for policy makers responsible for 
the implementation of the SDGs.’2
The work on developing the integrated alternative futures 
across scenarios is to a large extent based on modelling 
approaches and narratives. What is lacking in that rich 
literature is the integration of social sciences and better 
understanding of human behaviour (e.g. theories of social 
change, language, anthropology). There are several ways to 
enrich current modelling approaches with social sciences; 
social sciences can support model development, contribute 
to model assumptions as well as the analyses of results. 
‘The challenge of identifying interconnected pathways lies 
in understanding how complex and sometimes competing 
objectives can be met at global, regional, national, and sub-
national scales. Furthermore, these synergies and trade-offs 
across SDGs (Griggs et al. 2014; Nilsson, Griggs, and Visbeck 2016) 
come with a price which is crucial for policy makers and investors. 
Initial estimates of investment needs (WIR 2014; Schmidt-Traub 
2015; Jakob et al. 2016) have not fully taken these into account. 
Only assessing a few sectors, McCollum, Krey, and Riahi (2011) 
found synergies of decarbonization and energy efficiency with 
regards to pollution control and energy security of $100 – 600 
billion annually (0.1 – 0.7% of GDP) by 2030.’3 
More integrative and inclusive development of scenarios 
based on a holistic approach across sectors and disciplines 
could better identify alternative development paths for our 
society resulting in multiple benefits. More insight is needed 
to assess how all 17 SDGs interact and what a sustainable 
transformation of humanity could look like. ‘TWI2050 seeks 
to build bridges across different scientific communities 
by inviting communities to contribute to broadening the 
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) approach through 
new methodological approaches, especially with regards to 
the social, institutional, governance oriented and qualitative 
goals. Furthermore, TWI2050 provides the essential 
framework for intercomparison to robustly inform policy 
makers in implementing the 2030 Agenda through identifying 
crucial branching points.’4
2  TWI2050 (2017). The World in 
2050 (TWI2050), Concept Note.
3  Nakicenovic, Nebojsa et. al (in 
preparation ). Towards Pathways 
for Global Sustainability in 2050 
and Beyond.
4  Ibid.
REFERENCES
Climate Action Tracker (2015). Climate Pledges Will Bring 2.7 °C of Warming, 
Potential for More Action, http://climateactiontracker.org/news/253/
Climate-pledges-will-bring-2.7C-of-warming-potential-for-more-action.
html, accessed 28.07.2016.
Crutzen, Paul J. (2002). ‘Geology of Mankind’, Nature 415(6867): 23.
― and Stoermer, Eugene F. (2000). ‘The “Anthropocene”’, IGBP Newsletter 41: 
17–18.
GEA (2012). Global Energy Assessment – Towards a Sustainable Future, 
Cambridge / New York / Laxenburg: Cambridge University Press, 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Griggs, David et al. (2014). ‘Policy: Sustainable Development Goals for People 
and Planet’, Nature 495 (7441): 305–7.
IAMC (2014). AR5 Scenario Database, https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/
ene/AR5DB/, accessed 28.07.2016.
Jakob, Michael et al. (2016). ‘Carbon Pricing Revenues Could Close 
Infrastructure Access Gaps’, World Development 84: 254–65.
Kharas, Homi (2010). The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries, OECD 
Working paper, OECD.
Lenton, Timothy M. et al. (2007). ‘Tipping Elements in the Earth’s Climate 
System’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 105 (6): 1786–93.
McCollum, David L., Krey, Volker, and Riahi, Keywan (2011). ‘An Integrated 
Approach to Energy Sustainability’, Nature Climate Change 1 (9): 428–9.
Nakicenovic, Nebojsa et al. (2000). Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: 
A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Cambrige: Cambridge University Press.
― et al. (2016). Global Commons in the Anthropocene: World Development on 
a Stable and Resilient Planet, IIASA Working Paper, Laxenburg, Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).
― et. al (in preparation). Towards Pathways for Global Sustainability in 2050 
and Beyond.
Nilsson, Måns, Griggs, Dave, and Visbeck, Martin (2016). ‘Policy: Map the 
Interactions between Sustainable Development Goals’, Nature 534: 320–
22.
Pezzini, Mario (2012). An Emerging Middle Class, OECD Observer, http://www.
oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3681/An_emerging_middle_
class.html, accessed 28.07.2016.
Rockström, Johan, and Klum, Mattias (2015). Big World, Small Planet: 
Abundance within Planetary Boundaries, Stockholm: Bokförlaget Max 
Ström.
― et al. (2009). ‘A Safe Operating Space for Humanity’, Nature 461 (7263): 
472–5.
Rogelj, Joeri et al. (2015). ‘Energy System Transformations for Limiting End-
of-Century Warming to Below 1.5°C’, Nature Climate Change 5 (6): 519–27.
Schellnhuber, Hans Joachim, Rahmstorf, Stefan, and Winkelmann, Ricarda 
(2016). ‘Why the Right Climate Target was Agreed in Paris’, Nature Climate 
Change 6 (7): 649–53.
3534
Schmidt-Traub, Guido (2015). Investment Needs to Achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals: Understanding the Billions and Trillions, SDSN Working 
Paper, Sustainable Development Solutions Network.
Steffen, Will et al. (2004). Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet Under 
Pressure, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York: Springer-Verlag.
― et al. (2011). ‘The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary 
Stewardship’, AMBIO 40 (7): 739–61.
― et al. (2015a). ‘The Trajectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration’, 
The Anthropocene Review 2 (1): 18.
― et al. (2015b). ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a 
Changing Planet’, Science 347 (6223).
TWI2050 (2017). The World in 2050 (TWI2050), Concept Note, http://www.
iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/researchPrograms/TransitionstoNew 
Technologies/Concept-note-TWI2050-3page-Apr2017.pdf, accessed 
28.04.2017.
UN GA (2015). Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (A/RES/70/1 UN), New York: United Nations General 
Assembly.
UNFCCC (2015). Adoption of the Paris Agreement (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1), 
Paris: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
van Vuuren, Detlef P. et al. (2011). ‘The Representative Concentration 
Pathways: An Overview’, Climatic Change 109 (1): 5.
Waters, Colin N. et al. (2016). ‘The Anthropocene is Functionally and 
Stratigraphically Distinct from the Holocene’, Science 351 (6269).
WHO and UNICEF (2015). Lack of Sanitation for 2.4 Billion People is Undermining 
Health Improvements, 30 June, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/
releases/2015/jmp-report/en/, accessed 28.07.2016.
WIR (2014). World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action 
Plan, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
How Can Social Science 
Help Us Understand  
and Shape the Future of 
Global Cooperation?
Thomas Hale
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Can we study what has not yet happened? If so, can we 
understand the future well enough to shape it? These questions, 
which animated a lively discussion at the Masterclass, are of 
critical importance in contemporary world politics. 
There are increasing signs that the liberal international 
order created after 1945 risks collapse. While populism and 
nationalism are on the rise across the world, asserting the 
claims of particular peoples and emphasising their singularity 
and exclusivity, we are also more connected than ever before. 
These connections require global cooperation and careful 
management. And yet we are not rising to this challenge. A 
series of global collective action problems, from the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction to climate change, threaten to 
render our societies weaker, poorer, and more violent. There 
is a substantial risk that humankind may not end the twenty-
first century as well as it began it.
This critical context emerges out of a specific set of 
historical processes and trends, most of which we would label 
‘progress’. In Gridlock : Why Multilateralism Is Failing When We 
Need It Most, published with David Held and Kevin Young in 
2013, I sought to understand and explain the achievements 
and the limits of the postwar order. We concluded that 
deep structural trends, rooted in the extraordinary success 
of international cooperation and the transformations it 
allowed, now undermined its continued effectiveness and 
responsiveness. One of the central concepts developed in 
Gridlock was ‘self-reinforcing interdependence’ (Hale, Held, 
and Young 2013), the mutually enabling relationship between 
globalization and the institutionalization of world politics 
that profoundly deepened interdependence over the postwar 
period. The idea is that international cooperation is not just 
a response states use to manage existing interdependence; 
over time, cooperation also increases the links between 
economic and social systems across borders, deepening 
interdependence further. For example, trade agreements 
create incentives for companies to develop global supply 
chains and invest in technologies that facilitate cross-border 
production, changing their business models and building 
new constituencies for trade. The resulting increase in 
interdependence creates additional political incentives for 
countries to cooperate further, beginning the cycle again. 
We argued in Gridlock that this historical process of partially 
endogenous interdependence deepened to such a degree 
over the postwar period that a number of ‘second order’ 
cooperation problems arose – namely, multipolarity, harder 
problems, institutional inertia and fragmentation – causing 
gridlock. We set out a bleak picture of how gridlock paralyses 
multilateral governance, with dangerous implications.
But are we trapped by this kind of path-dependent, historical, 
structural logic? Or are there new possibilities and pathways 
available to move global cooperation forward? For these kinds 
of prospective questions, social science, as it currently exists, 
is less helpful, for reasons I review below. But the answer is 
not, as many might argue, to conclude that studying the future 
is simply too difficult or too un-scientific to attempt. We, as 
social scientists, should not be satisfied with our current set 
of tools, but instead push for ways to expand them. Given that 
global cooperation requires managing long-term change, we 
have a professional duty as students of the social world to 
devise better tools to guide future-oriented policies. 
The Scientific Process Looks Backward, But Must Scientists 
Also?
The scientific process is inherently retrospective. A hypothesis 
emerges from an existing body of theory, or in response to an 
unexplained empirical anomaly. The observable implications 
of the hypothesis are deduced, and then a set of empirical 
cases is examined, qualitatively or quantitatively or both, to 
determine if the hypothesized conditions and factors obtain. 
Should significant variation across cases remain unexplained, 
the theory and hypotheses will need to be improved, or 
potentially discarded in favour of better explanations.
Given this process, the most social scientists can say about 
the future is to say how future cases are likely to develop 
given what is known about similar cases in the past. Two 
complications immediately arise: the (dis)similarity of past 
cases and future cases and the intertwined dilemma of multi-
causality (one outcome having several causes) and equifinality 
(various factors converging to the same outcome). In other 
area of scientific inquiry, these problems are less severe. 
Consider, for example, the effect of a virus on the human body. 
A certain kind of virus tends to have a very similar effect on all 
kinds of human bodies. Why every individual’s case of course 
differs, for common viruses scientists are able to acquire 
sufficient data to relatively easily determine the range of 
possible effects and the conditions under which those effects 
vary (e.g. genetic predisposition or lifestyle characteristics). 
Similarly, they can also understand quite precisely how the 
virus will respond to certain kinds of treatments. Under these 
conditions, science is able to both predict the future (if you 
get this virus, you will have these outcomes) and to shape it (if 
you take these drugs, you can contain the problem). 
Such conditions almost never obtain in the study of global 
cooperation. Cases of the phenomenon of interest (e.g. the 
negotiation of a multilateral climate treaty) are either few 
in number, or completely unique. Therefore the number of 
cases can typically only be expanded by retreating to a higher 
level of abstraction (e.g. the negotiation of multilateral 
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treaties generally), which necessarily makes the resulting 
theories more general and renders their predictive power 
less precise. Compounding the difficulty, cases are often not 
independent of each other. The outcomes of the cases used 
to build a theory of a phenomenon may fundamentally alter 
the dynamics of future cases of that phenomenon. In such 
conditions, the causal factors of interests are often multiple, 
making it difficult to say exactly what is ‘doing the work’, or 
conjunctural, combining in specific ways to create complex, 
compound causal pathways. 
Given these limits, the challenges of forward-looking social 
science are not to be underestimated. But this does not imply 
that they should not be tackled.
Tools for Studying the Future
Three families of tools for studying the future present 
themselves: extrapolating from current explanations, 
modelling, and scenario analysis. Consider each in turn. 
Extrapolating from current explanations is the most 
comfortable future-oriented tool for social scientists. We 
are on solid scientific ground if we are able to say, ‘under 
conditions A we got outcome B, so if we see A again, B is again 
a likely outcome.’ For example, studies of US elections show 
that trends in economic conditions in the months before an 
election are strongly determinative of the outcome. So if 
we see negative trends, we should expect the incumbent to 
do poorly. This is useful knowledge, but it falls far short of 
the realm of prediction. Moreover, it will, by definition, fail 
to explain outlier cases, such as the US election in 2017. We 
should aspire to do better. 
Modelling (by which I mean various mathematical approaches 
from various disciplines) takes essentially the same approach, 
but uses stronger and more precise starting assumptions 
to squeeze more predictive power out of existing 
explanations. This approach has the benefit of making the 
theory’s assumptions transparent, and can lead to quite 
precise predictions. But the corresponding trade-off is the 
critical importance of getting the starting assumptions and 
explanations right in the first place. As noted above, social 
science is typically unlikely to have universally valid theories 
at a sufficient level of prediction to yield definitive results. 
That said, modelling can be extremely helpful for teasing out 
the logical consequences our dominant existing explanations. 
It is an under-used methodology in many branches of social 
science (such as political science), and so strikes me as an area 
for future growth in global cooperation research. 
The final set of tools, which I will group under the category of 
scenario analysis, causes the most discomfort for social scientists. 
These techniques are essentially ways to surface, structure, and 
tease out the implications of analysts’ ‘priors’ (in the Bayesian 
sense) about future trajectories. While certain aspects of the 
scientific process may be employed, such as hypothesizing 
certain effects and positing outcomes from certain processes 
or sets of conditions, there is no way to test the prospective 
work empirically. Very few social scientists engage in such 
work, although there are perhaps certain parallels to scholars 
who devote themselves only to theory development (typically 
via formal mathematical models) in microeconomics or 
political science. 
What Future for Future Studies in Social Science, and for 
Social Science in Future Studies? 
In sum, there are ways for social scientists to look at the 
future, but these are typically not valued as core parts of 
disciplinary practice, nor are they valued in the currency 
of professional achievement. Given the vast challenges 
facing global cooperation in the coming decades, can we be 
satisfied with this situation? My sense is that we cannot be. 
If the purpose of science is to understand the world, why are 
we focused only on that part of social reality that where our 
analytic tools have greatest traction? Are we not like the man 
who, having lost his keys in the dark, searches for them under 
a streetlight – not because he lost them there, but because it 
is the only place he can see? As scientists, we cannot settle 
for this approach. If our tools find it difficult to peer into the 
future, we need better tools. Developing the three baskets of 
analytic techniques described above offers a way forward. We 
will never, of course, have as much ability to look forward as 
we do to look back, but we will have some. And as we confront 
urgent global challenges, even a bit more vision could make 
all the difference. 
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Self-understanding of Science and the Aim of Future Narratives
Globalization is one of the most defining features of social 
and political life in our time. The proliferation of global actors 
and the dynamic relations between them are two main aspects 
of the processes of globalization as we currently know them 
(cf. Kumar and Messner 2010). Consequently, the globalized 
world is often interpreted as a network: everything seems 
connected to everything else. These connections (better: 
relations) between different actors, groups or intuitions 
beyond traditional borders influence social life today; they 
are also the starting point for various global developments in 
politics, economics and culture (cf. Rosenau 1999).
Against the backdrop of globalization, the world is facing 
immense challenges, politically, economically and ecologically. 
The impacts of climate change, the consequences of the 
financial crisis, and new forms of war and terror are three 
examples of these challenges. Two characteristics of these 
challenges seem most important: Firstly, these problems have 
an explicit global dimension and they can only be sufficiently 
understood within the context of complex, dynamic and 
interrelated processes of globalization. Decisions in one 
part of the world can imply a wide range of consequences 
in other parts and even lead to complex global problems. 
This is why academics as well as politicians and many other 
stakeholders think about global solutions for these problems. 
Secondly, many of these global problems have long-term 
consequences. The impacts of climate change are one obvious 
example, because economic and political decisions in the field 
of climate policy will influence future generations in various 
ways (cf. Edenhofer et al. 2012).
All the sciences help to reflect both the global and the 
long-term temporal dimension of today’s problems. In order 
to discuss in what way they do so, it is necessary to think 
about the relation between scientific research and the social 
and political sphere. Often, science likes to think of research 
as independent from the social and political sphere. The 
assumption behind this self-understanding is that sciences 
follow a specific logic which differs from a political logic. Thus, 
scientists want to be independent from any other political 
actor, in order to define their research questions and the way 
of reflecting on them independently. Many academics are 
very sensitive to attempts to instrumentalize research. They 
argue that sciences should be free to produce ‘independent 
knowledge’. Some even argue that scientists should not think 
about what knowledge is socially needed.
I suggest in this paper that such a self-understanding of 
science is misleading. Of course, scientific research should 
always be independent and also be sensitive to potential 
(political or economic) instrumentalization. Jacques Derrida 
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calls this a ‘university without condition’ (Derrida 2001). But 
Derrida also argues for a new understanding of the social 
embeddedness of scientific research. Because the sciences 
are part of the social and political sphere, they should always 
reflect their relation to these spheres. However, science – or 
the sciences – should not be reduced to knowledge ready to 
be exploited for political interests. Rather, sciences ought to 
remain, or even become, independent in order to be able to 
develop critical perspectives on social and political processes, 
also and especially in times of globalization.
If one of the most definitive features of social and political 
processes today are their global dimension and long-term 
consequences, the question arises in what way society should 
be developed and what the main problems of future societies 
are. Therefore, future narratives in general and modelling of 
future scenarios in particular become important academic 
and political tools to reflect social dynamics. Narratives are 
the broader concepts and reflect in which societies humans 
want to live in, normatively, politically, or economically. 
Scenarios develop different pathways for such a concept of 
future society and what this means for politics or economics. 
Such scenarios can help to analyze the various practical 
consequences of political decisions or economic dynamics. 
They can help to achieve a better understanding of the 
impacts of different social, cultural, and political pathways. 
Therefore, they provide an analysis of complex global related 
processes and their long-term consequences and how they 
influence each other. 
Political Function of Scientific Research
Philosophically, such narratives and future scenarios imply 
some problems. First, I would like to mention a few inherent 
structural problems (a); in a second step, I will problematize 
the social function of such scenarios and reflect on 
the relation between future scenarios and the political 
sphere (b).
(a) First, future scenarios often suggest causal relations 
between different natural and social developments. If a 
happens, b will follow and imply c with a probability of 
x percent. Some models even try to quantify the consequences 
of different developments. This is the reason why (not all, but) 
many scenarios focus on economic costs of different pathways. 
Climate research is again a very good example of this. Since 
Nicholas Stern has shown which climate policies imply what 
costs (cf. Stern 2007), many other studies have conceptualized 
climate policy in the framework of economic costs.
While this way of arguing is important, especially for 
operationalizing different climate policy options, focusing 
or even reducing the logic of scenarios to economic costs 
tends to fade out other social dimensions or actors. One 
argument might be that values, social actors or cultural 
dynamics cannot be translated into the logic of quantification. 
But without these, important aspects of reality get lost 
in the ensuing political discussion of the consequences of 
these future models. For example, the diversity of cultural 
actors worldwide and their social and moral background is of 
particular importance in the social and political sphere and 
also tends to be an important driving force within the climate 
and development arena. While cultural actors such as change 
agents cannot be quantified like living standards or growth 
rates and therefore economized easily, this is no reason to 
neglect them. 
Religions as cultural actors might be a good example. From 
the point of view of a secular liberal paradigm, they do not 
seem to be as important as other actors. Nevertheless, they 
have much influence on climate pathways and therefore 
should not be excluded. 
As social capital, moral background or cultural 
actor, religions play an important role in 
the public sphere’ and are important levers. 
Therefore, religions should be integrated in 
modelling the future. ‘Religions are of course, 
ambivalent phenomena. (...) This is no reason, 
however, to reduce them to the private sphere. 
Only if people adopt climate issues within 
their own cultural and religious practices, can 
political programs be effective. In this way, 
religions could provide an important impetus 
for change. (Reder and Müller 2012: 117)
The second critical aspect is the concept of time that is implied 
in these future models. Often a classical physical concept of 
time is implied, which interprets time as equal units, which 
again could be quantified and put into a causal relation. Such 
a concept of time neglects the plural structures of time and 
the different interpretations of time, which always exist in 
the social and political sphere (e.g. the difference between 
‘personal’ and ‘social’ time or the different concepts of ‘future’ 
as framework of time). Future scenarios should reflect upon 
these various notions of time and thus should also integrate 
the pluralistic logics (e.g. cultural differences concerning the 
concept of time) which are embedded in these concepts. 
(b) It is not only the inherent structure of future scenarios 
which might be problematic; also the social and political 
function of such models also has to be reflected on critically. 
Ottmar Edenhofer and Martin Kowarsch (2015a) have 
developed a helpful framework of three different scientific 
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models which refer to a distinction Jürgen Habermas made in 
the late 1960s (cf. Habermas 1987). When Habermas discusses 
the relation between scientific research and politics, he 
identifies three different types of this relation: a technocratic, 
a decisionist, and a pragmatic model. Drawing on Habermas 
and Edenhofer & Kowarsch, I want to make some comments on 
these models and discuss a few critical points. 
The technocratic model applies wherever social and 
political decisions are quantified in future models. The central 
idea behind such scenarios is that the world is complex and 
we need to collect as much data as possible and try to form 
plausible models on that basis. In this technocratic model, the 
world seems to be much too complex for political decision 
makers. This is why natural sciences in particular develop 
quantifiable models to understand cause-and-effect chains. 
Sciences could (and should) identify the general aims of the 
respective scenario and also reflect the function of different 
instruments to reach those aims. 
The technocratic model claims that researchers 
should address both policy objectives and 
means, because many policy problems are 
assumed to be too complex for policymakers. It 
is assumed that modern science and technology 
can resolve these problems without implying 
ethical judgments. The task of policymakers – 
aside from generic agenda-setting – is 
reduced to formal decision-making and the 
implementation of scientific proposals as laws. 
(Edenhofer and Kowarsch 2015b: 7)
The advantage of this model is that it results in a clear 
roadmap: Science delivers the analysis and politicians have to 
implement the results. Of course, the world is very complex 
and highly dynamic, but the relation between sciences and 
politics should not be conceptualized in such a linear sense. 
Given my initial remarks and my comments on the self-
understanding of the sciences, this concept is insufficient. It 
neglects the dynamic interrelation between the social sphere 
and scientific research. From a philosophical point of view, it 
especially neglects the normative dimension both of research 
and political decisions and the interrelation between facts and 
values (cf. Reder 2012: 272). For example, sciences may well 
help us understand the ecological consequences of normative 
claims and also the normative implications of economic facts. 
Within the framework of research operations 
that expand our power of technical control 
we can make no cogent statements about 
“value systems”, that is, about social needs and 
objective states of consciousness, about the 
directions of emancipation and regression. 
Either there are still other forms of decision 
than the theoretical-technical for the rational 
clarification of practical issues that cannot 
be completely answered by technologies and 
strategies, or no reasons can be given for 
decisions in such issues. (Habermas 1987, 64) 
Future narratives and the connected scenarios could not be 
separated from, nor subordinated to, the political sphere. 
They always also imply normative judgements, which should 
be discussed in a comprehensive way. Science is always value-
laden, e.g. concepts of vulnerability of course imply values, 
which have to be reflected also in the social and political 
sphere (Edenhofer et al. 2012: 9–18).
Does this mean that only politicians (as representatives of 
the people) should decide political aims, and also narratives 
in general (including their normative dimensions)? Habermas 
calls this the decisionist model. According to this model, 
politics provides the objectives for future scenarios and 
researchers reflect only on concrete means and instruments 
which support these aims. Finally, politics tries to implement 
these means. However, this model, too, is problematic, 
because politicians are not able to understand all the long-
term consequences of their decisions. Deciding on objectives 
should be informed by sciences and their future scenarios, 
because they could help to foster understanding of the 
different pathways decisions imply.
The third model is the pragmatist model, which I would like to 
argue for. This model is inspired by the philosophical theory of 
pragmatism, which was developed by authors such as William 
James, Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey. Below, I mostly take 
my inspiration from Dewey’s pragmatism. In line with Hegel, 
Dewey interprets the world as a relational network of individual 
and collective actions in which experiences play a central 
role. He understands experience as an immediate stimulant. 
Simultaneously, each experience challenges human beings 
to provide a reaction. In gaining experiences, human beings 
recognize themselves as relational creatures and constantly 
expand their own individual experiences (cf. Reder 2015).
The difference between experience and rationality is that 
experiences open a ‘direct approach’ to human reality and 
to the starting point of action and motivation. Rationality 
only helps humans to deal with and use experiences in an 
intelligent way and, for example, explain their functions for 
processes of human self-determination. This emphasis on 
human experience pervades Dewey’s entire philosophical 
work, and shapes his understanding of philosophy by stressing 
that a distinction should no longer be made between a thick 
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concept of reason and a subordinated sphere of experiences. 
Therefore, future scenarios always have to take experiences 
into account. 
To understand how philosophical and political arguments 
originate from experience, a look at Dewey’s concept of 
the production of knowledge might be helpful, because 
experience also plays an important role in this process. ‘An 
ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory simply 
because it is only in experience that any theory has vital and 
verifiable significance. [...] A theory apart from an experience 
cannot be definitely grasped even as theory.’ (Dewey 2005: 
169) Knowledge, and this is also true of political knowledge, 
originates from the processing of experience. Therefore, the 
knowledge production must be thought of as a multistage 
process. In The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey (1986) identifies 
different stages of the inquiry of knowledge: identification 
of a situation which is experienced; reflecting this situation 
as a problematic situation; creating hypotheses on dealing 
with this situation on the basis of the intelligence of 
experiences; development of possible solutions; and finally 
the experimental evaluation for the purposes of proving the 
proposed solution.
What are the advantages of such an approach? Firstly, 
starting with experiences avoids scenarios being ‘ideal’ 
in the sense that they would identify clear and causal 
relations without integrating the complex effects on the 
people. Integrating all stakeholders with their objectives 
and preferences for different means avoids scenarios being 
exploited by political interests. This means that scenarios 
should always be understood as part of deliberative processes 
in which socio-cultural actors as well as politicians and 
researchers reflect on their hypotheses and evaluate the 
consequences of them again and again (cf. Kowarsch 2016). 
The aim is not one ideal scenario, but different scenarios 
which draw on experiences and are understood as part of an 
open-end deliberative process. Let me summarize this model 
with a quote from Habermas: 
In the pragmatistic model the strict separation 
between the function of the expert and the 
politician is replaced by a critical interaction. 
This interaction not only strips the ideologically 
supported exercise of power of an unreliable 
basis of legitimation but makes it accessible 
as a whole to scientifically informed discussion, 
thereby substantially changing it. Despite the 
technocratic view, experts have not become 
sovereign over politicians subjected to the 
demands of the facts and left with a purely 
fictitious power of decision. Nor, despite the 
implications of the decisionistic model, does 
the politician retain a preserve outside of the 
necessarily rationalized areas of practice in 
which practical problems are decided upon 
as ever by acts of the will. Rather, reciprocal 
communication seems possible and necessary, 
through which scientific experts advise 
the decision-makers and politicians consult 
scientists in accordance with practical needs. 
(Habermas 1987: 66f.)
Secondly, this approach also implies some important 
consequences for the concept of the ‘political’ itself. The 
political should be reduced neither to political institutions 
nor to technical explanations of social change, but should be 
understood as a dynamic and complex process of all people 
who are affected (cf. Reder 2016). Many, if not all, challenges 
that arise in the context of globalization are technological 
in nature. However, as Habermas argues, such challenges 
‘cannot be met with technology alone. It is rather a question 
of setting into motion a politically effective discussion that 
rationally brings the social potential constituted by technical 
knowledge and ability into a defined and controlled relation 
to our practical knowledge and will.’ (Habermas 1987: 61) 
This is especially important both for global and long-term 
consequences of current challenges.
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the state to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at 
least 25 % by 2020 and by at least 80 % by 2050 compared to 
1990 levels. North-Rhine Westphalia is responsible for about 
a third of German GHG emissions or about 7 % of the EU’s GHG 
emissions. The state thus has a key role to play in meeting 
national and European climate targets. 
The Climate Protection Law introduced in 2012 mandated 
the participatory development of a Climate Protection Plan 
(CPP) to break down the state-wide reduction targets into 
sectors and timeframes (Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen 
2013). Comprehensive participation of state-wide actor 
groups in the development of the CPP is central to NRW’s 
climate protection efforts (Fischedick et al. 2015; Vallentin 
et al. 2016). Actors from all societal groups, including state 
and municipal administrations, were involved over 2013 
and 2014 in six working groups representing the main GHG 
emitting sectors. Their task was to develop climate protection 
strategies and measures and to identify sectoral potential for 
climate protection via scenario development (Lechtenböhmer 
et al. 2015; Fischedick et al. 2015; MKULNV NRW 2014).
Important targets of the process were to integrate 
expert know-how, to maximize transparency, to increase 
acceptance and public engagement, to create an appropriate 
implementation culture and establish new cooperation 
schemes for this purpose, and to initiate joint approaches 
between actors, science and government. 
The participants from the industry sector included about 40 
representatives of 16 stakeholder groups (see Lechtenböhmer 
et al. 2015). They were invited based on prior stakeholder 
mapping carried out by the Wuppertal Institute for NRW’s 
Ministry of Environment. The target was to have a broad 
representation of the main industries as well as other relevant 
stakeholders from all societal groups. The majority of the 
stakeholder representatives came from firms in the energy-
intensive industrial sub-sectors, together with representatives 
from industry associations, trade unions, chambers of 
commerce, environmental and consumer organizations, 
associations of municipalities, academia and others. 
The group sessions were prepared by WI scientists but 
moderated by experts from a consulting firm. Researchers 
supported the refining of stakeholder proposals for input 
into the model and helped to feed model outputs back into 
the discussion. 
The Scenario Set-up
The scenarios for NRW consisted of sub-scenarios for each of 
the six sectors that were modelled, which made cross-sector 
adaptation of the scenarios necessary as sector participants 
Introduction
Dealing with the consequences of climate change and making 
the necessary transition towards low GHG emission energy 
systems are complex challenges which require integrated 
long-term strategies and planning. Energy system scenarios 
can serve as tools for making the necessary changes visible, 
analyzing their interactions and describing possible pathways 
to such futures. However, to implement these kinds of 
scenarios, they need to be shared by many actors and result 
in practical action.
Participatory processes are often perceived to be a 
promising tool for improving the implementation of long-term 
visions as embedded, for example, in the scenarios. Although 
there seems to be no general proof that participatory 
processes are effective in achieving the targets assigned to 
them, the findings by Reed (2008) indicate that participation 
is an instrument to improve decision-making processes. 
‘Participation needs to be underpinned by a philosophy that 
emphasises empowerment, equity, trust and learning’ (Reed 
2008: 2417). 
A participatory process may also lead to a better 
understanding of future developments, systemic interactions 
and targets by participating stakeholders because it enables 
them to learn about the instrument and the effects of certain 
assumptions. Finally, through this kind of learning and active 
involvement, it is hoped that stakeholders will support the 
targets as well as the associated measures and thus actively 
help to improve implementation.
In 2012, the German federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia 
(NRW) decided to establish its Climate Protection Plan in a 
participatory process with a large number of stakeholders 
from all sectors of society.
The design of the process was developed by the Wuppertal 
Institute (Zeiss 2012) on behalf of the State Environment 
Ministry as described, for example, in Lechtenböhmer et al. 
(2016). The present article hints at some of the difficulties 
associated with one of the core instruments of the process, 
the participatory development of GHG mitigation scenarios, 
focusing particularly on the discussions with industry 
stakeholders who formed one of six working groups (cf. 
Lechtenböhmer et al. 2015).
Example: The Stakeholder-Based Climate Protection Plan 
Process in NRW
North-Rhine Westphalia is home to one of the most important 
industrial regions in Europe, and is the first German state to 
have adopted its own Climate Protection Law, which obliges 
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independently designed their scenarios. The overall result 
was meant to be as consistent as possible, however.
For the scenario generation, the WISEE NRW Energy System 
Simulation Model was used. This is a bottom-up simulation 
model with a very detailed representation of energy system 
technologies and a low degree of endogenization, i.e. many 
parameters can be changed by bringing in stakeholders’ 
knowledge. Its focus lies on unveiling existing energy 
efficiency and GHG mitigation potential rather than finding 
the optimal pathway to achieve a given target (cf. Herbst et al. 
2012; Hourcade et al. 2006). 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the model architecture with a 
focus on the industry sector. Except for the power plant sector, 
the model does not represent economic variables. NRW’s 
energy demand sectors – including industry – are covered in 
detail, whereas the rest of Germany is represented on a more 
aggregate level, with the exception of power plants, which 
are modelled in high resolution for the whole of Germany. 
Figure 1: Overview of the WISEE NRW model system (industry focus) 
Source: Lechtenböhmer et al. 2015. Abbreviations: BF – Blast Furnace; BOF – 
Basic Oxygen Furnace; BAT – Best Available Technology; LC – Low-Carbon 
Technologies. Notes: 1 other than aluminium; 2 selected base chemicals 
(ethylene, ammonia, etc.). 
In the ‘Industry’ module, more than 20 energy-intensive 
industrial production processes are described, with all 
relevant input and output flows, together with various future 
technology options. On this basis, WISEE calculates energy 
demand by multiplying an activity value (e.g. steel production 
or gross value added (GVA) of an industry) with an energy 
intensity value. Energy-related emissions are calculated by 
multiplying energy demand by the emission factor of the 
respective energy carrier. Process-related emissions are 
calculated on the basis of activity rates (e.g. anode use in 
the aluminium industry or lime use in steel production) and 
technology-specific emission factors. 
The time series of energy intensities for production processes 
are determined for every sector-specific technology (e.g. electric 
arc furnace, blast oxygen furnace, steam cracking) and for cross-
cutting technologies (e.g. motors, lighting) in their respective 
modules. To do this, vintage stock models for all major plants 
in steel, aluminium, cement and ethylene production were used. 
A technology matrix provided base assumptions for the 
specifications of new investments or replacements (lifetime, 
efficiency, energy carriers) and their availability dates (see 
Lechtenböhmer et al. 2015). Stakeholders actively helped 
to construct the assumptions on best available technologies 
(BAT), i.e. technologically proven and economically viable 
options. Low-carbon (LC) technologies were chosen by 
the authors based on the literature, and were validated 
by the stakeholders, although at times were considered 
too ambitious. 
Electricity supply was simulated in detailed power plant 
dispatch models. Using an hourly breakdown of electricity 
demand, these models simulate the changing electricity 
supply for Germany until 2050. 
The Process with Industry Stakeholders
The aim of the work with industry stakeholders was to 
formulate the industry sector’s emission reduction scenarios 
and long-term strategies for the Climate Protection Plan and 
to validate the core assumptions. To do this, five stakeholder 
workshops lasting one day each were held between September 
2012 and November 2013. The aim of each workshop was to 
discuss and refine the inputs prepared by the Wuppertal 
Institute using the (WISEE) NRW energy system model. A 
sixth workshop was held at the end of the period to finalize 
the process and fix results in a joint decision.
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Figure 2: Overview of the process of scenario definition with industry 
stakeholders
In the first plenary workshop (P1), the model framework and 
starting assumptions were presented, based on the existing 
model and some preliminary work on mitigation potential and 
framework data. It should be noted here that all framework 
assumptions (e.g. energy and CO2 prices, population and 
GDP growth, and sectoral value added) were provided to 
the participants in advance in the form of detailed Excel 
tables. However, at this stage little feedback was received 
and stakeholders did not react to the assumptions so far. 
This happened later, after the first scenario results had been 
presented (see P3). Furthermore, before the discussion with 
the full group, a dedicated workshop with energy modelling 
experts (e.g. from energy companies) had been organized in 
order to approve and validate the overall model that was used. 
In a second plenary workshop (P2), the available technology 
options for emission reductions were discussed in 
subgroups for each industrial branch and were prioritized 
by the stakeholders. However, experts from companies and 
trade associations dominated the discussions due to their 
deeper and more sector-specific knowledge of processes 
and technologies. 
Based on the selection and prioritization process, a scenario 
was designed by the scientists; however, it very much 
followed ‘business as usual’ lines and was thus rejected by 
the Ministry. As a consequence, the researchers identified 
further mitigation technologies from literature analysis 
and discussed them sector by sector with stakeholders 
from the respective industries or companies. These sectoral 
background workshops helped to define technical parameters 
(lifetimes, energy and emission intensities, stocks) of the 
technology options and to discuss the details of the models 
with the stakeholders. 
In the third plenary (P3), a draft scenario with low carbon 
assumptions was presented but not discussed. As a result, 
after the plenary, intensive and detailed discussions on basic 
assumptions, such as prospects of future industrial production, 
were conducted with representatives of the energy- 
intensive industries. 
Representatives of several sectors questioned growth 
assumptions (they had not objected at the beginning of 
the process) and insisted on using higher industrial growth 
assumptions. Due to this discussion, three industrial growth 
scenarios were developed. The moderate scenario with an 
assumed average industry growth of 0.6 % per year in NRW 
between 2010 and 2050 represented the original assumptions 
that had been derived from recent energy projections at the 
national level (BMWI and BMU 2010), while the intermediate 
and high scenarios were based on a study on behalf of the 
German chemical industry (VCI and Prognos 2013) plus 
assumptions by industry representatives on their specific 
sectors’ growth expectations. This study only provided 
projections to 2030, so for the period to 2050, the high growth 
assumption by VCI and Prognos was used for the high scenario, 
whereas for lower growth, the BMWI and BMU assumption 
was used, resulting in average growth rates of 1.6 % and 1.2 % 
per year respectively. 
In a fourth plenary (P4), a draft best available technology 
(BAT) scenario and a low-carbon (LC) scenario featuring 
more ambitious assumptions – such as the development 
of a hydrogen infrastructure for NRW – were presented, 
both incorporating stakeholder-validated assumptions. 
The workshop itself was quite controversial, with industry 
representatives favouring high growth and conservative 
technology assumptions and environmental NGOs the 
opposite. After the plenary, six scenarios were defined that 
comprised three alternatives on industrial production growth 
(moderate, intermediate, high) and two alternatives on 
technology (BAT and LC).
In the fifth plenary workshop (P5), the results of the scenarios 
and the necessary policies and measures were discussed. At 
the end, no general agreement on the scenarios was reached. 
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Both ‘groups’ stated their respective views on the scenarios 
in the final report, which also provided an overview of all 
the results. 
Conclusions
It can be concluded that core targets of the joint scenario 
building process which were more on the qualitative level of 
creating mutual understanding among different groups have 
been achieved. The knowledge base among stakeholders 
in the field of low-carbon innovations was improved and 
there was a high degree of commitment in discussing and 
elaborating proposals for industry-specific innovation agendas. 
Furthermore, in spite of the controversial topics dealt with, 
a highly productive discussion culture was achieved. This 
helped to build trust among stakeholders, including several 
groups that did not cooperate intensively before. Awareness 
of the different perspectives among the stakeholders was 
also created.
However, several challenges for regional innovation 
strategies were encountered at the same time. The long-
term perspective (e.g. until 2050) of the scenarios was 
often difficult to discuss and implement due to the shorter 
medium-term focus of company R&D and industry strategies. 
Moreover, the established industries typically benefit from 
their existing assets, which have been developed over 
decades and therefore make it more difficult to exploit more 
radical innovations (cf. Wesseling et al. 2017). Nevertheless, 
stakeholders agreed that sector-oriented university research 
should be strengthened once more, as it had been a motor for 
innovation in the past but had partly been lost, at least for the 
smaller sectors.
In addition, many low-carbon innovations seem to be too 
large in scale to be pushed forward regionally, a) given the 
limited resources of the state government and b) sectors’ 
innovation systems are very often cross-border, not only with 
other states but also internationally. This is emphasized by 
the economic and technical structures of energy- intensive 
processing industries in NRW, which also limit regional 
options to increase innovation potential. The cement, glass 
and paper industries mainly consist of SMEs partly owned by 
foreign multinationals.
Finally, quite interesting innovations seem to exist in industrial 
symbiosis across traditional company and sector boundaries. In 
order to identify and exploit them, however, a regional cluster of 
various industries could be an important asset.
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Imagining Global Futures 
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The Ambivalence of Conference Diplomacy as an Exercise in 
Global Cooperation
The idea of global cooperation gained unprecedented 
momentum after the end of the Cold War and in the context of 
a new wave of globalization. The numerous World Conferences 
held in the early and mid-1990s even seemed to signal a 
fundamental shift of world politics from confrontation to 
cooperation as envisioned in the Paris Charter of 1990, the 
UN General Secretariat’s Agendas for Peace, Democracy 
and Development and the UN Report on Global Governance 
(Commission on Global Governance 1995). We know by now 
that the shift from confrontation to cooperation was more 
imagined than real. What we are confronted with today is not 
the decay of a post-Cold War cooperative world order but the 
limitations of global cooperation in the world order which 
emerged after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. 
When the World Conferences of the 1990s were convened, 
it quickly became clear that single conferences (no matter 
how comprehensive and ambitious they were) could not be 
expected to solve the problems they were to take on. Rather, 
the conferences as events were to be seen as starting points 
of open-ended processes of multilateral consensus formation 
and negotiation.1 This was a marvellous solution to the task of 
upholding a multilateral approach to global challenges in spite 
of its meagre immediate effects on the substantive issues. 
But it also raised the question as to what extent multilateral 
deliberations and negotiations serve as steps towards the 
institutionalization and habitualization of global cooperation 
or merely help to gloss over the harsh realities of global inter-
state competition for power and resources. 
In the issue area of sustainability and climate change, after 
many crises and near-breakdowns, conference diplomacy has 
led to much hailed results – most recently the adoption of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (September 2015) and 
the Paris Agreement (December 2015). However, following 
the by now established patterns, the meaning of these 
agreements for the issues dealt with depends on the follow-
up. And this follow-up, thus far, has not been very promising. 
On the contrary, while the US Administration withdrew from 
the Paris Agreement on climate change in blunt disregard of 
what the Obama administration had signed up to, countries’ 
individual commitments (which are up for periodic review) fall 
far behind what would be necessary to reach the overall goal 
of keeping climate change ‘well below’ 2° Celsius compared 
to pre-industrial temperature levels. As things look right now, 
this goal is out of reach in spite of the fact that greenhouse 
gas emissions have plateaued over the past three years. 
So does environmental conference diplomacy produce 
nothing but waste paper? Obviously, global cooperation 
The UN Sustainability  
Agenda: Helping to  
Face or to Elude Common 
Global Challenges?
Lothar Brock
1  For a regime-theoretical 
differentiation of the roles 
of international institutions 
(regulatory, procedural, 
programmatic, generation of 
norms) see Young 1999.
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not only involves good will and determination to serve the 
common good, but is also inextricably linked to particularistic 
interests that come to bear in the initiation and practice of 
cooperation. Thus it is by no means clear that cooperation as 
such will serve the purpose we attach to it when we juxtapose 
it with confrontation (Brock 2016: 67). Offering an alternative 
to confrontation is only one aspect of cooperation. The 
other is that it functions as a strategy for the enhancement 
of particularistic interests, especially by cutting costs and 
helping to legitimate the pursuit of these interests. From this 
perspective, talks on climate change might lead the public 
to believe that things are moving in the right direction when 
they are not. Such talks may also elicit expectations which 
are difficult to meet. The resulting frustration may foster an 
anti-universalistic backlash as we experience it today. In sum, 
global cooperation is not only about living up to common 
global challenges; it is also about hypocrisy, deceit, cheating, 
or free riding (or all of these). 
This ambivalence of the ongoing conference diplomacy is 
clearly visible in the history of the UN’s sustainability agenda. 
In this article, I address this history up to the SDG agenda and 
the Paris Agreement in order to draw some conclusions on 
what to expect in the future. To that end, I will also refer to 
some of the theoretical issues involved.
The Beginning: Protecting Natural Resources and Sidetracking 
the New Economic World Order
The (first) UN Conference on the Human Environment 
(Stockholm 1972) added the protection of natural resources 
to the agenda for solving ‘world problems’ such as security 
and development. This agenda transcended the Cold War 
constellation and as such interacted positively with the East-
West détente of the early 1970s. It was accompanied by a 
‘great debate’ on the limits to growth, unleashed by the Club 
of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972). 
The protection of the human environment and raising 
awareness of the limits to economic growth were claimed by 
its adherents to be in the interest of every society and every 
human being. Nevertheless, they led to serious controversies. 
The then so-called Third World suspected that the whole 
debate served the purpose of sidetracking its own agenda: i.e. 
the shaping of a New Economic World Order which would not 
only help to secure natural resources for global development 
but would redistribute the benefits accruing from the use of 
these resources. The Indian delegation to the UN conference 
in Stockholm famously stated that smoking chimneys were 
only a problem for the rich countries whereas for the poor 
they were a sign of hope. 
While the Indian delegation clearly had a point, the ‘sign of 
hope’ also stood for dramatically growing environmental 
problems in the form of pollution, soil erosion, the destruction 
of the ozone layer, new health hazards etc. The response of 
the United Nations to the North-South dispute was to try 
to reconcile the issues of development and environmental 
protection. The conceptual frame for doing this was 
elaborated by the Brundtland Commission on Environment 
and Development. The Commission focused on sustainability, 
understood as improving the well-being of all without 
compromising the life chances of future generations (World 
Commission 1987). Since securing the well-being of all was 
regarded as depending on development, it followed that there 
can be no environmental protection without development and 
no development without environmental protection. 
The ensuing normative nexus between development 
and safeguarding natural resources under the term of 
sustainability proved to be quite strong. Not in spite of, 
but perhaps because of its abstractness, the notion of 
sustainability inspired generations of scholars, civil society 
groups and politicians by allowing them to refer to the need 
for change (even radical change) without fostering immediate 
dissent on what that stood and called for. It also carried 
forward the emotional appeal of the Brandt Report, which 
had argued that South and North could only survive together 
(Brandt Report 1980). 
The Brundtland Report thus helped to diffuse the ideological 
cleavages dominating the East-West and North-South 
constellations by focusing on sustainability as a bi-partisan 
standard of adequacy in international relations. It redefined 
the ongoing struggles over justice, access and participation 
in terms of a universal common good around which the 
conflicting parties could re-invent themselves as part of an 
international community with a (however rudimentary) global 
we-identity.2 However, while this approach helped to develop a 
new conceptual focus on the need for and possibility of global 
cooperation, it also tended to gloss over existing cleavages in 
world society. This came to bear in the new millennium when 
the troubles of the old divisions proved to be more persistent 
than most people anticipated in the early 1990s. 
From Rio to Paris: Rising Ambitions, Faltering Confidence
The end of the Cold War offered a singular opportunity to 
overcome both the East-West and the North-South divide in 
world politics through the institutionalization of collective 
problem-solving. As mentioned above, this opportunity was 
seized by the emerging ‘international community’ in the form 
of a multitude of World Conferences which were built on the 
2  On the possibility of a global we-
identity cf. Grimalda 2016.
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premise that globalization called for global governance, i.e. 
governing the world without world government (Rosenau and 
Czempiel 1992). 
Global governance as a concept calls for an expansion of 
international institutional capacities for cooperation without 
leading to a state-like centralization of political competence 
and power. The World Conferences launched after the end of 
the Cold War met this task by transforming themselves from 
singular events into open-ended processes of multilateral 
deliberations and negotiations. This was not really new.3 But 
it became much more important than before for shaping the 
normative frame of reference in which international relations 
were to unfold. As a consequence, multilateral conference 
diplomacy within the UN system and at the regional level 
developed into a standard practice for dealing with issues 
of international concern.4 In this context, civil society played 
an expanding role as part of the respective inter-state 
deliberations and negotiations and, equally if not more 
important, by organizing their critics. 
In the issue area of sustainability, the Rio Conference 
of 1992 set in motion a process of deliberations which 
contributed considerably to our understanding of what is at 
stake when we talk about sustainability, what can be done 
to enhance it, how this can be done and who should be doing 
it. It took up the basic understanding of sustainability as 
spelled out in the Brundtland Report by linking environmental 
and developmental concerns. But it specified the political 
implications arising from this linkage in the form of ‘the 
common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) of all 
countries for coping with the need for sustainability. This 
formula anticipated a growing share of the Global South, 
particularly of the newly emerging countries, in the global 
emission of greenhouse gases, but it also acknowledged the 
historic responsibility of the Global West for environmental 
depletion and climate change. It recognised, too, the uneven 
capabilities of the various groups of countries to contribute 
to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, global warming, thus 
confirming the necessity of increased and more focused 
material assistance from the established countries for the 
less capable ones. This was a historic achievement which paid 
tribute to the possibility of global cooperation even in an 
extremely heterogeneous setting. 
On the other hand, the compromise on the issue of 
responsibility came about in a situation in which the liberal 
democracies considered themselves to be the winners in the 
preceding struggle between East and West. Accordingly, the 
compromise on who was responsible for doing what, while 
constituting a step towards global justice, was also in line with 
the ambition of the liberal democracies to universalize their 
norms and values in a post-socialist and post-colonial world. 
This state of affairs met with growing discontent, if not 
resistance, on the part of the Global South (Ziai 2015).
In general, progress in dealing with issues of sustainability 
(with the exception of the Montreal Protocol) was rather slow 
and the much hailed Kyoto Protocol lost a lot of its appeal 
as an instrument for combating climate change when the 
US, under the Bush administration, left it in 2001. Also, the 
developmental part of sustainability did not unfold in the way it 
should have according to the ongoing sustainability discourse. 
Thus a second big effort was made to link developmental and 
environmental issues (including climate change) when Kofi 
Annan launched the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
in 2000. 
The MDGs had a time horizon of fifteen years. A review 
after the first ten years offered evidence of some progress 
according to MDG criteria, especially with regard to the more 
traditional goals of development cooperation (reducing 
poverty, improving education and health services). This 
encouraged the international community to embark on a 
more ambitious post-2015 agenda which was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in September 2015. Three months later, 
the climate negotiations were finally concluded in the form of 
the Paris Agreement. 
The SDG agenda followed up on the approach underlying the 
MDGs by providing concrete criteria for measuring progress 
in the mitigation of social inequities and environmental 
stress. These criteria were set up in the form of seventeen 
Sustainable Development Goals. The seventeen goals include 
the eradication of absolute poverty, the reduction of social 
inequalities at the national and the international levels, 
the mitigation of climate change and the strengthening of 
governmental capacities to provide for peace, justice and 
effective governance. The SDGs allude to the need for change 
not only in the Global South but also in the well-advanced 
Global North. This orientation recognizes that modernization 
does not stand for linear and smooth progress, but rather goes 
along with depletion, social cleavages, unrest and collective 
violence. Thus, in spite of the factual heterogeneity of world 
society, the Global North is as much an addressee of the SDG 
criteria as the Global South is. 
In this respect, the Paris Agreement fits well with the SDG 
agenda as it too addresses all states and provides concrete 
criteria for measuring progress towards achieving the overall 
goal of keeping global warming ‘well under 2 degrees’ Celsius 
in comparison to pre-industrial levels. Each country is called 
upon to commit to a plan of action for contributing its share 
to the mitigation of climate change. These commitments and 
their implementation are subject to a review every five years. 
The idea behind this procedure is to institutionalize a process 
of continuous adjustment of national policies to the actual 
3  See the earlier debates on inter-
national regimes (Young 1982). 
4  For a historical perspective on 
this cf. Neumann 2016.
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requirements of mitigating climate change. This includes the 
improvement of the ‘resilience’ of societies in the context of 
climate change. An essential part of the commitment of the 
fully industrialized countries is to provide the necessary funds 
for enabling needy countries to live up to their commitments, 
to improve their resilience, and to compensate them for 
damage which they suffer due to climate change. The emerging 
countries are to join this financing scheme in the mid-2020s. 
At the first follow-up conference to the Paris Agreement 
(Marrakesh 2016), the procedure established in Paris was 
basically confirmed. Most countries did present plans of action 
operationalizing their specific commitments. Nevertheless, it 
was quite clear that the existing pledges would not suffice to 
reach the 2 degree goal. What made things worse was that 
even the self-styled climate avant-garde was falling behind 
its own schedule. Thus, greenhouse gas emissions in Germany, 
instead of going down as they should, are going up. Part of the 
problem is the continuation of open-pit coal mining and the 
refusal of the German government to go along with stricter 
EU controls of the auto industry. All other countries have 
similar conflicts of interests in which the dynamics of tactical 
manoeuvering at the domestic level may outpace the ability 
to mobilize public support for a conclusive commitment to 
cooperation at the global level. 
Oscillating Contours of Global Cooperation
Cooperation in Conflict
The negotiations leading to the SDGs and the Paris Agreement 
were arduous and long drawn out. For many observers, it 
amounted almost to a miracle that the agreements were 
reached at all. This goes especially for the Paris Agreement. 
From this perspective, the adoption of the SDG agenda and 
the Paris Agreement offer a hopeful sign that all is not lost in 
the pursuit of a cooperative world order. But global consensus 
formation (at least as an emphatic enterprise) is more difficult 
today than it was in the 1990s and confidence that crucial 
problems can be solved through ever more systematic and 
comprehensive international cooperation seems to be fading. 
Rather, coming together and moving apart have to be 
seen as interacting in a dialectical manner which responds 
to the very ambivalence of cooperation mentioned above. 
In general, cooperation is deeply intertwined with conflict. 
‘Cooperation functions as an important way of dealing with 
conflict and conflict is a major driver of cooperation’ (Brock 
2016: 67). The most common example of this relationship 
is cooperation as a means of enhancing one’s capability 
to pursue particular interests in dealing with third parties. 
This kind of partisan or ‘antagonistic’ cooperation (Brock 2016: 
69) comes in many forms and shapes, from military alliances 
to clubs and patronage networks, all of which are inclusionary 
and exclusionary at the same time. In fact, the modern 
nation-state is built on the co-constitution of belonging and 
not-belonging. The downside to this state of affairs is that it 
produces constant conflict about who belongs and who does 
not. The good side is that the co-constitution of inclusion 
and exclusion as such is an expression of challenges (security, 
well-being, agreeable climate) which all parties are facing and 
in principle call for cooperation across dividing lines. 
Global Public Goods, Fairness and Contestation
Such challenges may be defined in terms of global public 
goods ‘with benefits that extend to all countries, people 
and generations’ (Kaul et al. 2003: 23) and corresponding 
public bads under which everybody suffers (though in very 
different ways due to the existing disparities in power and 
wealth). The problem is that the maintenance of public goods 
and the avoidance of public bads generate costs. Since public 
goods are non-exclusionary, the maintenance of public goods 
(and the avoidance of public bads) causes constant quarrels 
about who is to bear the respective costs (problem of free 
riding). So there has to be some understanding of fairness or 
justice (or justice as fairness) deriving from the fact that the 
maintenance of public goods and the avoidance or mitigation 
of public bads constitute a global challenge (Albin 2003). 
As pointed out above, a rudimentary notion of fairness was 
achieved in the UN debates on global sustainability under the 
formula of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ as 
established in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The common but differentiated 
responsibilities of the participating states are to come to 
bear ‘in accordance with their … respective capabilities and 
their social and economic conditions’. The acceptance of 
this formula was and is of crucial importance for making any 
headway in coping with the substantive issues (poverty, social 
inequality, global warming, etc.). What this formula meant in 
practice was always contested. The same goes for its practical 
implications for who is paying or contributing how much in 
which way. But the principle as such was maintained all the 
way from Rio to Paris. Is this now changing?
The US in particular has always been sceptical of the formula, 
arguing that it could serve as an excuse for the Global South 
to do nothing while asking for more money. But only with the 
advent of the Trump administration did these reservations 
turn into a flat rejection of the very idea that the US should 
be responsible for contributing to global sustainability. 
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Against the background of the traditional US opposition 
to global commitments, which it fears will curtail its own 
freedom of action, and in view of the fact that the US once 
before withdrew from a cooperative endeavour to mitigate 
climate change by leaving the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the 
Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 
may not have come as such a big surprise. However, in view of 
the fact that deliberations and negotiations on sustainability 
have gone on in intense form for three decades, producing a 
considerable output of agreements, conventions and plans of 
action, two questions come up: (1) Why are so much time and 
money being invested in multilateral consensus formation in 
the first place? (2) Why do the results seem to mean so little 
when it comes to translating multilateral agreements into 
state commitment and action? 
As to the first question, conference diplomacy has become 
more and more sophisticated, costly and productive (in terms 
of sheer paper output) during the past decades. If we look back 
a little further, this may be regarded as following a historical 
trend emanating from the Congress of Vienna of 1815 and 
the Hague Peace Conferences, and materializing in ever more 
extensive multilateral agendas, first under the League of 
Nations, and finally within the UN system. With a view to this 
development, a Realist answer to the first question would be, 
of course, that the entire story is all about mobilizing support 
and cutting transaction costs in the pursuit of each country’s 
national interests under the condition of inter-state anarchy. 
But why, then, should extensive conference diplomacy be 
accepted as an adequate way of advancing the national 
interest in the first place? 
A different approach to the first question centres around 
the issue of communication as a factor influencing political 
perception and preferences in dealing with controversies. In 
International Relations (as an academic field), basically two 
approaches have developed since the early 1990s around this 
issue: socialization theory and research on the emergence and 
contestation of normative orders. Socialization theory looks 
at how participation in international communication changes 
the perception of issues and the patterns of responding to 
them. The patterns of response can be described in terms of 
rhetorical action which (as the Realists would put it) aims to 
maximize resources and cut transaction costs. But different 
from the Realists’ approach, it is the process of communication 
and not the anarchical structure of the international 
system which shapes behaviour (Schimmelpfennig 2001).5 So 
socialization theory is able to acknowledge the broadening 
and deepening of multilateral deliberations and negotiations 
by referring to the socializing effects of communication.
As to the second school of thought (research on norms) 
which has profited considerably from Habermas’ theory of 
deliberation, the idea is to move from ‘rhetorical action’ to 
‘communicative action’, i.e. from bargaining to arguing (Müller 
2004; Risse 2000). The concept of arguing opens up the 
spectrum of possible change in international relations even 
further than socialization theory does. Whereas socialization 
theory sticks (mostly) to processes of homogenization, 
deliberation theory (as understood and applied in research 
on norms) focuses on the interplay between the promotion 
of norms, institution-building and contestation. This interplay 
is seen as a way of changing normative orders which are 
understood as frames of reference for defining interests and 
legitimizing political action (Deitelhoff 2009; Wiener 2014). 
What does all of this mean with regard to the present state 
and future prospects of global cooperation for sustainability? 
Conclusion: Facing and Eluding Global Challenges in Theory 
and Practice
Apart from Realism, the theoretical considerations above 
convey the message that there is more to the politics of 
sustainability than the production of waste paper. The 
approach via the concept of ‘global public goods’ confirms 
the reality of such goods, but also points out the structural 
difficulties of providing for them (free riding). From this 
viewpoint, it would follow that ‘managing globalization’ is 
becoming more difficult as the global power constellation 
shifts. The ‘communicative turn’ in International Relations, 
for its part, points to the socialization effects of international 
bargaining (following a logic of consequences) or to the 
importance of arguing as a way of self-binding of actors 
(following a logic of adequacy). From both viewpoints (which 
seem to be merging), the UN sustainability negotiations can 
be addressed as the emergence of a normative order which 
slowly gains in importance as a frame of reference for national 
policies and politics. ‘Donald Trump’ (as an argumentative 
figure) does not upset this theoretical apple cart, but rather can 
be viewed as an expression of the ambivalence of contestation 
as strengthening and obstructing normative orders. The US 
administration seems to be in the process of obstructing the 
emerging normative order of sustainability but up to now it 
has not stepped out of this order altogether. Rather, it has 
called for a re-negotiation of the Paris Agreement, which 
would certainly water down the agreement, but also could be 
regarded as confirming the need to continue with some form 
of global climate policy. 
On the other hand, a mere ‘we keep going’ would certainly 
not make much sense with regard to making headway on the 
substantive issues. At best, it would keep up a fragile balance 
between facing and eluding global challenges; at worst, 
5  See also the regime-theoretical 
pioneer work on these issues 
(Young 1999; Young and Levy 
1999).
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it would lead to disaster (which not even the richest part of 
world society could reasonably hope to survive). Theory does 
not have much to offer to go beyond this spectrum. It has a 
hard time catching up with the events. International relations 
theory tries to do so inter alia by paying more attention than 
heretofore to the emotional side of world politics (Mercer 
2010) and also by reaching out for more interdisciplinary work, 
especially in the field of evolutionary biology, anthropology 
or economics.6 Whether this will lead to an entirely new 
focus on the way global challenges are being faced (Müller 
2017: 186) is doubtful. But I agree with Harald Müller that 
this interdisciplinary work would be underrated if ‘sold’ as 
just another ‘turn’ in International Relations. We should 
stop turning (round and round) and instead try to combine 
research on dissidence and resistance (Daase and Deitelhoff 
2015) on the one hand, and on political authority beyond the 
state (Zürn 2015) on the other in a new (also old) approach to 
the analysis of international relations as a system of rule. This 
would open up a new critical perspective on the SDG agenda 
and the climate regime as parts of this system. Perhaps we 
could then turn from deploring the growing difficulties of 
managing globalization to taking a closer look at the chances 
which the global power shift may offer for working towards 
a more cooperative world order than the one that emerged 
after the end of the Cold War. 
7  See the contributions in Messner 
and Weinlich (2016). 
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The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) depart from their 
predecessor, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in 
several respects. While the MDGs focused on classic Third 
World issues, the SDGs present a more aspirational agenda 
that addresses all countries – demanding, for example, not 
only to ‘achieve universal primary education’ (MDG 2) but 
to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and 
promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’ (SDG 4). The 
SDGs systematically address inequalities, which the MDGs 
did not, and they incorporate demands for environmental 
sustainability (Freistein and Mahlert 2016). In order to relate 
the SDGs to the overarching theme of the Masterclass, the kick-
off presentation focused on their sustainability dimension. Its 
main argument was that by framing sustainability in a rather 
idealizing, rosy and overly optimistic manner, the SDGs might 
not be able to motivate the necessary transformational steps 
for achieving the sustainability goals. This lesson, at least, 
could be learnt from classic scenario analyses. 
Threats and Promises: Different Ways of Envisioning the 
Future
In international development, the future has traditionally 
been framed in terms of opportunities for further progress. 
In the post-war years, these were opportunities for catch-up 
modernization of the newly independent nation states in the 
global South. In the 1970s, the prospect of the future was 
to achieve universal basic needs satisfaction, which would 
considerably improve the situation of the world’s poorest. 
In the 1990s, the UNDP’s human development concept 
envisioned a stepwise expansion of people’s choices. Thus, 
while concepts and goals have varied in time and between 
different parts of the international development community, 
all framed the future in terms of progress: Improvements in 
comparison to the present situation are typically envisioned. 
Environmental discourses, in contrast, frame the future 
in terms of potential deterioration, degradation and risk. 
They embody the prospect of ecological disaster, of natural 
resource exhaustion, water-related conflicts, degraded soil, 
floods and droughts (cf. Horn 2014). In these discourses, 
the order of the day is to avoid disaster, but not to achieve 
improvements in comparison to the present. 
While envisioning threats has not (yet) become a mainstream 
way of addressing the future in the field of development, in 
the scenario literature, the prospect of crises and disasters is 
a core theme. An early case is Pierre Wack’s scenarios at Royal 
Dutch/Shell (cf. Schwartz 1995). In the 1970s, Pierre Wack 
and his colleagues anticipated the oil crisis. They warned 
managers that the Arabs would very probably demand higher 
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prices for their oil, which would present an existential threat 
to the company’s survival. 
Shell’s directors listened carefully as Pierre 
presented [his] scenarios. The directors 
understood the implications: they realized 
that they might have to change their business 
drastically. Pierre waited for a change in 
behavior at Royal Dutch/Shell, but no change 
in behavior came. That’s when he developed 
his breakthrough: scenarios, as he later put 
it, should be “more than water on a stone.” To 
be truly effective, they had to “change our 
managers’ view of reality”(Schwartz 1995: 6f.). 
Here, Pierre Wack experienced what today has become a core 
insight of the change management literature: A necessary 
condition of successful processes of collective change is the 
acceptance – or internalization – of the need for change (cf. 
Kotter and Rathgeber 2005). Going beyond mere ‘cognitive’ 
knowledge of possible future threats, this includes an 
emotional and/or imaginative component. In particular, if 
present conditions are satisfying and ‘business as usual’ has 
proved successful, mere ‘information’ about a future threat 
will not motivate people to change their behaviour. 
Accordingly, Pierre Wack now developed a different type of 
scenario whose core intention was to make threats concrete and 
tangible for the managers of a hitherto highly successful firm. 
In this new type of scenario, there were no more 
simple tales of possible futures. Instead, Pierre 
described the full ramifications of possible 
oil price shocks. He tried to make people feel 
those shocks. “Prepare!” he told oil refiners 
and marketers. “You are about to become a low-
growth industry” (Schwartz 1995: 7).
A core challenge of the scenario technique, in this reading, 
is to ‘change the mind-set’ of recipients – to unsettle their 
complacency, to foil the human tendency to ignore unpleasant 
information. Only under these conditions will recipients take 
a future threat as a premise of their present behaviour. 
Internalization of Environmental Threats: A Necessary 
Condition for SDG Implementation?
While the SDGs are no scenario, Pierre Wack’s insights at Royal 
Dutch / Shell can be meaningfully related to them. In both 
cases, what is at stake are the very foundations of survival: 
in the case of Wack’s scenarios, the survival of a firm; in the 
case of the SDGs, the survival of humankind. Also, in both 
cases, the future threats are not yet perceptible for those 
(or many of those) concerned. The managers of Royal Dutch /
Shell were top leaders of a very successful firm in a global 
key industry. Similarly, the biggest polluters, who are key for 
achieving the environmental goals of the SDGs, are at the 
same those who suffer least from consequences of climate 
change (Beck 2010). Finally, both Wack’s scenarios and the 
SDGs are transformational agendas. Both demand changes 
in long-held patterns of thinking and behaviour (UN 2015: 1). 
Against the background of these similarities, three central 
questions guided the discussions about SDGs and Common 
Global Challenges at the Masterclass: 
1. Do the SDGs help to internalize the environmental risks we are 
taking, and should they help to do so?
2. Have the initiators of the SDGs internalized these risks, and 
have we internalized them?
3. How can the implementation of the SDGs’ sustainability 
targets be supported by making risks / threats tangible?
By taking a reflexive approach to these questions, the group 
critically highlighted three points. First, internalization of 
SDGs does not mean internalization of a threat but rather the 
beginning of a discourse. The ‘internalization’ of this global 
agenda – its ‘adoption’ – can only happen through participation. 
This will unavoidably make visible different views on the 
SDGs. The pluralism and diversity of the world will become 
manifest in discussions on the SDGs. To internalize the SDGs 
therefore can only mean starting to communicate about them. 
While welcoming pluralism, the group recognized a need for 
integration of different disciplinary perspectives, which led to 
the question how such integration could be achieved. Second, 
the alleged need for internalization of some future threat 
only follows from a particular notion of time. It presupposes 
a Western concept of time as a unilinear sequence of events, 
as a teleological process. But other cultural accounts imagine 
time as a circular process, or offer dialectical and more open 
time concepts. For some, present and future can co-exist in 
the same time in point. Third, calls for threat internalization 
raise questions of control, power, and gouvernmentalité: If 
people accept the threats discovered by scientists, and as 
a consequence, change their behaviour, they are, in a way, 
‘governed’ by the SDGs. Inducing fear in people can be an 
effective means of control. Therefore, the communication of 
threats should be carefully reflected upon. 
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Other arguments referred to different groups and societal 
sectors, asking which of them actually have internalized 
environmental risks, and which have not. Thus, from the 
perspective of science, it was argued, the problem is now 
implementation, but not internalization any more. But what 
about the public at large? Today, environmental issues seem 
to be well-established in the media. Rather than excluding 
environmental threats, the media are selective with regard 
to successes. For example, ozone depletion has been 
effectively stopped – but nobody knows that. In order to 
motivate engagement in environmental issues, there must be 
positive messages about successes that have been achieved 
(cf. Kotter and Rathgeber 2005). At the same time, such 
successes can foster trust that experts will deliver working 
solutions. An undue technological optimism, in combination 
with incomplete knowledge of risks, can be a barrier to the 
implementation of the SDGs. What is more, the media do 
not only report environmental risks – they also present 
advertisements that stimulate ecologically harmful consumer 
behaviour. Thus, large parts of the economy do not have an 
interest in environmentally benign everyday behaviour. 
The insight into the contradictory messages of the media 
turned the discussion to the link between environmental 
risks and individual behaviour. Narratives are needed in order 
to internalize and implement the SDGs. In contrast to the 
SDGs, which remain rather abstract, narratives incorporate 
concrete courses of action. With this, they provide a necessary 
precondition for SDG implementation: Only if they know what 
practical action to take can people contribute to realizing 
the SDGs. But what would be an appropriate scope of SDG 
narratives? There was a broad consensus on the need for some 
middle-level narratives. On the one hand, which of the many 
goals and targets are most urgent and most feasible, and how 
they can be achieved differs between regions and countries. 
This renders a global SDG narrative implausible. On the other 
hand, while local SDG narratives can be very effective, there 
is still a need for a more integrative view that makes visible 
how a larger collective can achieve the SDGs in a more or less 
coordinated way. 
Against this background, it was also discussed whether such 
narratives should only be positive or also be threatening or 
pushing. Several discussants had reservations about the 
communication of threats and negative messages. People are 
‘fed up with being guilty and not being allowed to do things,’ 
some argued. Also, research from behavioural economics 
shows that describing a behaviour as undesired usually 
reinforces this very behaviour. Therefore, using positive 
messages and designing choice architectures towards 
supporting non-polluting behaviour would be a more adequate 
means for implementing the SDGs (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
At the same time, in some cases, negative sanctions up to 
legal prohibitions seem to be the most effective way of 
inducing change towards more ecological behaviour patterns. 
Thus, Dalkowski (2017) calls on policy makers to prohibit 
plastic packaging where it can be avoided, for example, take-
away coffees and salads in plastic bowls, and to discourage 
unnecessary car trips, and the like. Against the liberal position, 
he argues that buying take-away coffee is not an essential 
freedom but rather flows from convenience. Just not having 
the option to consume in an ecologically detrimental manner 
would relieve people of the burden of decision-making and 
increase their freedom. In sum, ‘carrots’ as well as ‘sticks’ 
might be important parts of narratives that contribute 
effectively to implementing the SDGs.
Conclusion
What is interesting is that at no point did discussants take up 
the question of whether they themselves have internalized 
the ecological threats. In my personal view, some comments 
underlined the importance of internalization. They showed 
that we might not yet have internalized the existential 
character of environmental damage, and that such an 
internalization could powerfully contribute to implementing 
the sustainability component of the SDGs. During the 
Masterclass, the relevance of threat internalization was 
repeatedly highlighted by Nebosja Nakicenovic. In his 
presentation, he very clearly communicated the urgency and 
existential character of several ecological risks. As a take-
away, in his concluding remarks, he reminded participants 
that all of us would probably not have the time to reflect and 
decide on all the questions discussed during the Masterclass. 
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1 ‘Expect the unexpected!’
‘Expect the unexpected’ could be a general rule for scenario 
building and policy making for a sustainable future. The world 
has become much more unpredictable recently – many regions 
exhibit political constellations and developments which were 
inconceivable only a few years ago. The best plan is futile if 
its underlying assumptions change. The best international 
agreements might become worthless overnight if the political 
systems in the undersigning countries change. The lesson to 
be learned by those striving towards a sustainable future is 
to be prepared for the unexpected. This requires a bird’s eye 
view and consideration of the broadest set of challenges to 
sustainability. As in risk management, it is important to try 
to reach a complete 360-degree perspective on the topic in 
order to prevent the incident from happening. What are the 
challenges, what are the barriers to sustainability? 
The following remarks will first suggest a typology 
of barriers to sustainability, which should support an 
understanding of their nature and mechanisms. The paper will 
then, secondly, propose ten principles for sustainable action 
which admittedly do not address the barriers one by one but 
which could nevertheless support decision making processes 
at the actor level. 
 
2 Typology of Barriers to Sustainability 
In its report on a social contract for sustainability, the German 
Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU 2011) deals with 
barriers to a transformation towards a sustainable society. 
It discusses five types of barriers: path dependencies, tight 
timeframe, barriers obstructing global cooperation, rapid 
urbanization, and easily available cheap coal supply (e.g. 
WBGU 2011: 6, 64–5). These barriers differ in category: for 
instance, cheap coal supply can be seen as caused by a wrongly 
set market framework (i.e. neglected negative ecological 
externalities), while urbanization describes a multi-causal 
development, which comes along with modernization and 
social differentiation etc. 
This article suggests a typology of barriers to structure 
their categories according to their origin. Some barriers 
are inextricably tied to the concept of sustainability itself; 
they are bound to the very nature of the concept. They 
will be called intrinsic barriers. Trade-offs, for instance, 
are always involved in promoting sustainability, since 
there is no well-defined optimum in a multidimensional 
concept. Other barriers are just coincidental, contingent 
barriers. They might be difficult to overcome but they 
are independent from the concept of sustainability. 
In the following, they are called extrinsic barriers – they do not 
originate in the concept of sustainability itself. The current 
set-up of the market framework is one example and could be 
changed, at least in principle.1 
3 Intrinsic Barriers 
3.1 Barriers related to immediate threats: poverty, social 
instability and wars 
People will not care about the future if the present absorbs 
their full attention. Before bothering about mid- or even long-
term consequences of their actions, rational agents will care 
about their immediate future and protect their own lives and 
the lives of their loved ones. One does not need to accept 
Maslow’s pyramid in every detail to realize that immediate 
threats to physical existence preclude consideration of the 
long term. Data on countries’ environmental performance 
prove this relation. The Yale Center for Environmental Law & 
Policy publishes rankings of countries’ performance on 
environmental issues in two areas: protection of human health 
and protection of ecosystems (Hsu et al. 2016: 11). ‘European 
nations dominate the EPI’s top performers, with all of the 
top 10 slots occupied by European countries … At the Index’s 
low end, Sub-Saharan African countries are the poorest 
performers, occupying 16 of the bottom 20 positions’ (ibid.: 
112). The poorest environmental performers ‘are those with 
significant political or economic strife, suggesting again that 
other pressing issues can sideline effective environmental 
policy’ (Hsu et al. 2014: 1–2). Even worse is the situation in 
times of war – the most unsustainable condition conceivable. 
In addition to all the suffering and distress, wars often leave 
a significant impact on the environment. The WBGU describes 
this impact in terms of the ‘Scorched Earth Syndrome’, which 
implies a ‘loss of biodiversity due to chemical warfare agents 
(e.g. agent orange), permanent soil degradation due to mining, 
contamination caused by fuels and explosives, health hazards, 
greater flows of refugees’ (WBGU 1996: 120). 
3.2 Trade-offs
The multidimensional character of the concept of sustainability 
is most evident in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
with their 17 indicators and 169 targets. No rational and well-
meaning person could question any single SDG. Yet nobody 
knows whether it will be possible to achieve the 169 targets 
simultaneously. In fact, there are serious doubts about 
that. Sustainability in general and the SDGs in particular 
1  The following does not claim to 
give a complete list of barriers. 
Rather, it is an attempt to 
structure the most important 
barriers to sustainability – it is a 
work in progress and warrants 
further elaboration, justification 
and extension.
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include targets that are not attainable at the same time.2 For 
instance, we might not be able to meet the overall demand 
for biomass if we want to avoid further deforestation and 
desertification and preserve the few remaining natural 
habitats. A study by the Institute of Advanced Sustainability 
Studies concludes: ‘the proposed SDGs are not sustainable, 
because future demands for biomass, as implied by the 
proposed SDGs, cannot be met sustainably’ (IASS 2015: 4). This 
paradigmatically illustrates the intrinsic difficulty in achieving 
sustainability: seventeen sustainability goals claim to be 
sustainable but their simultaneous realization would not be. 
It would not be surprising if an optimization problem with 
169 parameters does not have a single global solution. Nobody 
knows whether a global optimum for this function would even 
exist in theory, not to mention achieving it in practice. 
3.3 Conflicts of interest
Closely related to trade-offs and inescapably tied to the 
concept of sustainability are conflicts of interests. The most 
obvious conflicts of interests are, of course, situations in 
which one party (or several) overrules the legitimate interests 
of other parties by exercising power. Limiting such power 
politics remains a constant struggle for humanity in general 
and for international politics in particular. It is not specific to 
the concept of sustainability but intrinsic. 
Conflicts of interest occur everywhere and often they 
raise difficult ethical questions. For instance, how do we 
morally assess the industrialized countries’ contribution to 
resource depletion, pollution and global warming? These 
countries have undoubtedly been the main beneficiaries of 
the booming industrialization. However, the severity of the 
related environmental impact is a rather recent insight – and 
responsibility presupposes some understanding of the related 
consequences.3 How could one fairly assess a moral obligation 
of the present for actions of previous generations? Humanity 
cannot afford for all developing and emerging economies to 
follow the historical pattern of the ‘North’ – but the ‘North’ 
has no right and no means to prevent growth in these regions.4
3.4 Complexity of functional chains
It is an essential insight of the concept of sustainability 
that today’s global challenges have to be considered and 
addressed in their context and their interrelation with other 
domains. The WBGU introduced the concept of syndromes 
to describe, illustrate and reduce the complexity of issues 
related to global change (WGBU 1996).5 Syndromes are trans-
sectoral in nature: they affect the atmosphere, the biosphere, 
the economy, society and different environmental media etc. 
(WBGU 1996: 112). The Sahel Syndrome, for instance, describes 
a complex of symptoms which occur when the ecological 
carrying capacity of arid regions is exceeded, leading to soil 
degradation, desertification, the depletion of fossil aquifers, 
a loss of biodiversity, changes in regional climate, migration 
etc. (WBGU 1996: 116, 117). Even this relatively confined 
pattern involves a great variety of factors, causal relations and 
interdependencies. Any prediction of future developments 
cannot be more than tentative and vague approximations. 
How can we hope to assess the long-term consequences of 
human behaviour in light of the huge complexity of the global 
nexus of ecological, economic, and social and political systems 
and their interdependencies? This is not an issue of ignorance 
alone – the future is principally unpredictable. History unfolds 
in contingent, accidental ways. Even simple mechanical 
systems exhibit (deterministic) chaotic behaviour.6 
3.5 Barriers related to the human condition 
There are some barriers which can be interpreted as side-
effects of the human condition, of humans as social beings and 
as humans as tool-making animals. 
3.5.1 Human laziness, ignorance and selfishness
The greatest contributions to unsustainability stem from 
structural, i.e. amoral reasons – an insight which alleviates 
moral agents’ burden. Nonetheless, human laziness, ignorance 
and selfishness also contribute. There is a lot that enlightened 
consumers, voters and citizens could know and could do, but 
which does not happen because of laziness, ignorance and 
selfishness. Our consumption of tropical fruits imports water 
and energy from the South, and our fast moving consumer 
goods are bought by greenhouse gases, pollution and 
questionable social standards in Asia. The abovementioned 
consumerism is partly driven by our insatiable desire for ever-
increasing consumption. Western lifestyles bear a considerable 
burden of global resource depletion and pollution.7 
3.5.2 Range and development of technology 
It is technology which made homo sapiens so powerful; through 
technology humans could become the most influential factor of 
our current geological era, the ‘Anthropocene’ (Crutzen 2002). 
Human behaviour has never had such far-reaching consequences 
in time and space. Radioactive waste needs to be stored away 
3  Less than 140 years ago, Thomas 
Huxley stated that ‘probably 
all the great sea fisheries are 
inexhaustible; that is to say, that 
nothing we do seriously affects 
the number of the fish’ (Huxley 
1883). 
4  Apart from moral reasons, the 
‘North’ should have a strong 
self-interest in substantial 
development of less developed 
regions, simply due to the 
abovementioned relationship 
between environmental 
performance and economic 
situation. 
5  Syndromes are functional pat-
terns, which ‘are unfavorable and 
characteristic constellations of 
natural and civilizational trends 
and their respective interactions, 
and can be identified in many 
regions of the world’ (WBGU 
1996: 112).
6  Deterministic chaotic means that 
the equations are all mechanis-
tic (i.e. Newtonian physics) but 
the result is still a chaotic and 
therefore principally unpredict-
able state.
7  This category is close to what 
WBGU calls loss aversion: ‘In 
addition, the main barriers 
which make it more difficult 
for certain individuals or 
social environments to make 
sustainable decisions are 
considered to be the lack of 
long-term orientation, loss 
aversion, and path dependencies 
in general.’ (WBGU 2011: 78ff.)
2  This is the definition of a trade-
off. According to Webster, a 
trade-off is ‘balancing of factors 
all of which are not attainable 
at the same time’ (https://
www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/trade-off, 
accessed 9 May 2017). 
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for a million years, germline modifications affect all descendent 
individuals, and the cumulative effect of the ‘normal’ usage 
of our technologies pollutes the planet in an unprecedented 
way. Strikingly different to this magnitude of human ecological 
impacts, however, is our limited ability to steer technological 
development and effectively control technological (side-)effects.8 
3.5.3 Differences and changes in value systems 
Different societies have different cultural heritages, value 
systems, concepts of justice, well-being, equity etc. There are 
different views on slavery, on colonialism, and, as mentioned 
above, on the historical contributions to environmental 
degradation. These differences challenge the conclusion of 
international agreements, which have become even more 
important in light of the global challenges. 
Moreover, the value systems are not static but rapidly 
changing. Value systems have always changed over time 
and evolved due to intercultural exchange. In the shrinking, 
globalized world of today, however, the speed of change 
and the exposure to different cultural traditions have also 
increased. Infrastructural, information and communication 
technologies have enabled and driven globalization at a 
breath-taking speed and depth9, challenging cultural and 
societal developments. Cities like Karachi, which were villages 
a hundred years ago, have evolved into megacities of millions 
of citizens. One need not follow Huntington’s theory of a ‘clash 
of civilizations’10 to realize that globalization is challenging 
traditional patterns and value systems. Globalization has 
intensified the challenge of modernity – but many people react 
against these challenges and ‘pull back from the disgrace of 
using reason in one’s own right’, which is Meyer’s definition of 
fundamentalism (Meyer 1989). However, fundamentalism and 
populism are gaining global influence and thereby fuelling 
social conflicts at the national and international level and 
endangering global cooperation. 
These five types of barriers – the dominance of immediate 
threats, trade-offs, conflicts of interest, the inherent complexity 
of functional chains and the constitution of humans and their 
societies – will always accompany any realization of sustainability. 
You cannot have the latter without tackling the former. 
4 Extrinsic Barriers
Extrinsic barriers are those which do not originate in the 
concept of sustainability. Two types are distinguished here. 
The first category relates to barriers resulting from faulty 
institutional frameworks (e.g. market framework), while 
the second category results from mechanisms which can be 
described as Zeitgeist-related. 
4.1 Barriers resulting from a deficient set-up of the institutional 
framework
4.1.1 Market framework 
The Brundtland definition of sustainability implies that no 
generation should burden future generations with the task 
of compensating for their expenses. This is applying the 
polluter-pays principle to generations. The originator should 
provide compensation. At least in the European context, 
there seems to be political consensus about this principle. The 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that 
the EU policy ‘shall be based on the precautionary principle 
and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, 
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified 
at source and that the polluter should pay’ (EU 2012: Art. 
191 (2)). In a similar way, the German Federal Government’s 
sustainability strategy postulates: ‘Each generation must 
solve its own problems and not burden the next generations 
with them. It must also make provisions for foreseeable 
future problems’ (Bundesregierung 2016: 12, 33). Despite 
such statements of intent, the market framework is not set 
up accordingly. In many cases, the polluter pays principle 
is violated. This is most evident in cases of environmentally 
harmful activities, which are subsidized in the order of EUR 57 
billion every year in Germany alone (UBA 2016: 6). Polluters 
do not pay – indeed, they are subsidized. The global subsidies 
on fossil fuels alone add up to USD 500 billion per year (IEA 
2014: 313).11
4.1.2 Lack of governance 
A sustainable future must be a future for all of humankind.12 
You cannot aim for a humane future by sacrificing humanity 
in the present age. Humanity’s fair and peaceful cooperation 
is therefore a precondition for a sustainable future. However, 
there are no effective global correlates to most of the well-
established institutions and authorities that exist at a national 
level. Furthermore, new actors have emerged from the private 
sector and from civil society who do not have a formalized 
mandate but have nevertheless become important stakeholders 
in international policy making. The urgently needed global 
governance ‘is still a work in progress and is advancing only 
slowly… The reinvention of policy under the conditions of 
globalisation is still in its infancy’ (Messner 2011: 20–1). 
9  This development started 
almost 200 years ago. Even the 
steamship was celebrated as a 
revolution by contemporaries, 
since it would ‘abolish the 
limitations of time and space’ (cf. 
Berg 2005: 35f.).
10  Huntington (1993) described 
different cultural backgrounds 
as major sources of conflicts 
in the post-Cold-War period: 
‘It is my hypothesis that the 
fundamental source of conflict 
in this new world will not be 
primarily ideological or primar-
ily economic. The great divisions 
among humankind and the 
dominating source of conflict 
will be cultural. Nation states 
will remain the most powerful 
actors in world affairs, but the 
principal conflicts of global poli-
tics will occur between nations 
and groups of different civiliza-
tions. The clash of civilizations 
will dominate global politics. 
The fault lines between civiliza-
tions will be the battle lines of 
the future.’
8  There are important exceptions, 
such as the banning of CFCs by 
the Montreal Protocol, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty for nuclear 
weapons and the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine, which 
prohibits, among other things, 
the cloning of human beings. 
The latter is even an example of 
anticipatory political action. 
11  The cheap and easy coal supply 
which the WBGU report refers 
to as one barrier (see above) is, 
of course, also one aspect of 
the faulty set-up of the market 
framework. 
12  This is both a factual and a 
normative statement. Factual 
because it is simply impossible – 
at least under the conditions 
of our current civilization in an 
interconnected world – that 
one region, state or community 
enjoys peace and harmony 
within itself and with its natural 
environment, while the world 
around it goes to pieces. It is a 
normative demand as well, since 
the concept of sustainability 
starts with ‘meeting the needs 
of the present…’.
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4.2 Barriers of Zeitgeist-dependent mechanisms 
A second extrinsic category comprises barriers that have a 
strong relation to the dominant patterns of consumption and 
production. Short-termism, rebound effect and consumerism 
might be viewed as Zeitgeist-related, since the Zeitgeist 
describes the ‘general intellectual, moral, and cultural climate 
of an era’ (Merriam-Webster). 
4.2.1 Short-termism 
Closely related to the market framework (but not limited to 
it) is the short-term orientation of the dominant incentive 
structures in our societies. Driven by rapid technological 
development (e.g. Moore’s Law), shortening cycles of 
research and development, of production and consumption, 
instantaneous global communication and social media, 
quarterly reports and investors’ expectations of a quick 
return, short-termism penetrates all aspects of life. In light 
of fierce global competition, speed and readiness are major 
competitive advantages – not only in business, but also in 
media, in politics, and increasingly in science too. Being fast 
does often beat being better. Seeking proper, sound and 
sustainable solutions does take time (and costs). How can we 
establish sustainable solutions if success is being measured 
in annual quarters, if politicians are competing in terms of 
legislative periods, but the implications of their decisions will 
literally affect the next million years?13 The urgent dominates 
the important – that is a huge challenge for realizing viable, 
future-oriented, sustainable solutions.14
4.2.2 Rebound effect 
Technologically driven efficiency gains are often (over-)
compensated by a change in behaviour and lifestyles.15 
As Ian Barbour puts it: ‘Yesterday’s luxuries are today’s 
necessities’ (Barbour 1993: 14). Natural resources (as well as 
the environment as a sink for our industrial metabolism) are so 
cheap that technological progress leads primarily to increased 
comfort and luxury instead of more efficient use of resources.16 
For instance, since the 1970s the heating demand for German 
households has decreased by one third – if calculated per 
space. The heating demand per capita, however, has actually 
increased, since the living space per capita has expanded by 
more than 70 percent in the same period (BMWi 2011: 29). 
4.2.3 Consumerism
The prevailing consumerism is a major driver of resource 
depletion and pollution, in short: of non-sustainability. Erich 
Fromm sees consuming as ‘a form of having, maybe the most 
important one in today’s “abundance societies”’. Consuming 
would diminish anxiety, ‘since that which I consume cannot be 
taken away from me, but it forces me to consume more and 
more, since that which is consumed shortly ceases to satisfy me. 
The modern consumer could identify with the formula: “I am, 
what I have and what I consume”’ (Fromm 1980: 37)17. Arguing 
for the autonomous laws of consumption, Günther Anders 
even states: ‘Most products … hunger for being-consumed… In 
order to get the production going, another product (of second 
order) needs to be created and squeezed between product and 
human being, and this product is called “demand”. … We need 
to need products in order to be able to consume them’ (Anders 
1980: 16). This is exactly the situation Steve Jobs, co-founder 
and chairman of Apple Inc. describes, although he comes from 
a quite different living environment: ‘People do not know what 
they want until you show it to them’ (Jobs 1998). 
5 Addressing the Barriers: Tentative Principles for Sustainable 
Action 
How can such a typology of barriers help to operationalize 
sustainability? There is no quick fix to any barrier discussed 
above. Each barrier relates to a great variety of actors, levels 
and institutions. Nevertheless, the typology described can 
help in identifying what is most needed in each category. In 
the following, I suggest a list of principles for sustainable 
action. Many of them apply to different barriers. However, 
whereas the typology of barriers comes from the conceptual 
level, as it were from the top down, the action principles come 
from the bottom up and take an actor’s perspective. 
1. Strive for Peace and Poverty Reduction 
Ending human suffering and alleviating misery is one of the 
most noble and most important aspirations. These are goals 
in themselves and do not require any further justification. 
However, we could see social stability and peace as essential 
preconditions for any pursuit of sustainability as well (cf. 3.1). 
Being busy with combating climate change, we might not 
realize that international conflicts can pose a much greater 
risk to the Paris Agreement than unambitious NDCs18.
13  Consider, for instance, final 
storage facilities for radioactive 
waste. 
15  There are several different 
types of rebound effects. 
Tilmann Santarius distinguishes 
thirteen different rebound 
effects for energy efficiency 
alone (Santarius 2012). In the 
current context, however, 
it is sufficient to refer to 
the principle they all share: 
efficiency gains are (over-)
compensated by behavioural 
changes. 
16  This points to the importance of 
a proper set-up for the market 
framework.
14  The lack of long-term 
orientation is also one of the 
barriers discussed in the WBGU 
report on transformation 
(WBGU 2011: 78). 
17  Translated from German by the 
author. 
18  Nationally Determined Contri-
butions.
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2. Strengthen Mutual Understanding, Dialogue Capabilities 
and Mindfulness 
The best plans can fail if not everybody at the table feels respected 
and honoured. There is an increasing awareness of the potential of 
mutual understanding, of nonviolent communication and dialogue, 
of collective leadership and mindfulness. Scholars like Marshall 
B. Rosenberg19, Otto Scharmer20 and Steven R. Covey21 have 
pointed to intangible, ‘soft’ skills and their importance for conflict 
resolution, negotiation and leadership (cf. 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5). 
3. Maintain or Increase Option Diversity 
We do not know what the future will bring, and we can hardly 
tell what would really be sustainable in the long run. However, 
we do know that we need to maintain our flexibility to respond 
to unforeseeable developments. The more uncertain the 
future gets, the more important it will be to keep and maintain 
a plurality of options.22 This implies avoiding lock-in effects. 
We should be aware of path dependencies (cf. WBGU 2011: 
78ff.) and avoid actions which predetermine future action in 
an unsustainable manner. Any deploying of coal-fired power 
plants today implies related carbon emissions for the coming 
decades of operation. Maintaining or increasing the option of 
diversity is a general principle for any intelligent actor at all 
levels, from individual behaviour to geopolitical crises. 
4. Increase Transparency 
Conflicts of interests and trade-offs cannot be avoided (cf. 3.2, 
3.3) but they should be made obvious to allow public debate 
and discourse. Transparency is a key prerequisite for any fair 
negotiation – transparency about the stakeholders, their 
respective interests, and about winners and losers of different 
policy options. Of course, there will always be a mismatch in 
power of the parties involved but without transparency, any 
public awareness of inequities will be impossible. A lack of 
transparency about international value chains, about pollution 
or non-compliance with labour standards leaves consumers 
ignorant about the effect of their consumption. Intransparent 
financial flows obscure illegal and illegitimate operations. 
Lobby groups imperil democratic decision-making processes 
if they operate without transparency. There are various 
constellations in which increased transparency could avoid 
fraud, support fairness, and provide a basis for negotiations.
5. Establish Long-Term Incentives
Most areas of modern life exhibit short-term incentives 
(cf. 4.2.1). Reward is promised in terms of hours (‘overnight 
delivery’), success is measured in quarters, compensation 
systems are bound to quarterly or annual performance, and 
politics is mostly concerned with a period of a few years as 
well. Compared to the timespans of processes of global 
change, ocean acidification or climate change, almost all 
human incentive structures are short-term. It is difficult 
to fight the Zeitgeist but an awareness of the issue might 
stimulate creative ways of implementing long-term thinking. 
6. Implement and Observe the Precautionary Principle 
Often we cannot foresee the long-term implications of 
technologies and their usage (cf. 3.5.2). The precautionary 
principle could decelerate the roll-out and development 
of technologies. In a competitive global market, however, 
such principles will be seen as innovation brakes. To become 
effective, therefore, there will inevitably be a need to find 
global consensus on this principle – which also highlights the 
importance of the next principle. 
7. Explore Mechanisms of and Seek Partnerships for Multi-Layered 
Governance 
Effective global governance is a pivotal precondition for 
tackling many other barriers (deficient market framework, 
conflict resolution, peacekeeping etc.). While efforts are 
needed to reform and empower global institutions (above 
all the UN), cross-sectoral, multi-layered collaboration 
might be more promising in the short term. Multi-
stakeholder initiatives have driven de facto standards 
for businesses commitments towards sustainability 
(UN Global Compact), for disclosure of GHG emissions 
(Carbon Disclosure Project) or corporate reporting (Global 
Reporting Initiative). NGOs advise governments and 
corporations alike, and they have become indispensable 
voices in the call for sustainability. Global governance 
policy needs to account for this new role of the private 
sector and for multi-actor scenarios (cf. Messner 2011: 19). 
Cross-sectoral partnerships should be sought and fostered. 
The mechanisms of multi-layered governance need to 
be explored, and top-down and bottom-up governance 
approaches need to be combined (cf. WBGU 2016: 384).23 
19  Rosenberg developed the 
globally applied method of non-
violent communication. He used 
this method in several peace 
programmes in conflict zones 
(Rosenberg 2001: 212).
20  In his Theory U Otto Scharmer 
attempts to explore the source 
from which we operate: ‘We 
know a great deal about what 
leaders do and how they do it. 
But we know very little about 
the inner place, the source from 
which they operate.’ (Scharmer 
2007)
21  Covey pleads for emphatic 
listening for a genuine under-
standing of another person and 
for thinking in terms of win-win 
as a code of human interaction 
(Covey 2004). 
22  The idea of maintaining option 
diversity is taken from Hubig 
(1993).
23  ‘Overall, the WBGU advocates 
a mix: vertical, top-down 
governance structures should 
be complemented by bottom-up 
approaches’ (WBGU 2016: 384).
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8. Seek Multiple Wins 
The world is increasingly networked; networks have become 
the dominant structural form in personal relations, in business, 
among activists and scientists, but also among terrorists and 
criminals and many more. The operation of networks requires 
mechanisms of mutual exchange. Mutual benefits, trust and 
openness are therefore much more significant in networks 
than in other forms of organization like markets or hierarchies 
(cf. Powell 1990; Berg 2005: 206f.).24 The more important 
networks become as players on the international scene, the 
more important it will be to seek multiple wins – for instance, 
in mitigating conflicts of interest (3.3) or conflicting value 
systems (3.5.3). 
9. Reduce Complexity – Make the Sustainable Solution the 
Simplest One 
Currently, the more sustainable alternative is mostly not 
only the more expensive one (due to additional costs of 
incorporating the effects of negative externalities) but also 
the more complicated one. At the consumer level, ‘sustainable’ 
needs to mean ‘simple’ in order to be adopted. We cannot 
burden the consumer, for instance, with the hassle of studying 
several different labels at the point of sale.25 If we want to 
tackle human laziness and ignorance (3.5.1), we need to reduce 
the complexity of global interdependencies and causal chains 
for the context of individual behaviour. 
10. Foster Interdisciplinarity and Comprehensive Visions 
Today’s challenges cross the borders of our disciplines and 
categories. Interdisciplinary collaboration is often claimed but 
difficult to achieve in substance. Continuous efforts are needed 
to counterbalance ever-increasing specialization with measures 
of knowledge integration, cross-disciplinary learning, and 
self-critical reflection on the strengths and limits of one’s own 
disciplinary methods and paradigms. Furthermore, any isolated 
promotion of single SDGs risks thwarting other goals. It is not 
even clear whether the SDGs in total can be reached sustainably 
(cf. 3.2). We need to develop comprehensive visions which 
address several SDGs at the same time without imperilling 
the others. ‘Desert2Eden’ is such a vision – combining the 
rehabilitation of damaged ecosystems in arid regions with the 
use of solar radiation and infrastructure development – which 
could potentially support the achievement of nine (of the 17) 
SDGs directly (cf. Berg 2015). 
To sum up, we can see that the multitude of barriers to 
sustainability can be categorized according to their origin. 
The suggested typology, although only an initial and tentative 
proposal, takes a conceptual, top-down view of the different 
barriers. The proposed principles for sustainable action, 
however, take a bottom-up approach, an actor perspective. 
They are meant to support practical decisions in politics, in 
business, in civil society or personal life. Most principles tackle 
several barriers. The hope is that they will help in addressing 
the barriers, reducing complexity for the individual and 
supporting the transition to a more sustainable global society. 24  This only refers to the internal 
functioning of a network and 
does not exclude, of course, 
the possibility that a network 
operates with opposing 
attributes to the world outside 
of it. 
25  For this reason the Task Force 
for Sustainable Business and 
Growth within Chancellor 
Merkel’s future dialogue 
suggested the development of 
a ‘meta-label’ for sustainable 
consumption, which would 
enhance transparency on 
a product’s sustainability 
performance along its entire 
value chain (Berg et al 2012: 
90f.). 
REFERENCES
Barbour, Ian G. (1993). Ethics in an Age of Technology: The Gifford Lectures 1989-
1991, Volume 2, San Francisco, Calif.: Harper. 
Berg, Christian (2005). Vernetzung als Syndrom. Risiken und Chancen von 
Vernetzungsprozessen für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung, Frankfurt: 
Campus.
― et al. (2012). ‘Nachhaltiges Wirtschaften und Wachstum‘, in Presse und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (ed.), Dialog über Deutschlands 
Zukunft: Ergebnisbericht des Expertendialogs der Bundeskanzlerin, Berlin, 
84–92.
― (2015). ‘Desert2Eden. Integrated restoration and development of 
arid regions to address the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)’, 
GESolutions, Global Economic Symposium 2015, Kiel, 89–93.
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi) (2011). Forschung 
für eine umweltschonende, zuverlässige und bezahlbare Energieversorgung, 
Berlin.
Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2016). Deutsche 
Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, Berlin. 
Covey, Stephen R. (2004). The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Restoring the 
Character Ethic, New York, NY: Free Press.
Crutzen, Paul (2002). ‘Geology of Mankind’, Nature 415: 23.
European Union (2012). Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:120 
12E/TXT&from=DE, accessed 05.05.2017.
Hsu, Angel et al. (2014). The 2014 Environmental Performance Index, New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, www.epi.yale.
edu, accessed 29.05.2017.
― et al. (2016). 2016 Environmental Performance Index, New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University, https://issuu.com/2016yaleepi/docs/epi2016_final, 
accessed 17.09.2017.
Fromm, Erich (1980). Haben oder Sein. Die seelischen Grundlagen einer neuen 
Gesellschaft (1979), 6. Auflage, München: dtv. 
9392
Hubig, Christoph (1993, 1995). Technik- und Wissenschaftsethik: Ein Leitfaden, 
Berlin / Heidelberg / New York: Springer.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 
1 June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993- 
06-01/clash-civilizations, accessed 10.05.2017.
Huxley, Thomas (1883). Inaugural Address of the Fisheries Exhibition in London, 
http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/SM5/fish.html, accessed 15.05.2017.
Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) (2015). The Role of Biomass 
in the Sustainable Development Goals: A Reality Check and Governance 
Implications, corrected 2nd edition, Potsdam.
International Energy Agency (2014). World Energy Outlook 2014, Paris, http://
www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2014.pdf, 
accessed 29.03.2017.
Jobs, Steve (1998). BusinessWeek, 25 May, quoted according to https://
archive.wired.com/gadgets/mac/commentary/cultofmac/2006/03/7051
2?currentPage=all, accessed 08.05.2017.
Messner, Dirk (2011). ‘Three Waves of Global Change. The Dynamics of Global 
Governance in the First Half of the 21st Century’, in Thomas Fues, and 
Youfa Liu (eds.), Global Governance and Building a Harmonious World, 
Studies, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 9–38.
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/zeitgeist, 
accessed 13.05.2017.
Meyer, Thomas (1989). Fundamentalismus: Aufstand gegen die Moderne, 
Hamburg. 
Powell, Walter W. (1990). ‘Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of 
Organization’, Research in Organizational Behavior 12: 295–336.
Rosenberg, Marshall B. (2001). Nonviolent Communication: A Language of 
Compassion, Encinitas, Calif.: Puddledancer Press.
Scharmer, Otto (2007). Leading from the Future as it Emerges, http://
w w w. p re s e n c i n g .co m /s i te s /d e f a u l t / f i le s /p a g e - f i le s / T h e o r y _ 
U_2pageOverview.pdf, accessed 22.05.2017.
Santarius, Tilmann (2012). Der Rebound-Effekt: Über die unerwünschten Folgen 
der erwünschten Energieeffizienz, Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institut für 
Klima, Umwelt, Energie GmbH .
Umweltbundesamt (UBA) (2016). Umweltschädliche Subventionen in 
Deutschland, aktualisierte Ausgabe, Dessau. 
WBGU – German Advisory Council on Global Change (1996). World in Transition: 
A Research Challenge, Berlin: Springer. 
― (2011). World in Transition: A Social Contract for Sustainability, Berlin: WBGU.
― (2016). Humanity on the Move: Unlocking the Transformative Power of Cities, 
Berlin: WBGU.
Development Strategies 
with Low GHG Emissions: 
The Case of Brazil  
Emilio Lèbre La Rovere
9594
1 Introduction
Brazil occupies a unique position among the major greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emitting countries due to its low per capita energy-
related GHG emissions (2.4 metric tons CO2e in 2014), 
attributable to Brazil’s abundant clean energy sources. The 
sources of major emissions have historically been concentrated 
in agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU), and are 
related mostly to deforestation, crop growing and livestock. 
Recently, deforestation in Brazil has slowed considerably, to 
the point where forestry has ceased to be the major source of 
emissions. Thanks to reduced deforestation, Brazil cut its overall 
GHG emissions by 41 % from 2005 to 2012, and its total GHG 
emissions per capita decreased from a high of 14.4 tCO2e in 2004 
to an estimated 6.5 tCO2e in 2012 (La Rovere et al. 2013). 
Brazilian GHG emissions increased from 1.4 billion metric 
tons CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) in 1990 to 2.1 GtCO2e in 
2005, followed by a substantial reduction to 1.4 GtCO2e in 
2010, thanks to the sharp fall in the rate of deforestation 
(see Figure 1).
strategies, while pursuing higher living standards for its 
population. Average annual income per capita in 2005 was 
only $4,767. Inequality, as evidenced by Brazil’s uneven income 
distribution, is a major problem. Brazil has made some progress 
in reducing income inequality in the last decade, thanks to the 
government consistently increasing the minimum wage faster 
than the inflation rate and introducing social transfer programmes 
(e.g. Bolsa Família). They decreased the Gini coefficient from 0.57 
in 2005 to 0.53 in 2013, but inequalities are still a leading concern: 
in 2013, 15.5 million people in Brazil were living below the poverty 
line, of whom 6.2 million were living in extreme poverty. Inequality 
between regions is also a problem; reducing this is the objective of 
some regional incentive programmes.
2 Brazil’s Future Low-Emission Development Pathways: the 
IES-Brasil study 
2.1 A process designed for stakeholder involvement
The IES-Brasil study (La Rovere et al. 2016) has assessed the 
economic and social implications of different sets of GHG 
mitigation measures in Brazil up to 2030. Besides this new focus, 
which has bridged a key gap in the Brazilian literature in this field, 
another difference from previous scenario exercises was its use of 
a Scenario Building Team (SBT), made up of experts representing 
the viewpoints of a range of stakeholders. In a process involving 
five meetings and permanent exchanges in 2014 – 2015 and lasting 
more than one year, the SBT discussed the scenario assumptions 
for the implementation of a wide spectrum of mitigation measures 
in Brazil, including: energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, 
low-carbon agriculture and cattle raising techniques, transport 
modal shifts, methane capture in the waste sector (landfills and 
sewage treatment plants), and reforestation with native and 
fast growth species. This group agreed on assumptions for two 
scenarios with additional mitigation measures going beyond 
the extension of current governmental plans (the Governmental 
Planning Scenario, GPS). Its work was based on the assessment of 
barriers to the penetration of these mitigation options and the 
policy tools and measures required to overcome them. 
The SBT agreed on assumptions for two scenarios (AM1 
and AM2) with additional mitigation measures going beyond 
the extension of current governmental plans, one including 
measures costing up to US$20/tCO2eq, and the other up to 
US$100/tCO2eq. The study also assessed the macroeconomic 
and social impacts in Brazil should a global carbon tax on burning 
fossil fuels be agreed, testing both US$20 and US$100 per 
tCO2eq (2005 values) in the AM1+T and AM2+T scenarios. The tax 
revenues were supposed to be fully recycled through lower social 
security taxes on labour, so that fiscal neutrality was ensured. 
Figure 1: GHG Emissions by Source in Brazil, 1990–2010
Source: Brazil 2016 (million tons of CO2e – MtCO2e using GWP-100, IPCC 
AR5), except for 2005; data for Land Use and Total in 2005 consistent with the 
Brazilian iNDC (Brazil 2015)
As a consequence of the lower rate of deforestation, the share 
of CO2 in the GHG emissions mix declined sharply between 2005 
and 2010. The recent upturn in GHG emissions has been driven, 
notably, by methane emissions from enteric fermentation 
in Brazil’s large cattle herd (numbering 213 million head in 
2012). Also, the share of fossil fuel combustion in total GHG 
emissions has been steadily increasing in recent years. Fossil fuel 
combustion ranked second, after agriculture and livestock, in 
2010 (see Figure 1). Among fossil fuels, oil is by far the dominant 
source of CO2 emissions, followed by natural gas and coal (220, 
62 and 44 MtCO2 in 2010, respectively).
Brazil faces the challenge of building upon its historically low 
energy-related GHG emission levels through new decarbonization 
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Preliminary results of IMACLIM-BR scenario runs were 
discussed, eventually improved and finally validated by the 
SBT. As a result, the Brazilian government had access to pioneer 
insights about the macroeconomic and social implications of 
additional mitigation scenarios up to 2030, providing valuable 
inputs from a variety of stakeholders to the decision-making 
process about the Brazilian pledge to COP 21 in Paris.
2.2 Methodological framework
The development of IMACLIM-BR was key in making it possible 
to carry out the IES-Brasil study. The investment required for the 
transformations is assessed through a one-way soft-link in sectoral 
modules with which a series of mitigation actions are associated. 
Each mitigation action presents, for a given level of specification, 
a cost and an energy use profile. For example, energy efficiency 
actions show a reduction in energy in their energy use profile, 
whereas mitigation actions related to biofuels consist of switching 
from fossil to renewable energy. Mitigation actions that are not 
related to energy demand or supply in the AFOLU and waste 
sectors are assessed directly through their associated emissions.
These sectoral results provide inputs to the CGE model 
IMACLIM-BR (see Figure 2). In this model, the technical 
coefficients of low-carbon scenarios are calibrated according 
to the percentage variation of energy use compared to the 
reference scenario, the Governmental Planning Scenario (GPS). 
Monetary values are the total investment requirements for all 
mitigation actions considered, per sector. The model ensures 
macroeconomic consistency between the sectoral modules and 
IMACLIM-BR framework through a few key variables, such as 
population, GDP, GDP structure and final energy consumption. 
Figure 2: The Modelling Framework
Source: La Rovere et al. 2016
2.3 Main findings
An overview of the main findings of IES-Brasil, grouped 
according to their corroborative or innovative nature, is 
provided below:
In corroboration of previous studies, IES-Brasil concludes that: 
1. The effort to regulate and decrease deforestation is the 
foremost element that will enable the country to meet 
its emissions reduction targets for 2020, established by 
law following the agreement made in Copenhagen. The 
various governmental mitigation programmes already 
under way should taper emissions at 1.2 billion tCO2eq in 
2020, which is similar to 2010 levels. This level is far below 
the voluntary target of around 2 billion tCO2eq in 2020. 
2. If no additional mitigation efforts are made, there is a 
tendency for emissions to rise between 2020 and 2030 
due to the increase in the burning of fossil fuels and in 
agriculture and cattle raising activity. 
3. There is a huge potential to reduce national GHG 
emissions through the implementation of a wide spectrum 
of mitigation measures, including: energy efficiency, 
renewable energy sources, low-carbon agriculture 
and cattle raising techniques, transport modal shifts, 
methane capture in the waste sector (landfills and sewage 
treatment stations), and reforestation with native and fast 
growth species (see Table 1). 
4. Many of the mitigation measures can be implemented 
at low cost, such as those in the agriculture and cattle 
raising sector, energy efficiency and increased utilization 
of renewable energy sources like hydropower and 
sugarcane ethanol. Adopting these measures can result 
in a significant level of additional mitigation in relation to 
current governmental efforts, included and extended in 
the Governmental Plan Scenario (GPS). These results can 
be seen in the scenarios Additional Mitigation 1 (AM1) and 
Additional Mitigation 1 plus Carbon Tax (AM1+T). If other 
measures are made viable, such as restoration of the 
Atlantic Forest, large-scale production of charcoal from 
planted forests, significant increase in intercity freight 
and urban passenger rail transport, it would be possible 
to reach a more ambitious level of mitigation. These 
measures were tested in the second set of mitigation 
scenarios Additional Mitigation 2 (AM2) and Additional 
Mitigation 2 plus Carbon Tax (AM2+T). 
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Considering the assumptions adopted to run the economic 
models used in the IES-Brasil study (such as significant 
economic growth throughout the period up to 2030), and the 
hypotheses and mitigation measures selected by the Scenario 
Building Team (SBT), IES-Brasil has provided pioneer findings 
about the macroeconomic and social implications of additional 
mitigation measures beyond the extension of the government 
plans already under way (GPS): 
1. The selected mitigation measures, additional to those 
already under way, can contribute to an increase in 
economic growth, depending on the way in which they are 
implemented. If these measures were to be implemented 
solely with microeconomic instruments and command and 
control mechanisms of the scenarios that do not consider a 
carbon tax, GDP would grow more than in the GPS. However, 
should the selected measures be implemented with a 
carbon tax, the impact on GDP will depend on the tax level 
required: up to US$20/tCO2eq, GDP would not grow less 
than in the GPS, as shown in the result of AM1+T; but with a 
tax of US$100/tCO2eq, used in AM2+T, GDP growth would 
be lower than in GPS, as a result of the decrease in total 
economic activity due to the tax levied on all countries. 
2. Unemployment rates fall in all additional mitigation 
scenarios, even those considering a carbon tax, with the 
energy sector responsible for the most job openings. It is 
worth noting that in the scenarios that include a carbon tax, 
this results from the hypothesis that all revenue collected 
from the tax on burning fossil fuels would be used for 
relief of payroll taxes, in order to foster employment even 
with a reduction in global and national economic activity 
generated by levying the tax. 
3. The selected additional mitigation actions contribute 
to an increase in average annual household income in all 
scenarios that include additional mitigation measures, 
with the largest gain for the poorest families, contributing 
to a small improvement in the distribution of wealth. 
4. In scenarios with the selected additional mitigation 
actions, there is an increase in the level of prices compared 
to the GPS. This is due to the lower level of unemployment, 
which guarantees better salaries, higher production costs, 
and as a result, higher prices.
5. The selected additional mitigation actions have a positive 
impact on purchasing power, even given the increase in 
the level of prices. In the scenarios that consider a global 
carbon tax, only the richest class would lose purchasing 
Source: La Rovere et al. 2016
5. There are various barriers, both economic or 
financial and non-economic (legal, regulatory 
and institutional), to implementing mitigation 
measures, and different means of overcoming 
them. Such means include microeconomic 
instruments and command / control tools 
(scenarios AM1 and AM2), or a global tax on the 
burning of fossil fuels (scenarios AM1+T and 
AM2+T). 
Table 1: Cumulative avoided GHG emissions from 2010 to 2030 
(Mt CO2eq)
AM1 AM2
AFOLU 657.4 1995.6
Agriculture and cattle raising 260.3 259.2
Planted forests 29.6 427.3
Agroforestry systems 367.5 367.5
Atlantic Forest restoration  – 941.6
Energy Efficiency 408.1 791.3
Residential, commercial and services (includes solar water heating) 16.8 19.9
Industry (cement and steel) and oil refineries 38.7 382.7
Traffic optimization 30.5 30.5
Light duty vehicles 71.0 107.1
Heavy duty vehicles 251.1 251.1
Modal Shifts in Transportation 74.0 475.7
Urban transportation on wheels (BRTs, bicycle lanes and electric buses) 74.0 125.8
Urban transportation on rails (subways and tramways)  – 207.7
Freight transportation (railways and waterways)  – 142.2
Renewable Energy 524.1 813.3
Ethanol for passenger transportation 302.4 305.9
Biodiesel for freight transportation 121.3 265.2
Power generation 100.4 242.2
Waste 597.0 608.5
Total 2,260.6 4,684.4
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power compared to the GPS, while the purchasing power 
of the low and middle income classes would remain higher 
than in the GPS. In the scenarios that do not consider a 
global carbon tax, the gains in purchasing power are indeed 
higher. 
6. In scenarios with the selected additional mitigation 
actions, there is a slight decrease in total investment and 
the investment rate, the reasons for which are distinct 
between the scenarios that do and do not consider a 
carbon tax. In the scenarios with no carbon tax, this fall is 
a consequence of the loss of industry competitiveness due 
to the increase in prices. In the scenarios that do consider 
a global carbon tax, the fall compared to the GPS is due to 
a reduction in global and national economic activity. 
7. The Brazilian trade surplus falls compared to the GPS in 
scenarios including the selected additional mitigation 
actions without a carbon tax, namely due to the increase 
in the level of prices that reduces the competitiveness 
of Brazilian industry. In scenario AM1+T, the Brazilian 
foreign trade surplus is almost the same as in GPS, while 
in the more ambitious scenario with carbon tax (AM2+T) 
the trade surplus almost doubles compared to the GPS. In 
this case, the higher trade surplus is due to the increase 
in competitiveness of national industry on account of 
its lower carbon footprint in the production of energy-
intensive goods (including chemical products, non-ferrous 
metals, pulp and paper, and steel), reducing the imports of 
some products (such as non-ferrous metals) and increasing 
the exports of others (such as pulp and paper). 
8. In the period between 2015 and 2030, total investment of 
US$ 45 billion in the selected additional mitigation actions 
would be necessary for the implementation of the AM1 
and AM1+T scenarios, with US$ 169 billion required for the 
AM2 and AM2+T scenarios (2005 values). The GDP increase 
generated in the same period would total US$ 83 billion in 
the AM1 and US$ 277 billion in the AM2 (2005 values). 
9. The selected additional mitigation actions result in a 
significant reduction of emissions by 2030. This reduction 
amounts to 22 % in the AM1 and AM1+T scenarios, and 
39 % in the AM2 and AM2+T scenarios, compared to the 
GPS (see Figure 1). Without adopting new mitigation 
measures, emissions in the GPS start to grow from 2020, 
with an increase in emissions particularly in the energy 
sector and in agriculture and cattle raising. This increase 
could result in 1.67 billion tCO2eq in 2030, which is 
above the 1990 emissions level but still below the 2005 
level. In the Additional Mitigation 1 scenario, with the 
implementation of a selection of significant additional 
mitigation actions, emissions in 2030 would be in the order 
of 1.3 billion tCO2eq, keeping national emissions 5 % lower 
than the 1990 level. In the Additional Mitigation 2 scenario, 
the implementation of a selection of more ambitious 
mitigation actions would allow the country to continue on 
a trajectory of decreasing emissions, which in 2030 would 
reach approximately 1 billion tCO2eq, 25% lower than the 
1990 level. 
10. The scenarios illustrate a dynamic future of partial 
decoupling between economic growth and the evolution 
of GHG emissions in the country. With the reduction in the 
national population growth rate until stabilization around 
2040, even in a scenario of high economic growth, the 
mitigation measures already under way in the GPS should 
enable a stabilization of emissions between 2010 and 2020 
and a moderate increase between 2020 and 2030, well 
below the rate of growth in the economy. The selected 
additional mitigation measures could enable the country 
to reach a level of 51 – 65% of the 2005 emissions level in 
2030. The ratio between emissions and GDP (measured in 
tCO2eq/million US$ of 2005), which was halved from 2 to 1 
tCO2eq per US$ million between 2005 and 2010, would be 
0.66 in the GPS, 0.5 in AM1, and 0.4 in AM2, in 2030.
3 The IES-Brasil Study and the Brazilian NDC
The Brazilian Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) has 
set a voluntary target of an economy-wide reduction of GHG 
emission levels of 37 % in 2025 and 43 % in 2030, compared to 
the absolute level of GHG emissions recorded in 2005. Thus, the 
Brazilian NDC sets a final target of 1.2 Mt CO2eq in 2030, which 
is between the levels of AM1 and AM2 IES-Brasil scenarios.
Table 2 illustrates Brazilian sectoral priorities for the case 
of mitigation technologies in the energy sector. The Brazilian 
iNDC falls within the range of the two Additional Mitigation 
scenarios of IES-Brasil (AM1 and AM2). According to the vision 
of nearly 100 experts involved in the IES-Brasil study, and 
considering the assumptions of a fast economic growth rate 
up to 2030, achieving the Brazilian iNDC targets in the energy 
sector seems to be feasible. Moreover, if implemented through 
the adoption of appropriate public policies, the Brazilian iNDC 
can contribute to sustainable economic growth and improved 
social development while simultaneously reducing GHG 
emissions in Brazil. 
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economic growth, a decrease in the unemployment rate, and 
an increase in average annual household income, with the 
largest gain for the poorest families, contributing to a small 
improvement in the distribution of wealth, depending on the 
way in which these measures are implemented.
Building a low-carbon sustainable infrastructure has great 
mitigation potential, not to mention the various co-benefits 
that may arise, such as better air quality, shorter commuting 
journeys and improved logistics. Huge contributions to GHG 
emissions abatement can also be made by mitigation measures 
of other kinds, as shown in Table 1. In the Agriculture, Forest 
and Land Use sector (AFOLU), there are plenty of cost-
effective mitigation actions. They generally do not require 
investment in infrastructure itself, but are essentially obtained 
through the adoption of appropriate policies and techniques. 
Energy efficiency is also relevant in most sectors, the largest 
abatement contributions coming from the industrial and 
transportation sectors, which still rely heavily on oil products. 
In the residential, commercial and services sectors, energy 
efficiency is generally associated with electricity consumption 
and, because renewables already account for a large share of 
the Brazilian electricity supply, the mitigation potential in 
these sectors is limited.
There are various barriers, both economic or financial 
and non-economic (legal, regulatory and institutional) to 
implementing such an ambitious mitigation pathway, and 
different means of overcoming them. Such means include 
microeconomic instruments and command / control tools, as 
well as innovative financial mechanisms to fund the higher 
upfront costs of mitigation measures. 
There are clear signs that the previous cycle of economic 
growth in Brazil has come to an end, as indicated by the current 
economic crisis. After the adjustment policies implemented 
in 2015 – 2016, a new economic growth cycle must be 
sustained on a different basis. There is a wide consensus 
among Brazilian economists that a new development 
strategy should focus on higher investment in infrastructure. 
Therefore, given the huge potential of renewable energy 
resources in Brazil, a positive synergy emerges between the 
investment in low-carbon infrastructure and the starting of a 
new virtuous development cycle.
The deep political and economic crisis hitting the country 
since 2015 will require an update of these scenarios, with 
lower economic growth rates. The attainment of output and 
welfare levels reached in these scenarios will be delayed. 
On one hand, lower growth rates will delay the necessity 
of resorting to technologies with uncertain economic and 
technical feasibility and buy more time for the development 
of new low-carbon technologies. On the other hand, public 
budget constraints due to austerity policies may hamper 
Source: La Rovere et al. 2016
4 Conclusions and Prospects
According to the results of the IES-Brasil study, there is a 
huge potential to reduce national GHG emissions through the 
implementation of a wide spectrum of mitigation measures, 
including: energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, low-
carbon agriculture and cattle raising techniques, transport 
modal shifts, methane capture in the waste sector (landfills 
and sewage treatment stations), and reforestation with 
native and fast growth species. Many of these mitigation 
measures can be implemented at low cost, such as those in 
the agriculture and cattle raising sector, energy efficiency 
and increased utilization of renewable energy sources such as 
hydropower and sugarcane ethanol. Adopting these measures 
can result in a significant level of additional mitigation in 
relation to current governmental efforts. If other measures 
are made viable, such as restoration of the Atlantic Forest, 
large-scale production of charcoal from planted forests, 
significant increase in intercity freight and urban passenger 
rail transport, it would be possible to reach in 2030 the level of 
1 billion tCO2e, 25 % lower than in 1990 and a 49 % reduction 
from 2005, a higher level of ambition than in the NDC. More 
importantly, besides other environmental co-benefits, this 
deeper mitigation pathway can contribute to an increase in 
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investment in projects needing urgent public resources and 
political will in order to benefit from current low international 
interest rates to support thriving public -private partnerships.
In the coming negotiation rounds in which countries review 
their contributions to the Paris Agreement, Brazil can move 
towards a more ambitious target. The continued involvement 
of stakeholders, as envisaged in the IES-Brasil study, may help 
not only in the implementation of the iNDC but also its review 
towards a higher level of ambition.
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Introduction
After a remarkable and much-celebrated decline in armed 
conflict following the collapse of the Cold War system 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002; Goldstein 2011; Pinker 2011), the trend 
now seems halted at around 35 – 40 active conflicts per year. 
More worrying still, conflict casualties show a notable uptick 
in recent years, with 2014 being the deadliest year since the 
late 1980s (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). A third notable 
trend is the increasing concentration of armed conflicts in 
Africa and the Middle East. This is partly a result of successful 
peacebuilding efforts in Latin America and Southeast Asia – 
hotspots of interstate and civil wars during the Cold War era. 
However, some also point to the harsh and increasingly erratic 
climatic conditions in parts of Africa and the Middle East as a 
contributing driver of violence and instability (Johnstone and 
Mazo 2011; Kelley et al. 2015; Sternberg 2012). At face value, 
such reasoning seems to carry some merit. Contemporary 
civil wars are predominantly a feature of warm and tropical 
or semi-arid regions and the average conflict today is located 
much nearer to the Equator than the distribution of the globe’s 
population would dictate. Puzzlingly, this pattern remains 
statistically significant even after controlling for dominant 
correlates of conflict, including economic, demographic, 
political, ecological, and historical factors (Buhaug, Gleditsch, 
and Wischnath 2013). It should come as little surprise, then, 
that fears are mounting that climate change and possible 
adverse knock-on consequences for agricultural productivity 
will bring more conflict and instability in the future (CNA 2014; 
US DoD 2015).
In this essay, I discuss whether and how food insecurity may 
act as an intermediate mechanism linking climate variability 
and change with violent conflict with references to the recent 
scientific literature.1 Two dimensions of food insecurity 
are especially relevant in this regard: food price shocks to 
consumers and agricultural income shocks among producers. 
Emerging research indicates that climate-induced economic 
shocks have limited influence on the risk of conflict outbreak 
but can affect the dynamics of violence (severity, duration) 
in ongoing conflicts. Food price shocks appear much more 
consistently linked to conflict risk, but here the role of climate 
and weather extremes is unclear. The discussion ends by 
reflecting on the often-ignored significance of the reverse link; 
from conflict and instability to environmental vulnerability.
On Conflict, Climate Zones, and Climate Change
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the 
leading provider of statistics on organized political violence, 
1  Climatic extremes and adverse 
environmental change may 
be associated with instability 
and conflict through other 
transmission mechanisms than 
food insecurity. Two commonly 
proposed pathways that are not 
considered here link climate 
variability with conflict via 
large-scale migration or material 
destruction as a cause of 
extreme weather events.
the global frequency of armed conflict rose gradually during 
the Cold War era and peaked in the early 1990s with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav federation (Pettersson 
and Wallensteen 2015). The demise of the bipolar world order, 
the contemporaneous third wave of democratization, and 
accelerating economic globalization led some to declare the end 
of history (Fukuyama 1992). The triumph of peaceful liberalism 
lasted little more than a decade, however. During the first decade 
of the 2000s, the decline in armed conflict stagnated, and in 
recent years the frequency of conflicts and wars has returned to 
the levels seen three decades ago (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Global frequency of armed conflict, 1946–2015 
While the post-Cold War decline of war was short-lived, the 
end of the East-West rivalry appears to have had a more 
lasting imprint on the spatial distribution of armed conflict. 
Latin America and Southeast Asia, previous hotspots of 
civil and interstate wars, now enjoy unprecedented political 
stability and peace. Instead, what we have been witnessing 
over the past couple of decades is an increasing concentration 
of organized political violence in Africa, the Middle East, and 
South Asia (Gleditsch and Rudolfsen 2016). 
Figure 2 illustrates the spatial distribution of armed conflict 
over the past half-decade and reveals that most conflict zones 
are located in warm and tropical regions close to the Equator. 
This does not, of course, mean that local climatic conditions 
necessarily are fundamental drivers of contemporary conflict. 
Population pattern and density, level of development, 
political system, colonial legacy, and other explanations 
of conflict also are unevenly distributed across space. 
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However, accounting for such factors only reduces but does 
not eliminate the statistical power and significance of the 
‘climate effect’ (see Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Wischnath 2013 
for further details).
Figure 2: Density of armed conflict, 1950–2008 
If common explanations of conflict are unable to account for 
the visible spatial overlap between certain climate zones and 
conflict frequency, maybe climate change and deteriorating 
environmental conditions are part of the explanation? Indeed, 
a common feature of many conflict-ridden countries today is 
the harsh climatic conditions they are enduring, with recurring 
severe droughts, unbearable heatwaves, and limited supplies 
of renewable resources such as freshwater, forage, and dense 
vegetation. One does not need to subscribe to environmental 
determinism to understand the challenges such conditions 
impose to agricultural productivity, food security, and physical 
well-being. And climate change threatens to make this worse. 
So, to what extent do climatic conditions and extreme weather 
events influence the outbreak and dynamics of contemporary 
armed conflicts? A decade of systematic scrutiny has resulted 
in few robust findings, and the empirical evidence base to 
support the notion of a general and direct climate-conflict 
link is thin (Adger et al. 2014; Buhaug et al. 2014; Salehyan 
2014). Lack of scientific support need not imply that climate 
variability is irrelevant for conflict, however. Just as exposure 
to climate change varies across space, so do societies’ abilities 
to deal with climate change-related challenges. Accordingly, 
two similar climatic events can have very different social and 
security implications depending on the characteristics of 
the affected societies. For this reason, the conflict research 
community is shifting attention from climatic conditions and 
events themselves (which were a natural first focal point) to 
phenomena known to be sensitive to climate change as possible 
indirect drivers of conflict and instability. One such proposed 
indirect pathway goes through food insecurity.
Food Insecurity as an Intermediate Link?
Within the context of the climate-conflict nexus, two aspects 
of food insecurity appear particularly relevant. The first is loss 
of agricultural income and livelihood. One of the strongest 
and most robust correlates of civil war is poverty (typically 
operationalized as low GDP per capita), which facilitates rebel 
recruitment and obstructs effective governance (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). To the extent that 
climatic extremes and environmental change increase poverty 
and despair, then, they could also contribute to increased risk 
of societal instability and conflict.
Thus far, there is little evidence that agricultural income 
shocks constitute an important trigger of conflict outbreak. 
Most quantitative comparative investigations of rainfall-
induced income shock and civil conflict conclude that the two 
are at most only weakly correlated (Buhaug et al. 2015; Ciccone 
2011; Koubi et al. 2012). Some even report that violent conflict 
is more likely in affluent years, contrary to the scarcity theory, 
suggesting an important tactical element in the climate-
conflict calculus (Witsenburg and Adano 2009; Theisen 2012). 
However, some studies find that worsening environmental 
conditions and resulting adverse impact on agro-economic 
performance can affect conflict dynamics by escalating 
hostilities and making a peaceful resolution to ongoing 
conflicts less likely (von Uexkull et al. 2016; Wischnath and 
Buhaug 2014), even if other, non-climatic factors are found to 
be more influential.
The second proposed manner in which climate-induced 
food insecurity can be a catalyst of violence is via food price 
shocks. Rapid increase in consumer price of food can put 
severe strains on household budgets and human well-being, 
especially among the urban poor in developing countries who 
typically spend up to half of their disposable income (or more) 
on food. Absent a rapid and appropriate response by the state 
(e.g. price control measures; ration cards; unemployment 
benefits), the affected population may have few coping 
options beyond protest and competition. There is no shortage 
of examples of conflicts and revolutions that broke out during 
periods of heightened food prices, the 2011 wave of uprisings 
across the Arab world being a recent case in point. At the same 
time, the historical connection between climate variability 
and fluctuations in the market price of food is weak (Tadesse 
et al. 2014). For example, the 2010 – 2011 international food 
price crisis was driven mostly by peaking oil and energy prices 
and related increases in transportation and fertilizer costs, 
cynical commodity market speculation, and increased biofuel 
production. Moreover, domestic food policies, and the extent 
to which volatilities in international food trade translate 
into local consumer prices, vary greatly between countries 
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(Smith 2014), pointing to the importance of context in 
determining social vulnerability to economic shocks. 
In sum, the jury is still out regarding the true role of food 
insecurity (in its many guises) as an intermediate link between 
climate variability and societal instability. So far, available 
empirical evidence suggests that climate-induced income 
shocks have a modest effect on conflict risk. Food price shocks, 
in contrast, can serve as a powerful trigger of social unrest in 
societies where more fundamental grievances are prevalent, 
but in these instances the link to weather fluctuations and 
climate change is often weak.
Discussion
Based on a reading of the best available scientific evidence, it 
appears that climate-induced food insecurity at most exerts 
an indirect and conditional effect on conflict risk – and only in 
societies where more fundamental causes of social grievances 
are widespread (e.g. poverty and inequality, political exclusion, 
corruption, illiberal and oppressive political systems). 
However, climate and conflict may be causally linked in other 
ways as climate impacts and conflict are endogenous to one 
another (Gartzke and Böhmelt 2015). Indeed, the reverse 
association, from armed conflict to climate risks, is likely many 
times more powerful than the conventional climate-conflict link. 
Conflicts and wars cause enormous human suffering, destroy 
material goods and infrastructure, trigger capital flight and 
brain drain, and deter investment in future development. For 
this reason, civil war is development in reverse (Collier et al. 
2003; Gates et al. 2012). Low level of economic development, 
poor growth, and political instability in turn are major 
contributors to environmental vulnerability. In the words of 
the IPCC, ‘conflict strongly influences vulnerability to climate 
change impacts’ (Adger et al. 2014: 12).
Taken together, these insights give a glimpse of what we 
might expect in the future. Stable and wealthy societies 
possess the skills and resources and (most often) also the 
political will to address acute climate-related challenges and 
impacts, such as severe droughts and floods, in an appropriate 
and peaceful manner. Conflict-affected societies, in contrast, 
many of which struggle with endemic political chaos, low 
levels of political trust, corruption, and poor economic growth, 
may be unable to adapt to and cope with these challenges 
on their own. The result may be a vicious cycle of instability 
and underdevelopment and – absent concerted international 
assistance – an increasing gap between the stable, developed 
global North and a failing global South (though see Hegre 
et al. 2016 for a more sophisticated approach to modelling 
future conflict scenarios).
The latter insight carries an important policy message; conflict 
resolution and peace building constitute the most effective 
climate resilience strategy in war-torn regions. Without 
peace and stable, well-functioning political institutions, it 
is hard to see how societies can address existing and future 
security challenges imposed by climate change. Accordingly, 
while crop modification, development of irrigation systems, 
improved seasonal weather forecasts, establishment of 
insurance schemes, exploitation of renewable energy 
resources, and other adaptation policies may have significant 
positive effects in the short run, comprehensive sustainable 
socioeconomic development depends on lasting peace and 
a predictable political environment encouraging trust-based 
social interaction and long-term investments in material and 
human capital.
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Writing Narrative  
Scenarios: Experiences 
from Technology  
and Security Foresight
Karlheinz Steinmüller
Introduction
Scenarios are one of the main tools of foresight. They provide 
a structure to discuss possible and preferable futures, they 
inspire dialogues about options for action, and they are 
broadly used as well by companies and by organisations for 
supporting strategic planning and decision making (Van der 
Heijden 1996; Fink and Siebe 2016). 
In general, scenarios contain, as well, a qualitative (verbal) 
description of a future situation and the path which leads to this 
situation. In the words of Herman Kahn, one of the pioneers of 
scenario methodology, scenarios are ‘a hypothetical sequence 
of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention 
on causal processes and decision points’ (Kahn and Wiener 
1967: 6).
Scenarios help in clarifying thinking about the future, since 
they map existing expectations and assumptions and put the 
focus on chance (uncertainties) and choice (human action). 
Being based on an appreciation of existing uncertainties, all 
scenarios are hypothetical. For the exploration of possible 
futures, it is therefore standard practice to generate not 
one but alternative scenarios.Used in a creative and open 
way, scenarios allow ‘thinking out of the box’ in order to 
overcome too narrow perceptions of what might be possible 
and plausible. If monitored regularly, they allow nascent 
developments to be spotted and action to be taken early. But 
one has always to bear in mind that scenarios are not forecasts. 
Even if you have generated a rather comprehensive portfolio 
of scenarios, the future will not look exactly like any one of 
them. At best, one will come close to a good approximation of 
the ‘real future to come’.
Basically, one has to distinguish two kinds of scenarios. 
Exploratory scenarios serve to explore the range of possible 
futures, whereas normative scenarios serve to describe wishful 
states of the future (or, very rarely, undesired futures that are 
to be avoided). Both types are in a way complementary: On the 
one hand, exploratory scenarios include normative aspects, 
since the values, interests and wishes of the main actors have 
to be taken into account. Normative scenarios, on the other 
hand, should consider what framework conditions realistically 
have to be expected, otherwise they become utopian.
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Scenarios are used for quite different aims in quite different 
ways. According to purpose and context, scenarios are 
presented in different formats. Scenarios that are used 
as an inspiring input to a future creation workshop or for a 
municipal future discourse are subject to other criteria than 
exploratory scenarios in the framework of a research project. 
Depending on their purpose and on their client or addressees, 
scenarios are either formulated in technical terminology or 
written in a popular way. In research projects or in corporate 
foresight, a short description – slides with main aspects and 
charts – is sufficient. Standard for most scenario studies is 
a rather detailed representation of the respective future 
situation usually combined with main milestones on the road 
to this situation. 
Sometimes, a historiographical approach is chosen and 
the scenario is written in the likeness of history books. One 
might regard this ‘dense description’ (in the terminology 
of historians) as a semi-narrative style of presentation: 
Sequences of causes and effects are exposed, turning points 
(sometimes called ‘game changers’) with groups of actors and 
their interests highlighted. A narrative description in the strict 
sense ‘tells’ the scenario like a story with protagonists and 
their motives and emotions; this mode of presentation is most 
appropriate for broad communication. Besides words, images 
are increasingly used; sometimes scenarios are illustrated by 
elaborate pictures, sometimes they are displayed as comic 
strips or video clips, and sometimes even exemplified by 
diegetic objects (Kirby 2009; Steinmüller 2016). In the end, 
a scenario with a strong and convincing narrative resembles 
Explorative Scenarios Normative Scenarios
Basic question •	 ‘What kind of future do we have 
to expect?’
•	 ‘What kind of future do we want?’ 
Modality •	 Possible or probable futures •	 Desired, preferred futures (rarely: 
futures to be avoided)
Examples •	 Scenarios for decision making or 
strategy in organizations
•	 Model runs in societal, economic 
or environmental modelling
•	 Vision processes in cities
•	 Visionary scenarios for applications 
of new technologies
•	 Scenarios for corporate 
communication
Method •	 Different exploratory scenario 
techniques
•	 Forecasting techniques und 
modelling
•	 Normative-participatory methods
•	 Creativity methods (future workshop)
•	 Back-casting techniques
Multiplicity •	 Portfolio of alternative scenarios 
to one topic
•	 Usually one scenario for one topic
Description •	 Frequently rather abstract 
outlines or semi-narrative 
formats
•	 Frequently narrative formats
in structure and mode of narration a short story, and more 
specifically a science fiction story.
Experiences with Scenario Projects
In the last two decades, I was involved in more than ten projects 
that generated either semi-narrative historiographical or 
fully fledged narrative scenarios. In the following, some 
examples are given:
Starting in the year 2002, the German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research commissioned a research dialogue 
called ‘Futur’. In the framework of this large project, guiding 
visions for a broad scope of emerging technologies were 
developed by several focus groups. Twelve narrative 
scenarios helped to specify everyday situations in which 
these technologies could be applied. These scenarios were 
deliberately written like short science fiction stories with well-
chosen characters, a very specific plot and even a more or less 
pointed ending (Gaßner and Steinmüller 2009). They had topics 
like ‘Tina and Her Butler’ about an elderly lady and her virtual 
assistant (Gaßner and Steinmüller 2013). Another project 
funded by the same ministry tackled governance questions of 
forestry with the extreme time horizon of the year 2100.1 The 
long-term impacts of different forestry policies were outlined 
in three historiographical scenarios against the background 
of climate change, demographics and technological change. 
To demonstrate specific points, perspectives of actors and 
decisive events were highlighted in separate boxes (Schulz-
Montag et al. 2009). 
Quite another approach was taken in the project ‘Problem 
Child Demographic Change’ (2008–2011). This project aimed 
to deconstruct some public myths around societal ageing. 
Exploration meant, in this case, identifying possible impacts 
of demographic change in fields as diverse as education, 
healthcare and individual financial provision. Six narrative 
scenarios helped to make these impacts evident. Personally, 
I found it most interesting to write a counterfactual present-
day scenario2 on the assumption that there was no drop in 
birth rates during the 1960s (Bieber 2011). 
Recently, the EU commissioned a study on the future of the 
European transportation industry.3 The project team decided 
to develop a mainly pessimistic and cautionary ‘dark scenario’ 
for the time horizon 2030 based on existing trends and a 
‘bright scenario’ for the year 2050 combining positive answers 
to existing challenges on the background of a deep cultural 
change in the transportation industry. Both scenarios were 
written in the historiographic style and accompanied by two 
less comprehensive but more extreme ‘side-scenarios’ that 
highlighted specific developments (Moraglio 2015).
1  ‘Futures and Visions Forest 
2100. Long-Term Perspectives 
of Forest and Land Use – 
Developmental Dynamics, 
Fundamental Normative 
Attitudes and Governance’ 
(2007–2009).
2  Counterfactual or virtual history 
has recently gained more 
academic recognition; see, for 
example, Ferguson (1999) and 
Steinmüller (2009). 
3  RACE2050 – Responsible 
Innovation Agenda for 
Competitive European Transport 
Industries up to 2050’ (2014–
2015).
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In 2011, the Berlin-based Center for International Peace 
Operations started a project ‘The Future of Peace Operations 
2025’. Its main aim was to contribute to the conceptual 
evolution of peace operations and to inspire debate among 
experts, practitioners and decision-makers. In an exploratory 
scenario process, based upon expert workshops with key 
factor and consistency analyses, four historiographical 
scenarios were developed. ‘They should also help promote a 
change from the current, mostly reactive approach to crises 
and conflicts in the world to a more proactive or preventive 
one.’ (von Gienanth, Hansen, and Köppe 2012: 2) To give 
an idea of semi-narrative, historiographical scenarios, we 
quote in the following the short description of the scenario 
‘Regional Diversity’:
Regional organizations are clearly in charge – 
including of peace operations. Transnational 
challenges – from climate change to resource 
scarcity, organized crime, state fragility and 
violent conflicts – are increasing the need for 
functioning global governance structures. 
However, after the “rise of the rest” and the 
“decline of the West”, existing multilateral 
structures failed to accommodate the new 
powers who in turn found ways to accommodate 
themselves – largely through a network of 
regional organizations. As a consequence, the 
UN has lost its role as the major multilateral 
player in the area of peace operations and 
the Security Council is no longer the primary 
legitimizing body for such operations. While 
the regionalization of peace operations could 
have led to “regional solutions for regional 
problems”, key actors alternate between 
cooperation, competition or mere co-existence 
without much consideration for each other. For 
peace operations, this to and fro is frequently 
getting in the way of sustainable successes. 
Fragile states remain a major challenge but 
state fragility fatigue limits reliable support 
and stabilization initiatives. (von Gienanth, 
Hansen, and Köppe 2012: 16)
Another set of scenarios was produced in the project FESTOS 
‘Foresight of Evolving Security Threats Posed by Emerging 
Technologies’ (2010–2012). This project, commissioned by 
the EU in the framework of FP7, was supported by a large 
international group of experts from the fields of technology 
foresight and security and risk research. Its starting point 
was the assumption that new technologies may be greatly 
beneficial, but they may also have a dark side, either due to 
unintended effects or because they may be directly abused.
The main objective of FESTOS was to raise awareness 
with respect to security threats posed by the potential 
abuse of new technologies like nanotechnologies, robotics 
or biotechnologies: ‘Looking ahead to the year 2030, this 
foresight study scanned the horizon of different fields 
of technology. Possible means of prevention and policy 
measures were studied in the context of trade-offs between 
security needs and the freedom of research and knowledge.’ 
(Auffermann and Hauptman 2012: 1) With surveys, expert 
workshops and intuitive scenario generation, the project 
followed its slogan ‘Unless we invent new threats, we won’t 
be able to prevent them.’
The project team deliberately looked for threats that 
have from a present perspective a rather low likelihood but 
a high impact.4 During breakout groups within an expert 
workshop, core elements for four scenarios were identified. 
These elements were further elaborated to narrative 
scenarios following closely the style of short science fiction 
stories (Peperhove et al. forthcoming). In all these scenarios, 
technological breakthroughs were set into a societal context:
• ‘Cyber-Insects Attack!’: Swarms of artificial bees attack 
people and cattle. Since the origin of this behaviour is 
unknown, conspiracy theories abound.
• ‘The Genetic Blackmailers’: Individual DNA is abused to 
blackmail a politician – everybody would know his health 
risk factors and specifically his high propensity to abuse 
alcohol.
• ‘At the Flea Market’: Intelligent nano-based household 
appliances self-destruct in reaction to a wireless signal. 
People are desperately trying to get hold of good old pre-
nano devices at a flea market.
• ‘We’ll Change Your Mind...’: Terrorists use a ‘virus’ for health 
implants with the aim of manipulating voting behaviour in 
particular of the older generation. Whoever gets close to a 
politician of a certain party feels sick.
Looking back at these and other projects, one can observe 
that certain challenges repeatedly appeared. First of all, 
the assumptions behind the scenarios and the style of 
presentation had to find the commitment of the whole 
team. But methodological preferences and presentation 
predilections are different, even within expert communities. 
Narrative scenarios were in some cases rejected outright by 
some experts at first, with comments like ‘What is this fairy 
4  In foresight terminology: ‘wild 
cards’; see Steinmüller and 
Steinmüller (2004).
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tale good for?’ Therefore, much effort was put into explaining 
the advantages of narrative scenarios and in general in 
establishing group ownership of the scenarios.
From the narratological point of view, a basic challenge 
consisted in the necessity to integrate all ideas, all relevant 
aspects into a coherent text within given length restrictions – 
and at the same time to tell a convincing, plausible and 
credible story with living (and not cardboard) characters. 
Publication needs added their specific rules and restrictions. 
Last but not least, if you are enlarging on a future topic in a 
comprehensive scenario, you have to use many details either 
illustrating your point or making up a background, a kind 
of future scenery against which the core elements of the 
scenario are presented.
The challenges encountered in scenario writing are similar 
to certain problems in writing science fiction. It is therefore 
helpful to compare the approaches of foresight and science 
fiction, and to see what foresight can learn from science fiction.
Learning from Science Fiction
There are many definitions and many theoretical approaches 
to science fiction5, which we need not consider here. But one 
can follow Moskowitz, when he pins down the basic feature of 
science fiction: 
Science fiction is a branch of fantasy identifiable 
by the fact that it eases the ‘willing suspense of 
disbelief’ on the part of its readers by utilizing 
an atmosphere of scientific credibility for its 
imaginative speculations in physical science, 
space, time, social science, and philosophy. 
(Moskowitz 1974: 11) 
Seen from this perspective, science fiction performs 
thought experiments. For short stories, in particular, the 
starting question is most frequently ‘What if...? ’6 The 
author elaborates on possible impacts and consequences, 
searching for the most dramatic ones. Such literary thought 
experiments follow their own rules – similar to the rules of 
foresight (Steinmüller 2016). 
Like foresight (or more generally all research), science 
fiction is a collective enterprise. Writers advance on concepts 
introduced by other, earlier writers; they use a common 
vocabulary of (fictive) technical jargon. Like science, science 
fiction has experienced phases of accumulative growth and 
paradigm shifts.
Since Dennis Livingston proclaimed the utility of science 
fiction for foresight (Livingston 1978), science fiction has 
5  See, for example, Suerbaum et 
al. (1981); Weber (2005).
6  Asimov (1984: 215) notices that 
sometimes the starting question 
is ‘If this goes on …?’ or ‘How 
could …?’; cf. Ravetz (1997).
been used as a source of motivation and inspiration for project 
teams, as an idea pool for innovation (see, for example, ESA 
2002), as a mind opener in workshop settings and sometimes 
even for early warning and as a source of weak signals. 
Recently, diegetic prototypes from science fiction movies 
have attracted academic interest (Kirby 2009).
The central advantage of science fiction is that it adds social 
contexts to its speculative ideas. A science fiction story only 
‘eases the willing suspense of disbelief’ if it has convincing 
characters and interesting plots, in short: if it mirrors (like all 
genres) human behaviour – and produces a flavour of real life. 
Putting some invented technology into a futuristic setting 
does not suffice; science fiction lives from a kind of artistic 
technology assessment. Or, in the words of writer and futurist 
Frederick Pohl: ‘A good science fiction story should be able to 
predict not the automobile but the traffic jam.’ (Lambourne 
1990: 27)
Of course, science fiction writers are much freer in their 
speculations and quite regularly transgress the borders 
of the possible and plausible and the scientifically and 
technologically feasible. Their aim is to create dramatic, 
gripping plots, so they emphasize surprising consequences, 
unintended effects, collateral damages and potential abuses 
of technologies. One may ask whether science fiction has the 
more realistic perception of the human being and of society.
Methodology: Writing Narrative Scenarios
Writing narrative scenarios is an art in itself; it operates at 
the crossroads of scenario generation and creative writing. 
This starts with the choice of the form of the presentation – 
all options of fiction are available, from short story and 
monologues of fictive characters, dialogues or debates 
Science Fiction Foresight
Aim • Entertainment • Decision making
Approach • Intuitive & creative
• But also with method
• Methodological
• But also with creativity
Guiding questions • What is imaginable?
• What is the most surprising, 
striking, terrifying that can 
happen?
• What is possible / feasible?
• What are plausible impacts?
• What is desirable?
Quality criteria • Originality
• Strength of imagination
• Narrative (dramatic) quality
• Plausibility, realism
• Methodological transparency (e. 
g. explicit value statements)
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of several dramatis personae, to interviews, reports and 
commentaries, essays and reviews of fictive books. Besides 
stories and reports, frequently a keynote speech on the 
occasion of a celebration or anniversary is chosen, where the 
speaker looks back at the developments and events leading to 
the present (i.e. future) state of affairs. 
It goes without saying that different literary forms imply 
different formal requirements as to style and length. The 
expectations of potential addressees or recipients (often 
based on earlier experiences with scenarios) have to be met; 
certain forms are better suited for specific topics. A frequent 
choice is a semi-narrative historiographical description, as 
mentioned above. It follows the model of history books, or 
historical essays. It includes a so-called ‘dense description’ of 
the future situation, the wider context, and the evolution of 
situation. Where appropriate, very specific, concrete, tangible 
details illustrate the image of the future, but in general the 
description stays on a more abstract level, indicating, for 
example, the actions of certain groups of actors and definitely 
not of individual persons with their names and backgrounds 
and idiosyncrasies. The latter is the case in fully fledged 
narrative scenarios that follow the model of short stories.
According to our experience (Gaßner and Steinmüller 2006, 
2009), writing narrative scenarios can be broken down into 
seven steps or phases.7 The procedure starts with bounding, 
the delimitation of the topic for the scenario, the definition of 
the focus. Usually, the time horizon and the overall character 
of the scenario (mainstream and rather plausible vs. wild card 
and extreme, optimistic vs. pessimistic…) are also agreed upon.
The main elements of the scenario are – as a rule – 
developed in one or several workshops, with stakeholders 
and / or with experts, depending on the subject. Along with 
trend extrapolations or other exploratory tools, creativity 
techniques like mental travels into the future are employed 
here. The next step consists in elaborating an exposé for the 
scenario. This includes the characters (protagonists) with 
their names, ages, professions and other necessary features, 
but also the general setting of the scenario, its background, 
assumptions about society, technology, politics, economy, 
environment as far as needed, and last but not least a general 
idea and structure of the plot: the ‘conflict’ (if there is one), 
the position of the protagonists, issues to be addressed 
by discussions or by means of the unfolding plot. This 
comprehensive programme has to be put in concrete terms. 
In the movie industry, this step is called a ‘storyboard’: the 
sequence of actions and reactions of the protagonists, the 
plot in close-up resolution with its exposition, its unfolding, 
turning points, solution and ending.
After these preparatory steps, scenario writing in the narrow 
sense of the word follows. This implies much more than simply 
7  These stages of scenario 
development are not precisely 
shaped according to the model 
of story writing; rather, they 
follow the model of producing 
a movie. 
working along the storyboard. All essential scenario elements 
identified earlier have to be integrated into a coherently 
developing story. Writing a scenario is also the proof of these 
ideas – whether they really fit into a well-rounded whole.
In principle, feedback from the complete scenario team 
would be helpful after each step, including feedback from 
the workshop participants. Usually, however, feedback can 
be invited only once or twice, and to obtain feedback on the 
written draft scenarios is most important and necessary for 
content and process quality. Input from the team – even if 
contradictory comments come in – is welcome for finalizing 
the scenarios. Besides that, these comments provide ideas 
for debate. Moreover, feedback from all team members is 
a decisive means to establish ownership. As the final step, 
the scenario is published, presented to the addressees, and 
depending on the project aim, conclusions and implications 
are drawn and recommendations derived. 
The abstract elements and crude first ideas of the scenario 
are enriched from step to step; real life is brought into the 
scenario: the context of everyday life of the protagonists, 
their societal and biographical backgrounds, their wishes, 
fears, motivations, the general political framework conditions, 
ethical and environmental considerations, technological and 
organizational innovations – and all that is needed to make 
the scenario plausible and convincing.
Writing a scenario, one has to ask: Which protagonists 
fit best into the scenario story? Who are the winners, 
losers and ‘heroes’ in the world of the scenario? And which 
developments lead to the future of the scenario? What 
were important events, moments of decision? Most of these 
questions have already been answered in preceding steps, 
but they have to be reconsidered in the light of the complete 
story of the scenario.
According to our experience, narrative scenarios are best 
presented with some kind of short topical introduction about 
the aims of scenario project and, if necessary, trends and 
other assumptions… The scenario as such should be preceded 
by reading instructions (Advice to Readers) about the uses and 
limitations of scenarios and recommendations on how to read 
the scenarios. Often marginal notes are useful to emphasize 
certain points or to give additional comments. But one has to 
bear in mind that scenarios should never be lengthy.
Narrative scenarios have on the one hand certain 
advantages in comparison with more abstract forms of 
presentation. For a narrative scenario, ideas have to be 
elaborated more specifically. The context of everyday life 
makes gains and pains of change more transparent and hints 
at forces that promote and forces that resist change. It shows 
whether technologies function socially or not. Summing it 
up: It produces additional insights.
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On the other hand, there are important disadvantages: With 
each decision about the future technological and societal 
background you gather new uncertainties. One has to pile 
up one hypothesis to the other. And the additional insights 
may have a questionable character. With each decision about 
minor items, as well as with the choice of the protagonists, 
their backgrounds and their motivations, personal convictions 
and biases of scenario writers may creep into the scenario. 
Wording is important; attributes may convey subconscious 
value statements. One has to be very careful about each 
word… Writing scenarios like a story surely needs more time 
than drawing a rough sketch. Sometimes even more research 
in specific items is needed. 
In scenario writing, there is always a fundamental tension 
between two structures: The ‘idea line’, defined as the 
sequence of scenario elements or portfolio of scenario ideas 
that have to be conveyed, and the ‘plot line’, defined as the 
sequence of events that belong to the plot, as the unfolding 
of interactions of the characters.
Conclusion
Well-written narrative scenarios help to overcome the 
limitations of science fiction as well as of foresight. Where 
science fiction often ‘overdoes it’, sacrificing everything for 
the sake of a good story, narrative scenarios follow strict 
methodological rules. Where foresight often sticks to a 
narrow and abstract ‘realism’ and lacks imagination, narrative 
scenarios are based on creative ‘thinking out of the box’. 
Good narratives are an excellent means of communication. 
They combine interesting and relevant content, a ‘news 
value’, with a credible, plausible setting and a convincing 
story with inspiring ending. They reach their audiences if they 
are tailored to the target group(s) and if they provide lines 
of action available for their addressees. But even with truly 
imaginative and justly plausible scenarios, the Future remains 
a terra incognita.
Idea Line Plot Line
Presenting Content Story Telling
•	 Integration of all relevant ideas •	 Plausible and dramatic plot 
•	 Tangible descriptions, bargain between 
abstract concepts and specific details
•	 Convincing characters, convincing motivation 
and interaction of protagonists
•	 Causal relations of elements •	 Intriguing beginning, arc of suspense, and 
pointed ending
•	 Short, specific, focused •	 Free play of imagination
•	 No overload, no unnecessary decora-
tions or side-ideas
•	 Playful decorations
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Human*Tree and the Un /
Making of FutureS:  
A Posthumanist Reading of 
Wanuri Kahiu’s Pumzi
Susan Arndt
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European moralities have been largely pillared on a 
Manichaeism of nature versus culture, rendering culture as 
superior and hence entitled to tame nature. For one thing, this 
rhetoric positions animals, plants and inanimate materiality 
as nature as an antithesis to humans as culture. For another, 
humans themselves are subdivided along this very rhetoric, 
which can be traced back as far as antiquity.1 Taking this thesis 
as its point of departure, this essay will explore the legacy of 
the nature-culture distinction in the context of the superior-
inferior divide with regard to ‘being human’. Thus framed, 
the article will make a plea for thinking beyond the concepts 
born of this divide, mobilising FutureS as a complementary 
category of analysis. This approach, in turn, will be utilised 
for a posthumanist reading of Wanuri Kahiu’s Pumzi and its 
negotiation of agencies in the un/making of futureS.
1 The Dead End of Critical Thinking – and Beyond
Aristotle, for example, suggested that the Greek men were the 
only ones capable of practising reason, while Greek men can 
learn and Greek women can understand it. Those called, from 
the Greek racist perspective, ‘Barbarians’2, however, were not 
even able to understand reason and hence could be used by 
the Greeks as means and tools (cf. Isaac 2004: 207–11, passim). 
Discursively, this idea was fed into Christian narrations about 
difference (one need only consider Eve’s punishment for 
wanting to taste the fruit of the tree of knowledge) and was 
dis*continued throughout Medieval societal hierarchies right 
into the Renaissance and its humanism. Its celebration of 
human individuality resulted in anthropocentrism, which would 
set the human apart from nature. The Enlightenment again 
inhabited this rhetoric while adapting it, together with the 
notion of humanism, into contemporary findings and needs, 
on one hand, and equating reason with progress, on the other, 
thus suggesting that in the absence of reason there could be 
no progress, and vice versa. In doing so, the colonial space was 
positioned in what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls ‘not-yet’ societies 
that were forever confined to the ‘waiting room of history’ 
(Chakrabarty 2008: 9). Analogously, both People of Colour 
and women (Black women even more so than white women), 
amongst others, would be ‘not-yet’ humans. In other words, in 
a linear conceptualisation of time, white Christian males were 
always ahead in terms of time and progress as compared to 
those they declared to be their ‘inferior Others’. This European 
account of reason / intellect and progress is the gist of the 
matter in narratives that hold culture as antithetical to nature, 
suggesting: the more culture, the more human; the more 
nature, the less human. Throughout modernism and to date, 
this ideologem has rendered a binarism of gender, sexuality, 
1  For a detailed exploration of this 
rhetoric cf. Arndt, Susan (2012). 
Die 101 wichtigsten Fragen: 
Rassismus. München: C.H. Beck.
2  The infamous term ‘Barbarians’ 
was initially used by the Greeks 
to other all those who did not 
speak Greek (not understanding 
their language, they would call 
them ‘brr-brr sayers’) and was 
later used as a homogenising 
label for all those who were not 
Greek.
religion, race, nation, class, and ability and the respective 
modes of discrimination all too well-known to this world – 
be it sexism, racism, classism, the discrimination against 
differently abled persons, non-Christians, queer people etc.
The abovementioned pattern of ‘classification’ according to 
underlying and multidimensional apparatus of discrimination 
has been generating power structures, respective 
epistemologies and social positions that have been practised 
and performed, affirmed and resisted, analysed and resituated 
in societal contexts, activism, arts and academia. Although 
today’s offshoots of critical thinking – be it feminism, 
queerism, postcolonialism, Marxism or posthumanism – 
celebrate intersectionality, this classification still works 
within the linguistic legacy of the nature-versus-culture logic 
and its constructed criteria for scaling ‘being human’. It is 
true; deconstruction employs a double movement of thought 
away from, for example, ‘race’ or sex as a biological entity and 
towards race and gender as a social position (cf. Raman 1995: 
255). Yet, by using these categories, critical thinking still gets 
mired linguistically and, thus, epistemologically in century-old 
powerful narrations of othering, as well as the very binarism 
of culture / nature that informs it, being translated into what 
Abdul JanMohamed calls the Manichean allegory ‘of good 
and evil, salvation and damnation, civilization and savagery, 
superiority and inferiority, intelligence and emotion, self and 
other, subject and object’ (JanMohamed 1983: 4). The ongoing 
presence of this Manichean allegory, in turn, keeps forcing 
resistance into a rhetoric of defending the ‘othered’ as is, for 
example, the case with Léopold Sédar Senghor’s ‘Négritude’ 
and Hélène Cixous’s ‘écriture féminine’ as celebration of Black 
or female emotion. Even though designed to subvert, the 
defensiveness at work here keeps powerful stereotypes alive. 
In due consequence, for critical thinking to be able to truly 
transgress given structures, discourses and epistemologies, 
it needs to think beyond the Manichean allegory of nature-
versus-culture, its conceptualisations of difference and the 
rhetoric of defensiveness. Wary of this current aporia, this 
essay employs one of many possible categories of analysis 
capable of overcoming the Manichean rhetoric of securing 
power via othering: FutureS (cf. Arndt 2017).
2 FutureS as a Critical Category of Analysis
The ‘category of analysis’, FutureS, interferes into ‘future’ as 
a linear sequence of past, present and future and hence of 
progress. In doing so, it insists on three semantical pillars that 
induce me to speak of ‘futureS’ rather than ‘the future’. While 
having the capitalised ‘S’ in common, the ‘F’ is only capitalised 
(i.e. ‘FutureS’) when referring to ‘the category of analysis’, 
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while ‘futureS’ is my term for talking about the subject of 
‘future’ in a deconstructed way.3
Firstly, the capitalised S in both FutureS and futureS 
suggests that ‘future’ does not exist in the (simplicity of any) 
singular. This very ‘S’, secondly, draws attention to the fact 
that futureS are intersected and moulded by complexities and 
coexistences of ‘glocal’ encounters of conflicting, competing 
and complementary agencies, interests, contingencies, 
possibilities and options in the un / making and (not) sharing 
of futureS. Throughout global histories, some futureS have 
buttressed each other, while some have deflated each other 
and others have prevented each other’s existence; some have 
advanced and some hindered the other. There are futureS that 
neither did nor will ever happen, because one futurE thwarted 
the other – and in this instance, the capital ‘E’ puts emphasis 
on this erasure of given pluralities. Consequently and thirdly, 
futureS (as moulded by and moulding the category of analysis 
‘FutureS’) are made and shared unevenly by power-coded 
agencies: ‘The future is already here, it’s just not very evenly 
distributed’, as internet visionary William Gibson (1999) 
suggests. Indeed, every struggle about power, freedom and 
justice is about futureS and every struggle about futureS is 
to strive for access to power, freedom and justice. After all, 
futureS’ polyphony, complexity, reflexivity and relationality 
are coded by the structures and discourses of power, along 
the grammar of racialisation, gender, sexuality, religion, 
health, ability, age and nation. The social positions thus coded 
decide, to a high extent, about the very impact and agency a 
person or collective may have in shaping (their own and other 
people’s) individual and collective futureS and their share 
of it. Ultimately, however, the struggle over futureS is not 
determined by power constellations alone. Rather, both power 
and futureS can be negotiated and un / made by agencies. 
Contextualised by power and powerlessness, privileges and 
deprivation, ethics and unscrupulousness, responsibility and 
the lack thereof, agencies desire and fear, fight and sustain, 
accept and negotiate, experience and forget, build and destroy 
futureS. In fact, agency is power’s most virulent protagonist 
and antagonist at the same time. 
Thus framed, in the following, FutureS will be mobilised 
as a category of analysis for a posthumanist rereading of 
fictionalisations of futureS as performed by (resistant) fictive 
and factual dreams and hopes and their power to procreate 
alternate futures. My argument will scrutinise the linear 
notion of time, reading past, present and future as being 
entangled in a cyclical causality: whatever has (not) happened 
keeps on affecting the present and its futureS. Moreover, I will 
discuss the intersection of memories, dreams and non*human 
agencies so as to demonstrate how they scrutinise the present 
and un/do this present’s futureS. To put it simply, I will analyse 
3  In due correspondence with the 
usage of ‘FutureS’ as a category 
of analysis, I will use it (in terms 
of grammar) as singularetantum, 
while futureS as a pluralised 
term for talking differently about 
‘future’ keeps requiring the 
grammatical plural.
non*human agencies that can affect the un / making of futureS 
and how the revisiting of the past (via memory) intersects with 
interventions into the present (via dreams) in the process. By 
way of example, I will discuss Wanuri Kahiu’s short film Pumzi 
(Kahiu 2009), looking at its post-anthropocentric presentation 
of non*human agencies and the un / making of futures in the 
interaction between technology and organic lives as well as 
the subsequent transgressing of the nature-culture divide and 
its binarisms.
3 Who is Afraid of Dreams in Wanuri Kahiu’s Pumzi?
Wanuri Kahiu’s Pumzi is set in an ‘East African Territory’ 35 
years after World War III, known as the ‘Water War’, in a post-
apocalyptic survival community called Maitu, which, as we 
learn, is a Kikuyu word meaning ‘Our Truth’. Maitu’s truth, as 
the film gradually reveals to us, is that the world outside is 
dead; an indoctrinated belief that has confined humans to life 
in this technology-governed habitat.
The opening high-angle shot of Maitu, resembling a brownish 
box in the midst of a wilderness, fades into newspaper clippings 
with headlines ranging from the all too familiar ‘Greenhouse 
Effect’ to the more distressing ‘Whole day journey in search 
of water’. These, together with the sight of skeletons and 
other remnants of dead animals as well as seeds stored in 
several jars, usher in the atmosphere of museum archives. 
The wide shot that follows introduces us to the protagonist, 
Asha, asleep at her desk, which faces a screen projecting some 
illusion of green life. A quick glimpse of her REM jump cuts 
into the dream itself, in which she, wearing a white dress with 
green patterns, appears full of joy and laughter, reaching for 
and flying towards a single green tree on top of a hill in the 
middle of a desert.
In the midst of her ecstasy, the foreboding, authoritative, 
siren-like voice of an electronic device is heard, incessantly 
warning ‘DREAM DETECTED’ and commanding Asha: ‘Take 
your dream suppressants.’ (1:12–1:20) Awake, she lands 
back in her hi-tech surroundings, dressed in her dark khaki 
uniform, her blue eye shadow connecting the lifelessness 
of her conscious state to the lingering residue of her lively 
dreamscape. Obediently taking a pill, Asha is now wide awake, 
back in Maitu’s reality.
Asha takes a bathroom break, walking us through what 
appears to be the cyclical routines of an ordinary day. She enters 
a hall with glassy walls that features Black men and women (as 
skinny yet in better physical shape than herself) cycling on fixed 
bikes. What seems to be a fitness centre at first soon turns out to 
be human bodies generating electric energy needed for Maitu’s 
self-sustaining ecosystem. Upon passing a checkpoint, Asha is 
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granted a daily dose of some 100 ml water. In the bathroom, she 
removes parts of her ‘armour’, wiping the sweat off her body 
with a rag – which must pass as bathing in this environment – and 
wrings it into a container filled with her urine, which she then 
places in recycling machine that turns those bodily fluids into 
drinkable water. Catching a cleaning woman’s timid gaze, Asha 
shares some of her daily water ration with her, which suggests 
that water is a currency in Maitu and distributed unevenly 
among its inhabitants according to their social status. These 
two sequences familiarise us with Asha’s own class, which as 
historian or archivist, is seemingly above the cleaning woman 
and the labouring bodies on bikes and treadmills. 
The opening scene is reiterated and intensified when Asha 
returns to her office in the museum, passing the corpse of a 
tree, placed above a dated newspaper article featuring the 
picture of a tree under the heading: ‘There goes the last tree’ 
(4:05). This header corresponds to the name of her workplace 
‘Virtual Natural History Museum’: the death of the very last 
tree represents the absence of non-human organic life in 
Maitu, which can only be accessed and remembered virtually 
and hence merely as an optical illusion and a bygone reality. 
This is at least what the museum keeps signifying: organic 
life cannot exist beyond the glassy walls of Maitu anymore 
and Maitu is hence the last refuge for human life but at the 
expense of reducing ‘being human’ to survival only.
This survival is, however, more about the illusion of being 
human than living. Various shots throughout the film feature 
human bodies at work, following orders. As is the case with 
dreams, emotions are generally suppressed, as are human 
interaction and communication. Intra-human communication 
being reduced to mimicry and watching each other, verbal 
communication takes place only in the realm of the digital and 
the virtual: the words that are heard belong to a voice-over 
that seems to merely translate the digitised communication 
in which the human body’s only communicative movement is 
that of typing. Thus verbal communication between human 
and technology is dominated by the latter’s medium and 
governed by its language only.
The next sequence shows Asha holding a box ‘with no delivery 
note’ (4:29); it has been addressed to her but in the place of a 
returning address it shows geographical coordinates. As soon 
as Asha begins to curiously examine the box, which contains 
a jar, she is asked by a virtual woman on a screen, named 
Denti: ‘Status report?’ (4:19). Assuming that the box was sent 
by Denti, Asha reports that she will examine it; however, 
Denti denies being the sender and instructs Asha to report 
it to the security board (4:30 – 4:35). Rather than obeying her 
instructions, Asha starts the analysis and finds out that the soil 
in the jar (as diagnosed by a computer’s voice) has ‘abnormally 
high water content’ and ‘no radioactivity’ (5:05 – 5:20). 
An understanding dawns on her that she will later put as: ‘[T]
he soil is alive.’ (8:04) This is momentous news indeed, since it 
contradicts Maitu’s ‘our truth’ that animate life is impossible 
outside its container-world, thus making organic living within 
Maitu the sole ‘option’ for human survival. Yet the reliability of 
this truth is now being questioned by Asha. In terms of age, she 
is too young to have ever known anything other than the post-
WWIII Maitu. Yet, being the keeper of a virtual history of natural 
life, she is at home in the (hi)story of organic life and its death. 
This memory might be a crucial component to making her 
dream come true and envisioning alternate truths and futureS. 
Upon touching and smelling this new soil for the very first 
time in her life, Asha falls back into her recurring dream 
(5:21 – 6:06) – a dream that was suppressed, yet did not stop in 
the wake of the museum’s memories. This time, however, the 
dream is not as gentle as in the previous one. Asha, once again 
wearing her green and white dress, falls into deep water, 
watching drowned roots of a tree while struggling to breathe. 
While she was smiling, indeed laughing in the first dream, now 
she seems to be horrified by the lack of oxygen. Nevertheless, 
this existential fear turns right into hope when Asha sees a tree 
bathed in sunlight, metaphorically referencing photosynthesis 
as the guarantee of human survival. A flashlight that might 
symbolise the aha-moment wakes her up in the double sense 
of the word: she stops fainting / dreaming, ready to cultivate 
her dream / agency in the soil. 
The agencies of memory*dreams, soil and a seed prompt 
the protagonist Asha to insist on the possibility of alternate 
futureS (cf. Assa 2017), releasing a latent autonomy in Asha 
that makes her decide, somewhat hesitantly, to pursue 
the memory’s dream-agency rather than taking a ‘dream 
suppressant’. In doing so, she conceives a human*tree: she 
sows the dormant Mantis seed (that was seen stored in a glass 
jar in very early shots of the film), reunifying it with the soil 
and using her (body’s) water, as partly recycled from her urine 
and sweat, to nourish it. The seed as a symbol of reproduction 
and potential futureS, takes its chance and agency, beginning 
to grow with rather supernatural rapidity. Insofar as Asha’s 
name translates as ‘breath’ in Kiswahili and as ‘hope’ in Hindi, 
aptonymically we are facing a breath of hope: the hope that 
human beings can breathe oxygen as recycled from the 
carbon emanated by trees. ‘I am tasting its growth potential 
[...] This could mean… there is life on the outside’ (6:55 – 7:05), 
says Asha. And while her words addressed to Denti still 
sound computer-animated, the growth potential of both the 
soil and her hope is featured by the background music that 
switches from electronic futurity to epic emotions and thus, 
iconographically, from technology to humanity.
This hope, however, is thwarted by Denti’s ‘That is impossible’ 
(7:06) and the consequent emergence of Maitu’s body of 
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governance, as represented by three Black women, on Asha’s 
screen. They insist that ‘[t]he outside is dead’ (7:53). Thus, 
rather than sharing Asha’s hope that ‘the soil is alive’ (7:54), 
the council asks Asha to take her pills, denies her request for 
an exit visa and insists on the nullity of her findings: ‘You are 
not qualified to determine that. Forward your work to science 
lab’ (7:56 – 8:02). Thus while the council privileges Maitu’s ‘our 
truth’ and those who confirm its technology-backed scientific 
evidence, Asha insists on the veracity of her own knowledge, 
revealed by the soil and the seed to her as the keeper of 
memory and the dreamer of alternate futures: ‘But I know it 
is alive. It has to be. Look!’ (8:04 – 8:24). Asha scans her dream 
onto the screen and the council woman on the left seems to 
be tempted to reach for this dream, while the one on the right 
keeps closing her eyes. Yet the woman in the centre, standing 
a step ahead of the other two (and thus seemingly in the most 
powerful position) denies inspection by the others, ordering 
Asha again to take her dream suppressants and subsequently 
cancelling the communication. Denti reappears, only to 
withdraw her fragile solidarity completely (if there were any), 
rebuking Asha for having been compromised by her ‘ailment’ 
since she stopped taking her medication: ‘I can’t help you any 
more’ (8:43 – 8:55). This ‘any more’ might again suggest that 
she did help her earlier and might even have been the one who 
sent Asha the soil in the first place, although now failing to be 
resistant enough to pursue the agency of dreaming towards 
alternate futureS.
Asha, in contrast, stops following orders; she grabs a 
compass, eager to map her route to the coordinates written 
on the box. Not long afterwards, three guardsmen barge in 
to destroy the museum and drag Asha out, transferring her 
to the hall of physical labourers, condemning her to toil 
alongside the same people we saw her passing by before – 
which might even suggest that some of them too might have 
been dissident ex-dreamers.
Obviously, the council of Maitu is afraid of Asha as 
empowered by the agency of the seed in the soil and her 
memory-driven dream, which are apparently stronger than that 
of the dream-suppressant pills. Therefore, the council decides 
to separate Asha from her memories (and their dreams) and 
the seed*soil: Yet why does the council feel endangered by 
this very alliance of the in*animate? Is the council representing 
human or organic interests at all? Or only those of technology? 
After all, who would be afraid of memories and dreams (of 
organic life outside of Maitu) – and why? Who gives the orders 
as represented by the computer voice and the council? Who 
would lose most when organic life is reborn of cross*species 
solidarity? Well, humans would not be harmed by the 
resurfacing of (dreams about) organic life at all, would they? 
Strictly speaking, technology would not be endangered either. 
Yet within Maitu, technology that seems to be the only one 
speaking and giving orders would lose control and power. So, 
in a nutshell, if technology is seemingly in control of Maitu 
and afraid of alternate (organic) futureS, are we not facing 
a techno-dictatorship in need of human labour to survive? 
Knowing that human labour can only be controlled if subjected 
to the illusion that the outside world is dead and that security 
and survival are only guaranteed within Maitu’s technologised 
habitat, eventually such a techno-dictatorship would be 
eager to suppress dreams and agencies for alternate futureS. 
According to this logic, the existence of the Mantis seed and its 
potential growing in the soil and thus Asha’s memory-woven 
dreams are a significant menace to the techno-dictatorship, 
which (in their logic) needs to be eliminated. Therefore, the 
council needs to expel Asha from the museum to disconnect 
her from her memory, triggered by her dreams, as well as from 
the seed sown in the soil, as it cannot blossom without Asha’s 
water and her dream-agency of finding a soil able to secure 
the seed’s survival and its futureS as a forest.
Thus the security that is apparently granted by Maitu is 
eventually dedicated to the established order of the techno-
dictatorship only. Humans, in contrast, turn out to be exploited 
by it and eventually given hardly more than an illusion of some 
safety. Human obedience as needed by the techno-dictatorship 
is gained by complementing this illusion with the fear of death 
mixed with a mirage of freedom. In due correspondence, its 
walls of glass reinforce Maitu’s illusion-based governance 
and its void promises of freedom and planetary belonging. 
Therefore, true organic living (beyond mere survival) and 
freedom and safety (beyond being imprisoned and exploited) 
can only be gained beyond the (b)orders and alleged security of 
Maitu’s ‘our truth’ – and it is found in ‘Pumzi’, in a trans*species 
solidarity beyond its glassy gates.
About to give up the very agency to reach out beyond Maitu, 
Asha’s earlier sharing of water with the white cleaning woman 
now returns to her as solidary agency. While Asha is dragged 
out of her memory, she insists on hoping and seemingly takes 
the seed with her, yet fails to secure the compass – which has, 
however, been pilfered by the cleaning woman. Telling her 
so by mere passing by, the dream and possibility of escaping 
towards futureS resurfaces in Asha: she flees to the outside 
with the fecundated soil, eager to plant the seed of her 
memory-woven dream*tree.
After a long bewildered march in a seemingly endless desert, 
Asha has (the aspired) hallucination of seeing a green tree. It 
is here that Asha plants the seed, nourishing it with the little 
drops of water left to her – and her body. The camera zooming 
out, her death is portrayed as the beginning of futureS of a 
cross*species recreation of organic life. The blossoming seed 
turns into a fragile human*plant that becomes a human*tree 
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surrounded by the desert. The camera then pans out into an 
aerial shot depicting the fast-paced growth of the human*tree 
while a neighbouring rainforest seeps into the picture, turning 
desert-yellow into leaf-green, the whole uninterrupted 
sequence framed by letters spelling PUMZI.
Thus, ultimately, by donating her body across species 
and metamorphosing into a human*tree, Asha and other 
in*animate actors create futureS for planet earth that 
overcome the culture-nature divide and position humans in 
mutual entanglements (in terms of genes and conviviality) 
with other variants of organic life. In doing so, futureS here 
does not concern time and duration but becoming (true) 
at all – or remaining a truth, so to speak. After all, Asha will 
have arrived in a futurE that is synonymous with our present: 
a fragile and endangered environment. Asha’s death as the 
beginning of futureS of a re-greened earth, able to provide 
water to organic life, is, ultimately, nothing but the state-of-
the-art manifestation of this planet’s situation – bluegreen, 
alive and endangered. Thus Pumzi intervenes into the present 
on behalf of futureS that need to be un / made before they 
can eventually happen: futureS that have to overcome the 
destruction of the planet, its water resources and all its 
in*organic entities by humans and their technologies.
Even if we do not know whether Asha’s donation will 
endanger the techno-dictatorship in her world, for one thing, 
Pumzi suggests to our world that cross*species solidarity and 
responsibility beyond any culture-nature divide will generate 
alternate futureS most needed in the very now and for futureS. 
Moreover, dreams are narrated as agents of inspiration, 
imagination and intervention that offer opportunities that are 
beyond neither Asha’s nor our own reach. Thus framed, dreams 
are narrated as the windows for alternate futureS, engaging 
the poetics of imagination in order to transcend reality. Just 
as Asha is a powerful actor because she dreams (virtual) 
memories, dreams are also generally one of the main sources 
of change and resistance against univocality, abused power and 
discrimination. They offer alternative scenarios and hence are 
powerful even when dedicated to unknown phenomena that 
cannot even be predicted yet. Dreams happen to become true, 
even if reached beyond one’s own time by others and even by 
means that have not been envisioned yet (cf. Arndt 2017).
Secondly, Pumzi performs the overcoming of the nature-
culture divide and its impact on conceptualising human beings 
and the times they inhabit. Rather than narrating time linearly 
and as progress, in Pumzi times are all entangled. While the 
film’s overarching slowness puts emphasis on given continuities 
in cycles of power and oppression in a sense of ‘nothing ever 
changes’, the ending happens eventually in an almost light speed 
sequence, thus putting emphasis on change. Yet, ultimately, 
the future thus screened intervenes into the present. 
In doing so, Pumzi narrates futureS as causal, i.e. as caused 
by the present and its past and the memory thereof, as well 
as reliant on cross*species interactions of responsibility 
beyond anthropocentrism and its history of classism, sexism 
and racism: Asha’s expression of solidarity with the cleaning 
woman and the latter’s subsequent reciprocation is just 
one side of the coin here; Asha profits from the agencies 
of dreams, the soil and a seed as well, but pays it forward 
by dedicating her life to organic life to thrive. On the other 
hand, the manifestation of their collective agency in saving 
the planet subverts the speculative tendency of mainstream 
works of fiction and sci-fi narratives that portray the (white) 
man as the only true saviour. In line with the discovery of the 
most ancient remnants of human presence on this planet 
(those of Lucy rather than Christianity’s Eve) a Kenyan woman 
once again becomes the site of an origin narrative in Pumzi – a 
Kenyan film that hosts a Black woman’s body, knowledge and 
memory-woven dreams as the backbone of a human*tree*soil 
agency towards alternate futureS beyond the nature-culture 
divide and its power-driven narrations about difference.
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WritingBetweenWorlds  
as Probing the Future:  
Europe and the Literatures 
of the World
Ottmar Ette
An Unruly World
How can we think and write about a world in which Europe (as 
a place of movement) has always been the vector-like lieu de 
mémoire of a myth? Ever since the young and beautiful Europa 
appeared on a beach of the Mediterranean Sea, Europe 
has also appeared in the light of rapture and temptation, 
displacement and rape, looting, deportation and migration. 
Published in spring of 2009 and reflecting on an epoch of 
worldwide, total unruliness (dérèglement), Amin Maalouf’s Le 
dérèglement du monde pointedly names all the dangers which – 
at the beginning of the 21st century – have led humanity to the 
edge of an abyss. Ever since this novelist and essayist, born in 
Beirut in 1949 and now dividing his time between Paris and the 
Ile d’Yeu, raised the issue, the situation (as we all know) has 
become more intense, drawing us to the close of the current 
phase of accelerated globalization. It is quite obvious that 
Maalouf’s argument implies a worldwide scale:
Nous sommes entrés dans le nouveau siècle 
sans boussole. Dès les tout premiers mois, des 
événements inquiétants se produisent, qui donnent 
à penser que le monde connaît un dérèglement 
majeur, et dans plusieurs domaines à la fois – 
dérèglement intellectuel, dérèglement financier, 
dérèglement climatique, dérèglement géopolitique, 
dérèglement éthique. (Maalouf 2009: 11)
Obviously, we need not dwell on additional dimensions 
of this fundamental and worldwide dérèglement, such 
as a dérèglement migratoire or the unruliness of political 
discourse. We are more disturbed and more restless than ever, 
trying to readjust the Boussole which also appeared as central 
metaphor in the title of Matthias Enard’s 2015, Prix Goncourt-
winning novel. Whoever was expecting Maalouf’s carefully 
constructed opening lines to his essay to continue as a deeply 
pessimistic perspective on the planet and our world-society 
might find himself pleasantly disappointed: This Lebanese-
born representative of a WritingBetweenWorlds (Ette 
2016b) is prone neither to pessimism nor to nostalgia and is 
certainly quite immune against a sclerotic romantic agony or 
Weltschmerz. As if he were implicitly responding to Samuel P. 
Huntington’s talk of a Clash of Civilizations, published in 1996, 
our author aims to provide points of reference for conviviality, 
a new bearing for the planetary ship of fools to follow.
Writing in French (and therefore beyond his mother 
tongue), this writer and essayist is probing for a differentiated 
panorama of the long-lasting process of globalization, whose 
cultural dimensions have traditionally been underestimated. 
Debates on economic policy and the billions required to 
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remedy a persistent financial crisis, political tensions within 
Europe due to the so-called migrant crisis and Brexit have done 
nothing to remedy this blind spot. However, it has been and 
still remains a grave mistake not to pay sufficient attention 
to, or even completely ignore, the cultural, intercultural and 
transcultural implications of globalization. As we have seen 
in recent years, the consequences of this oversight can be 
catastrophic. Thus, Amin Maalouf’s message is a clear one: It 
is the cultural dimension of human life that will determine our 
fate in the future.
Monologic responses are no longer sufficient. Instead, 
we need fundamentally polylogical solutions that allow for 
a shared life in peace and difference. Obviously and on a 
planetary scale, conviviality (Ette 2010) will be the central 
challenge for the 21st century: Conviviality will be the 
challenge and lemma of our times. The essay is preceded 
by a well-chosen motto by William Carlos Williams, which 
refers to the vital importance of human survival knowledge 
(ÜberLebenswissen): ‘Man has survived hitherto / because he 
was too ignorant to know / how to realize his wishes. / Now 
that he can realize them, / he must either change them / or 
perish.’ Our survival is at stake.
Following Amin Maalouf, it is of the utmost importance 
that we no longer view the respective ‘other’ through the 
lens of heterostereotypes, such as the ones suggested to 
us by ideological, religious or mass-cultural constructions. 
We must resist unilateral constructions of the other which 
have also reappeared in so-called intercultural dialogue. 
What is more: Ways of thinking beyond alterity have become 
vitally important. We must aim to view the infinite forms of 
cultural difference and differentiation with a fresh glance – 
through the eyes of many others (and not simply the other) – 
simultaneously thus from a multitude of perspectives. When 
it comes to achieving this, the author of Léon L’Africain 
emphasizes that nothing can replace literature:
L’intimité d’un peuple, c’est sa littérature. C’est 
là qu’il dévoile ses passions, ses aspirations, ses 
rêves, ses frustrations, ses croyances, sa vision du 
monde qui l’entoure, sa perception de lui-même et 
des autres, y compris de nous-mêmes. Parce que 
en parlant des «autres» il ne faut jamais perdre de 
vue que nous-mêmes, qui que nous soyons, où que 
nous soyons, nous sommes aussi «les autres» pour 
tous les autres. (Maalouf 2009: 206)
Literature is the best counter-venom against all forms of mass-
cultural or propagandistic simplification or schematization. 
Literature speaks to us from a wide range of languages, 
cultures and communities. Beyond the homogenizing and 
outmoded concept of ‘world literature’, literatures of 
the world grant us access to highly diverse cultural and 
transcultural configurations, which – in turn – allow us to think 
and act in polylogical life-situations, or at least facilitate such 
practice. Literatures of the world are not only polylogical lieux 
de mémoire, but seismographs for future events: Writing in 
different languages, Georg Forster, Alexander von Humboldt 
and Adalbert von Chamisso were already aware of this.
Today, following those phases of accelerated globalization 
which ranged from the late 15th to the mid-16th, from the mid-
18th to the early 19th and finally from the 1980s to our days 
in the 21st century (Ette 2016a), literatures of the world are 
the privileged space for experimentation with and – more 
importantly – experience of cultural complexity. As potential 
schools of thought, literatures of the world may teach us 
complexity, polylogical thinking and open-endedness. Due 
to the fact that literatures of the world do not spring from 
a single source, but from multiple sources, not from a single 
but from many origins, cutting across and surviving a great 
number of spaces and times, languages and cultures, political 
and economic systems, their structural characteristics are 
polylogical and open-ended, making them the true (and 
historically legitimized) laboratories for a transareal and 
transcultural future.1 Despite continuing and constantly 
shifting asymmetries, they are not dominated by a single 
spatial and temporal logic, a single model of understanding or 
even a single language and culture.
Not so much concerned with roots as with routes, relying on 
numerous languages and ever since the beginning of the first 
phase of globalization, this kind of literature is represented by 
great authors such as Leo Africanus or Garcilaso de la Vega el Inca, 
while in the 18th century we might think of Anton Wilhelm Amo 
(who was brought to Germany as a slave and won an international 
reputation as a ‘black philosopher’). These are literary modes 
of expression and experience which have little interest for the 
sediment-like strata of history. Instead, they search for vectors 
and oriented movement: The only thing foreign to them is stasis.
Literatures Without a Fixed Abode
The question whether or not literature offers some specific 
type of knowledge has long since become a focus of current 
debates. For instance, it is becoming clear that the humanities 
and cultural studies are moving beyond the once dominant 
theme of cultural memory and refocusing on knowledge. 
By raising the issue of knowledge in literature, we are also 
addressing the question of the social, political and cultural 
relevance of this knowledge within distinct societies of 
knowledge and information in the 21st century.
1  I develop this perspective on 
literatures of the world in Ette, 
Ottmar (2017): WeltFraktale. 
Wege durch die Literaturen der 
Welt, Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.
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In the past quarter of a century, a perspective oriented 
towards the past has produced important results while also 
suppressing the prospective elements contained in texts such 
as The Epic of Gilgamesh, Shi Jing or the stories of One Thousand 
and One Nights. However, literatures of the world not only 
function in terms of cultural memory or attempts at locating 
the present. Instead, they unfold a prospective thrust, looking 
towards possible realizations of the future. Literatures of the 
world express a type of life-knowledge which interacts with the 
past and present, pointing to life-forms and life-norms of the 
future. What does literature want and what is it capable of? How 
can we better understand literature’s specific, vector-like logic 
as lieu de mémoire through a poetics of movement?
Speaking for literary and cultural studies, the time has 
come to view Europe as a space of intersecting movements 
of migration. Thus we may continue the project of a poetics 
of movement which conceptualizes literature in motion 
and as motion, thus emphasizing a WritingBetweenWorlds. 
Though rooted in a long history, the latter will continue to 
gain momentum in our century. Many Nobel Prize winners 
mentioned below, but also Salman Rushdie, Jorge Semprún, 
Norman Manea, Elias Khoury, Emine Sevgi Özdamar, José F.A. 
Oliver and Yoko Tawada are good examples. The literatures 
of the world will increasingly be literatures without a fixed 
abode. European literatures of the future will be part of 
these developments, including a drive towards translingual 
writing – the current flows of refugees should make this 
sufficiently clear. The future will not be dominated by an ever 
more homogeneous world literature. Instead, the polylogical 
unfolding of literatures of the world will mark a present 
and future beyond national literatures (which will obviously 
survive as well). As something that has grown historically, the 
epoch of world literature has itself become a part of history: 
It is a Eurocentric thing of the past.
Today, we are aware of the fact that the temporal foundations 
of our thinking and understanding of reality lost much of 
their importance during postmodernity, as historical and 
chronological foundations did during European modernity – 
without fading away completely, obviously. At the same time, 
spatially organized concepts and modes of thinking have 
become more important, as have spatial modes of perception 
and experience. Beginning in the second half of the 1980s, at the 
latest, new spatial concepts stopped emphasizing territoriality 
and refocused on mobility. Literatures without a fixed abode 
were an essential factor in this process, with Nobel Prize winners 
such as Mario Vargas Llosa, Herta Müller, Gao Xingjian and V.S. 
Naipaul. The debates of the 80s and 90s – up to the present day – 
did not remain confined to cyberspace, but expressed spatial 
projections, mappings and remappings of the postcolonial and 
the clash of cultures. Even Samuel P. Huntington’s ideological 
Clash of Civilizations or Niall Ferguson’s Civilization: The West 
and the Rest could still be viewed as elements of a geoculturally 
or geostrategically tainted spatial turn. Literatures without a 
fixed abode, however, show us how to exit the topographical 
mappings of (disturbing) otherness.
Beyond Otherness
We must step out of or maybe even say goodbye to a 
thinking based on otherness, which provided the foundation, 
epistemology and methodology for entire philosophical 
traditions in the 20th century, such as French philosophy, 
as Vincent Descombes correctly pointed out. A poetics of 
movement, which has become an urgent necessity, should 
no longer hypnotically stare at the opposition of the familiar 
and the foreign, the self and the other. Instead, taking those 
attempts at conceptualizing this difference as a difference of 
self and other within us (as in the thinking of Julia Kristeva and 
Tzvetan Todorov) to new heights, a poetics of movement would 
embrace a cosmopolitan vision, interested in fundamentally 
complex relationships and – as literatures of the world would 
show – polylogical modes of thinking.
Thus, we must replace the still dominating, seemingly 
natural history of space with a history of movement in which 
pre-existing mappings are conceptualized in terms of vectors 
and dynamic, mobile space-time. Saint-John Perse, Samuel 
Beckett, Albert Cohen and Elias Canetti were the pioneers 
of these multilingual, polylogical maps of movement for a 
Europe of the future. Literatures of the world help us imagine 
this kind of shift, due to their ability to represent vector-like 
patterns of writing and the imagination. Literatures without 
a fixed abode are the most intense, sensual and aesthetic 
manifestations of this tendency.
As lieux de mémoire, the literatures of the world are markings 
on maps of movement. We cannot conceive of Europe – as its 
mythic origins show – without the space outside Europe and 
constant flows of migration. The Europe of the past, the present 
and the future – in movement and as movement – is a perfect 
demonstration of how necessary multilingual and polylogical 
thinking is – but also of the dangers which arise from the 
constant urge to turn one’s back on the future and get immersed 
in memoria. It is in today’s world – and this is what the concept 
of vectorization is all about – that older movements become 
recognizable again: As movements, they are present and 
readable within the stable structures and mobile structuring of 
spaces – just as migratory movements are traces of pathways. In 
a WritingBetweenWorlds, we are able to identify these traces.
Since the last quarter of the 20th century, literatures without 
a fixed abode have unfolded drastically, usually implying 
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translingual and transcultural forms of writing, linked to 
migration. This means that, in more radical and permanent 
ways than ever before, all elements and aspects of literary 
production have been set into motion. There is much to 
be learned from this. We are witnessing a generalized 
vectorization of all (spatial) relations. WritingBetweenWorlds 
develops new concepts, allowing for new ways of 
understanding: this also – and especially – applies to lieux de 
mémoire. As laboratories for multiple logics, literatures of the 
world have traversed the centuries, cultures and languages on 
offset and decentred paths, accumulating a knowledge about 
life within life. This knowledge can help us bridge an abyss 
which – as a representative of a literature without a fixed 
abode was obviously keen to point out – is getting deeper and 
more menacing. Cautioning us while programmatically stating 
it at the same time, Amin Maalouf writes in his essay:
Ce qui est en cause, c’est le fossé qui se creuse 
entre notre rapide évolution matérielle, qui 
chaque jour nous désenclave davantage, et 
notre trop lente évolution morale, qui ne nous 
permet pas de faire face aux conséquences 
tragiques du désenclavement. Bien entendu, 
l’évolution matérielle ne peut ni ne doit être 
ralentie. C’est notre évolution morale qui doit 
s’accélérer considérablement, c’est elle qui doit 
s’élever, d’urgence, au niveau de notre évolution 
technologique, ce qui exige une véritable révolution 
dans les comportements. (Maalouf 2009: 81)
The WritingBetweenWorlds of the present shows us the 
pathways towards successful conviviality. Here, and resisting 
the signs of our times, different points of origin also probe and 
even engender new futures.and even engender new futures.
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